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BRITISH MEDIATION IN
THE DANISH-GERMAN CONFLICT
1848-1850

PART ONE

From the March Revolution to the
November Government

BY

HOLGER HJELHOLT



København 1965

Kommissionær: Ejnar Munksgaard

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KNUD FABRICIUS

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Preface.

The work the first part of which is presented here, is intended to cover the same period as my work *Sønderjylland under Treårskrigen* (Slesvig during the Three Years' War) I–II (1959–61). Thus it starts with the outbreak of the Slesvig-Holstein revolution March 18–24, 1848, and I hope to carry the account down to the peace between Denmark and Prussia on July 2nd, 1850.

The limitation of the subject is indicated by the title. The account, therefore, as regards records, is first of all based on the archives of the Foreign Office in the Public Record Office in London. I offer my best thanks for facilities to the officials of the Record Office during my studies there – the first time in 1950, many times later –.

By kind permission of Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Mountbatten of Burma I had in 1963 an opportunity to examine part of Lord Palmerston's private archives, which at that time were being registered in the National Register of Archives, Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London. For all the assistance and kindness which during my work there I met with on the part of the Registrar, Miss W. D. COATES, and her collaborators I offer my cordial thanks. – Furthermore, I have to acknowledge the gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen to make use of material from the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, where I – also in 1963 – examined the material from the years 1848–50 found there which seemed to me to be of importance for my subject. I am much obliged to the Librarian, Mr. R. MACKWORTH-YOUNG, and to Miss PRICE-HILL and her collaborators for valuable assistance.

A supplement to the official material of the English Foreign Office is found in the British Minister in Berlin, Lord Westmorland's collection of "Correspondence on the Affairs of Denmark and Schleswig Holstein relating to the Treaty of Peace, signed by Lord Westmorland" (i. e. on July 2nd, 1850). In 1952 this collection was acquired by the Danish Rigsarkiv (Public Record Office).

When the Rigsarkiv in 1962–63 acquired microfilms of some records of interest to Danish history found in the Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Abteilung Merseburg, East Germany, it did me the favour of including the correspondence of the Prussian Minister in London, Chevalier Chr. Carl Josias v. Bunsen, with Berlin during the years 1848–50, for which I offer my best thanks. Furthermore, I am obliged to the Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Frankfurt a. M., for kindly lending various records to the Danish Rigsarkiv for my use there.

During a stay in Paris and Brussels in the spring of 1964 I examined the dispatches from the ministers in London of the countries concerned, but have in the present volume seen fit to quote a few dispatches only. However, I offer my best thanks for facilities in the respective archives.

In few places I have had reason to utilize the archives of the provisional government (in the Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbibliothek in Kiel), of which I made ample use in my work on Slesvig during the Three Years' War. – It is a matter of course that I have extensively used the materials in the Rigsarkiv which are related to my subject, especially the correspondence between the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and our Minister in London. I have also examined the copies of the reports, etc., by Ungern-Sternberg, the Russian Minister in Copenhagen, which are kept in the Rigsarkiv, but I have endeavoured to limit the mention of the Attitude of Russia – as well as of Sweden-Norway – to what seems reasonable as regards my subject.

As indicated above, the collection of material has covered a good number of years. I offer the Directors of the Carlsberg Foundation my cordial thanks for their grants towards studies and travels.

Furthermore, I am highly indebted to the Rask-Ørsted Foundation for a grant towards the translation of the work, which has been made by Mr. NIELS HAISSLUND, M.A., to whom I also offer my best thanks.

My son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel NILS BERG has kindly read through the whole manuscript and has read a proof.

An Index will be printed at the end of Vol. II.

HOLGER HJELHOLT

Abbreviations Concerning Literature.

- Actenstücke = Actenstücke zur Schleswig-Holsteinischen Frage. Waffenstillstand von Malmoe vom 26. August 1848. Gedruckt für die Mitglieder der deutschen Nationalversammlung. 1848. Frankfurt a. M.
- Aktenstücke zur n. S.-H. Geschichte = Actenstücke zur neuesten Schleswig-Holsteinischen Geschichte. Zweites und drittes Heft (Leipzig 1852).
- Brevskaber = Brevskaber om de slesvigske Forhold (Printed for private circulation). København 1848.
- Bunsen. II and III = Christian Carl Josias Freiherr von Bunsen. Aus seinen Briefen und nach eigener Erinnerung geschildert von seiner Witwe. Deutsche Ausgabe, durch neue Mittheilungen vermehrt von Fr. Nippold. II (Leipzig 1869). III (1871).
- Bunsen: Memoir = Memoir on The Constitutional Rights of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, presented to Viscount Palmerston . . . London 1848.
- Haralds = Hjalmar Haralds: Sveriges Utrikespolitik 1848. Ett bidrag till belysning af danska frågans första skede. Uppsala 1912.
- H.T. = (Danish) Historisk Tidsskrift.
- Hjelholt. I = Holger Hjelholt: Sønderjylland under Treårskrigen I (1959).
- Knuth = Udenrigsministeren Grev Knuths Fremstilling af Danmarks Underhandling 1848 indtil Vaabenstilstanden i Malmø. Meddelt af C. Paludan-Müller (in Historisk Tidsskrift 4. rk. V, 1875-77, pp. 460-509).
- Krigen 1848-50 = Den dansk-tyske Krig i Aarene 1848-50. Udgivet af Generalstaben. (1867 ff.).
- Löfgren = Erik O. Löfgren: Sverige-Norge och Danska Frågan 1848-49. Från Stilleståndet i Malmö till den svensk-danska konventionen augusti 1849. Uppsala 1921.
- Olsen = Albert Olsen: Danmark og den engelske Mægling 1848 (in Hist. Tidsskr. 11. rk. II, pp. 215-267).
- Schleiden = Rudolf Schleiden: Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners. Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung 1848-1849. Wiesbaden 1891.
- Statsrådets Forhandl. I = Statsrådets Forhandlinger 1848-1863. Udgivet ved Harald Jørgensen. I. (1954).
- Stockmar = Denkwürdigkeiten aus den Papieren des Freiherrn Christian Friedrich v. Stockmar. Zusammengestellt von Ernst Freiherr v. Stockmar. (Braunschweig 1872).
- Thorsøe = Alex. Thorsøe: Kong Frederik den syvendes Regering. I (1884).

Abbreviations Concerning Records.

In order somewhat to limit the number of notes and the volume of these, I have as a rule refrained from quoting the sources of dispatches to and from Bunsen and to and from Reventlow, when the dates of the references appear from the text. Bunsen's correspondence is in the Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Abteilung Merseburg (East Germany), and, as mentioned in the Preface, it has been possible for me to use the microfilms of the correspondence acquired by the Rigsarkiv. Reventlow's correspondence is in the usual files in the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the Rigsarkiv. — The dispatches quoted from the Belgian Minister, Van de Weyer, in London, are in the Archives des affaires étrangères in Brussels.

F.O. = The records of the Foreign Office in the Public Record Office, London.

U. Min. = Udenrigsministeriets arkiv i Rigsarkivet (i. e. The Archives of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Danish Public Record Office).

EE. 1 (etc.) = Herzoglich Schleswig-Holsteinisches Hausarchiv. Abteilung III.

Litr. EE. No. 1 (etc.) in the Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbibliothek. Kiel.
Frankf. a. M. BT. I/409 = Bundesarchiv. Frankfurt a. M. BT. I/409. Acta der Bundes-Registatur. Fasc. Reg. Litr. S. Schleswig-Holstein.

P. P. = Palmerston's Papers (cf. my Preface).

R. A. W. = Royal Archives, Windsor.

Westmorland = Correspondence of the Affairs of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein relating to the Treaty of Peace, signed by Lord Westmorland. U. Min. England: Documents concerning Danish-German relations, belonging to the official archives of the Earl of Westmorland (d. 1859). 1848–51 (52). 6 vols.

1. The Danish Monarchy.

In 1848 the Danish Monarchy was constituted by the Kingdom of Denmark proper, which consisted of the Islands and North Jutland, as well as the Duchies of Slesvig (or South Jutland), Holstein, and Lauenburg. Furthermore the Faroes, Iceland, Greenland, and the Tropical Colonies. According to the census of 1845 the Kingdom had a population of well over 1,350,000 people, in Slesvig just under 363,000, in Holstein about 480,000, and in Lauenburg about 46,500. If the population figures of the Duchies are added up, it is seen that the population of the Kingdom was in excess of these by about half a million.

An unkind fate had brought about heavy losses of territory to the Monarchy. As established by the German historian Heinrich v. Treitschke, the star of Denmark was waning in the seventeenth century.¹ At the conclusions of peace 1658–60 Denmark had to cede the old Danish provinces east of the Sound, Skåne, Halland, and Blekinge, to Sweden. Later Danish attempts at recapturing them were in vain. During the Napoleonic wars Denmark because of England's bombardment on Copenhagen in 1807 and her seizure of the Danish fleet was driven into the war on Napoleon's side.² The consequence was that Denmark in 1814 was forced to cede Norway to Sweden, where the French Marshal Bernadotte was elected Crown Prince, but the country had joined the alliance against Napoleon. As a kind of compensation for Norway Denmark received Swedish Pomerania and Rügen, which territories, however, according to agreements at the Congress of Vienna fell to Prussia, while Denmark in exchange received the greater part of the Saxon duchy of Lauenburg.³ As appears, an unkind fate had highly decreased the Nordic element in the Monarchy and increased the German one. The German popul-

¹ H. Hjelholt, *Treitschke und Schleswig-Holstein* (Berlin 1929), p. 234.

² Erik Møller, *England og Danmark-Norge 1807*, (H.T. 8. r. III, p. 309 ff.).

³ Georg Nørregård, *Efterkrigsår i dansk udenrigspolitik 1815–24* (København 1960), p. 110 ff.

ation of Lauenburg had been added to that of Holstein. But how were the national conditions of the population of Slesvig?

That the population of North Slesvig in town and in the country was and is Danish, however, is now undoubtedly considered a fact accepted by German and "Schleswig-Holstein" historians. After 1920 North Slesvig has indeed become part of the Kingdom proper, and the so-called "Home Germans", i. e. Germanized Danes, who mainly speak Danish, at the general election in November 1960 obtained 9,058 votes out of the 110,736 votes cast in the area (8.1 per cent.) (Stat. medd. 1961). But like the population of North Slesvig that of South Slesvig was of Danish descent. I here disregard the Frisian immigration to the North Sea islands and the west coast of Slesvig. Politically and administratively Slesvig (Southern Jutland) from the dawn of history was part of the Danish realm in quite the same way as Zealand, Skåne, or Northern Jutland. In a curious phrase a Slesvig-Holstein historian states that the history of the later Duchy of Slesvig originally belongs in "the circumference of Danish history".¹ On the other hand, it is correct that Slesvig at an early stage obtained a special position as a Danish duchy, and that its development in many ways – politically and nationally – was complicated and influenced by relations to the German County (later Duchy) of Holstein.

The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston's statement as to the complicated character of the Slesvig-Holstein question has often been quoted: "only three men in England had ever understood the Schleswig-Holstein question: The Prince Consort, who was dead (1861), Mellish (a clerk in the Foreign Office), who was mad, and himself, who had forgotten it."² In spite of this despondent statement we shall try roughly to sketch the legal and administrative interrelations of the Kingdom, Slesvig, and Holstein during the period after the Congress of Vienna and before the revolutions in 1848. The special conditions of Lauenburg may in this connexion be left out of consideration.

When after the Napoleonic Wars the German Confederation was founded as a successor of the Holy Germano-Roman Empire,

¹ A. Scharff, *Schleswig-Holsteinische Geschichte* (Würzburg, 1960), p. 15.

² Algernon Cecil, *Queen Victoria and Her Prime Ministers* (London, 1953), p. 182.

which had been dissolved in 1806, Denmark became a member of it as regards Holstein (and Lauenburg). Slesvig, as had always been the case, remained outside Germany as a Danish duchy. For long periods, however, it had been divided between the royal line and the ducal family of Gottorp. Only during the Great Northern War, the Danish King had succeeded in acquiring the Gottorp part of Slesvig: "At anden halve Part – Af Schleswig Danmarks blev – Den fjerde Friderich – Med Fliid igiennem drev" (i. e. That the other part of Slesvig became Denmark's, Frederick IV energetically carried through).

In 1720 Britain as well as France issued acts that guaranteed Denmark's peaceful possession of Slesvig for ever and against any aggressor.¹ In order to obtain this guarantee from Britain, who from 1714 had her sovereign in common with Hanover, Denmark had to Hanover ceded the diocese of Bremen, which had been captured from Sweden. In 1721 Frederick IV incorporated the Gottorp part of Slesvig under the Danish Crown, and received the oath of fealty to himself and his successors "according to the wording of the Danish Royal Constitution" (*secundum tenorem Legis Regiæ*) from the Estates of Slesvig.² The Royal Constitution (of 1665) had, as regards the Kingdom, introduced female succession, which thus also became valid in Slesvig.³ Assertions by Slesvig-Holstein historians that there is something ambiguous and obscure in the expressions of the oath of fealty and the patent, is nonsense.⁴ The reason why English historians accept these assertions, is presumably in part ignorance of Danish historiography.⁵ On the other hand, it is correct that Holstein had a male succession.

Frederick IV had intended to incorporate Slesvig not only constitutionally, but administratively as well, in the Kingdom. The scheme was not implemented, and Slesvig kept the close connexion in administration and institutions with Holstein which had developed through centuries. All the three parts of the Mo-

¹ Grimur Thomsen, Om de fransk-engelske garantier for Slesvig af 1720 (in *Anti-slesvigholstenske Fragmenter* 3. hefte 1848).

² H. Hjelholt, Inkorporationen af Den Gottorpske Del af Sønderjylland i Kronen 1721 (København, 1945).

³ Cf. H. Hjelholt, Om enevældens gyldighed i hertugdømmet Slesvig (in *Sønderjydske Aarbøger* 1945).

⁴ A. Scharff, *op. cit.* p. 43.

⁵ See, e. g., Frank Eyck, *The Prince Consort* (London 1959), p. 103.

narchy, however, had departments in common as regards financial and military affairs.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century the liberal and national movements arose which came to exert so decisive an influence on the constitutional and social conditions in Europe. In Denmark it was tried to meet the wishes for a liberal constitution by Royal Ordinances in 1831 and 1834 for the introduction of Provincial Consultative Assemblies of the Estates.¹ This was the first step away from the absolute system of government of the Royal Constitution of 1665. As a pattern the Government had the eight Provincial Assemblies established for Prussia in 1823–24. In Denmark four Consultative Assemblies were introduced: for the dioceses of the Islands, for Northern Jutland, for Slesvig, and for Holstein.

The good and peaceful co-operation and life together which during the eighteenth century had prevailed between the various nationalities of the Monarchy, from the thirties and the forties were broken up by the liberal and national currents. During these decades the political Slesvig-Holsteinism developed which so highly gained ground in the upper classes of the two duchies. It set up as its programme three tenets or articles of faith: (1) The Duchies are independent states, (2) The Duchies are firmly allied states, (3) The Duchies are ruled by the male line of descent. In order to uphold these tenets, it was indeed necessary to refuse to see reason, but how often is this not done in politics?

What were the ideological contents of this political programme? First of all it was particularist and separatist. Its purpose was the maintenance of an independent state "Slesvig-Holstein" in contrast to or independent of the Kingdom. There was much in the history of previous centuries to which, with greater or smaller justification, references might be made as a basis. Many old and venerable parchment letters from the Ribe Privilege of 1460 and much later could be quoted. A bad thing was the Incorporation Patent for Slesvig of 1721; but should Slesvig-Holstein historians not be capable of spiring this away? Keine Hexerei, nur Behändigkeit, meine Herren! In the 1840'es there was every prospect that the male line of the Danish royal family should die out

¹ Hans Jensen, *De danske Stænderforsamlingers Historie 1830–1848 I–II* (København, 1931–34).

within a foreseeable future. Then, according to the third article of faith of the Slesvig-Holsteiners, the Duchies would be separated from the Kingdom and their sovereign would be a member of the younger royal line, the ducal family of Augustenborg. This family – and its representative at the time, Duke Christian August – therefore had the greatest personal interest in supporting Slesvig-Holsteinism, as, indeed, the Duke did to the best of his ability. Furthermore, it was to be hoped that he, by using his right of succession to Holstein (and his asserted right to Slesvig) as a battering-ram could also become an heir to the Kingdom – if, in order to preserve the United Monarchy, the female succession could be changed there. Several people had advocated such a way out, among them the Danish diplomat Chr. Bille and the author Peder Hjort.¹

It is difficult to unravel how great a share German national feeling or nationalism had in the Slesvig-Holstein movement, but it was not insignificant. The University of Kiel, which was common to Holstein and Slesvig, obtained many of its teachers from Germany. Future officials in the Duchies were obliged to study at this university at any rate for two years, and many of them furthermore went to the universities of Germany. It could hardly be avoided that there they would become enthusiastic over the same ideals as the German students, would dream of a powerful and united Germany with a free constitution. From a national point of view the population in Holstein was German, and in the course of time a fairly great German immigration had taken place in Slesvig. But this was not all. How incredible this may seem to our time, German had become the official language: in church and school, as a legal and business language in South Slesvig and in part in North Slesvig as well. In North Slesvig, indeed, Danish was prevalent as the language of church and school in the country, but in the towns German was school language and the more fashionable language in the church. Danish legal language had not been ousted by German in the country in North Slesvig until the end of the eighteenth century. – From all this it appears that the Civil Service – and the upper classes attached to it – had a German much more than a Danish outlook.

¹ Axel Heils, Augustenborgske Breve til J. G. Adler og P. Hjort (in *Danske Magazin* 6. r. III), especially p. 135 ff.

Conservatives as well as Liberals could without difference follow the three articles of faith of Slesvig-Holsteinism – and did so. But the Slesvig-Holstein Movement furthermore was strengthened by the liberal and radical ideological currents. What a democracy would it not be possible to carry through in an imagined small ideal state “Schleswig-Holstein”!

The Slesvig-Holstein Movement did not, of course, remain unchallenged. It met with opposition not only from the Kingdom, but from a considerable part of the Slesvig which it considered a given part of the state “Schleswig-Holstein”. A Nationalist German historian like Treitschke might mock the Danish dialect in Southern Jutland as “Rabendänisch” and as being “without vital force”, which would naturally be supplanted by German.¹ But not everything need take a course “natural” to a German. On the contrary the Danish Movement in Northern Slesvig in 1840 succeeded in having Danish introduced as legal and official language, a reform which, indeed, might be considered a matter of course, as the popular idiom and the language of church and school were Danish. On the other hand, the equality of Danish and German in the Slesvig Assembly of the Estates was not maintained. In the Assembly the Danish-minded and loyal deputies constituted a minority as against the Slesvig-Holsteiners. After the elections in 1847 the latter were nearly twice as numerous as the former.

Christian VIII, who was King from December 1839 to January 1848, did not want any member of the House of Augustenborg to ascend the Danish throne. In the letters patent of July 8th, 1846, which were issued after investigations by a commission, it was laid down that the succession according to the Royal Constitution of 1665 was valid for the Kingdom, Slesvig, and Lauenburg. On the other hand, it was recognized that there was doubt as regards “various parts of the Duchy of Holstein.” But, it was furthermore stated, the King would attempt to remove the obstacles which were found there regarding the same succession and work at having brought about “a complete recognition of the integrity of the total Danish state.” In order to calm the Slesvig-Holsteiners it was stated that the King did not intend to encroach on the independence of Slesvig or make any change in its con-

¹ Hjelholt, Treitschke und Schleswig-Holstein, p. 236.

nexions with Holstein up till now. The King intended to protect Slesvig in the possession of the "rights due to this province, which indeed is inseparable from Our Monarchy, but also independent."

In spite of these reassuring statements the letters patent gave rise to violent protests from the Slesvig-Holsteiners and from the National-Liberal circles in Germany, who had identified themselves with their cause. The members of the House of Augustenborg of course protested, and the Holstein Assembly of the Estates lodged a complaint with the Federal Diet in Frankfurt. The Danish Minister to the Confederation, Fr. v. Pechlin on September 7th, 1846, made the following statement to the Diet:¹ The King did not intend to bring Holstein into a different and closer relation to the Kingdom than had so far been the case, nor to sever it from the connexion with Slesvig. But he aimed at maintaining the Danish United Monarchy as a union of self-contained and mutually independent countries; as regards Holstein, however, provided that justifiable claims of succession were not encroached upon. The Federal Diet then on September 17th, with reference to the above-mentioned statement made a decision in which it was stated that the Diet trusted that the King at the final arranging of the conditions of the Monarchy would respect the rights of the Confederation, the male lines entitled to succeed, and the Holstein Estates.

In the spring of 1847 all the eight Provincial Assemblies of the Estates in Prussia had been summoned for a "United Diet", which was given a power to make a decision concerning direct tax and security for Government loans. This Prussian partial compliance with the wishes of the time for a free constitution probably also influenced the development in Denmark. Towards the end of 1847 schemes were drawn up for a liberal constitution of the United Monarchy. King Christian VIII died on January 20th, 1848, before the plans were published. This was done by his successor, Frederick VII, by a proclamation of January 28th. In this it was indicated that the King intended to arrange the public conditions in a way corresponding to the maintenance of the independence of the various provinces as well as of their

¹ Alex. Thorsøe, *Den danske Stats Historie fra 1814-1848* (København 1879), p. 680 ff.

connexion so as to form a "well-ordered whole". Assemblies of the Estates – in equal numbers – common to the Kingdom and the Duchies were to be introduced. They would be given power to make decisions in fiscal legislation and financial matters and legislation concerning affairs common to the Kingdom and the Duchies. In the proclamation it was stated that the four Assemblies of the Estates should continue to exist, and that nothing would be changed in the "present connexion" between Slesvig and Holstein. It was intended first to submit the Government proposal to the consideration of "experienced men", most of these being elected by the Estates.

The proclamation meant a decisive concession to the wishes for a liberal constitution. Still it was met with a criticism bordering on a rebuff in Slesvig-Holstein as well as Danish-national circles. The Slesvig-Holsteiners wanted a Slesvig-Holstein, not a United Monarchy, and the concessions of the proclamation to them: the maintenance of the connexions between Slesvig and Holstein and representation by the two Duchies equal to that by the Kingdom did not satisfy them. On the other hand Danish-national or "Eider-Danish" circles were decided opponents of these two concessions. Considering the population figure they naturally found the equal representation unjust to the Kingdom, and contrarily to wishing for maintenance of the former connexion between the Duchies, they wanted to have it loosened and to have the connexion of Slesvig with the mother country strengthened. The "experienced men", however, never got a chance to make a report. Christian VIII's and his advisers' good intentions were not carried into effect. They were swept away by the revolutionary commotion that in January 1848 started in Southern Italy in order during the months of February and March to spread to great parts of Europe.

2. The Slesvig Holstein Revolution.

1848 is the year of revolutions. It started in Italy in January. There the movement was also directed against the "foreign rule" of Austria in Lombardy and Venice. On the 24th of February a revolution broke out in Paris. Louis Philippe, the Citizen King, was overthrown and a republic was founded. In Austria there was

an outbreak of disturbances on the 13th of March, and Metternich, the head of the old system, resigned. He, like the Citizen King, received asylum in England. In Berlin the rebellion broke out on the 18th of March; bloody combats were fought between the masses and the soldiers. The next day King Frederick William IV consented to a change of Government and was exposed to humiliating incidents. Thus he had to uncover before the civilians who had been killed in the fight and who by the masses were carried on biers into the castle yard. A few days later he rode about the capital decorated with the National-German colours, and made speeches to the effect that now he would place himself at the head of the movement the object of which was a united, powerful, and free Germany. Baron Stockmar, the intimate friend and adviser of the House of Coburg, on the 31st of March wrote to Prince Albert:¹ "Der arme König von Preussen hat total abgewirtschaftet." He always did not act until it was not only too late, but the best thing would have been that he had done nothing at all. If the Germans knew Prince Albert, continued Stockmar, as he himself knew him, they would recall him to Germany "as the most promising son of the Fatherland." The close relationship between Stockmar, Prince Albert, and Bunsen, the Prussian Minister in London, is attested by Stockmar's request in the letter that the Prince should show it to Bunsen (or inform him of its contents) as a reply to a letter from Bunsen to Stockmar.

As early as the beginning of March the national protagonists of the German movement for unity and liberty had summoned members of the various German Assemblies of the Estates to a sitting in Frankfurt a. M. in order to discuss the summoning of a popularly elected parliament. This sitting of the so-called "Pre-Parliament" was opened on the 31st of March. It was decided at the sitting that a "National Assembly" should be elected by universal suffrage in order to debate and work out the future constitution. The Federal Diet and the Governments of the constituent states bowed to these decisions. For that matter, the Federal Diet had previously invited the constituent states to send a representative each – seventeen in all – to Frankfurt, in order that they could discuss a revision of the federal constitution with the Diet. Before the "Pre-Parliament" was dissolved, it set up

¹ R.A.W. I 3/1. – Cf. Stockmar, p. 487.

a committee of fifty members to function on an equal footing with the Federal Diet. About this committee and its activities the British Minister in Hanover on the 13th of April wrote to his Government, "Fifty men, who have no possible right to call themselves the Representatives of Germany, issue their Decrees and dictate their will to almost as many Millions of their Countrymen, in spite, but with the extorted sanction of the Representatives of the Governments who still call themselves the Germanic Diet."¹

On the 18th of May the Deputies elected assembled in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt and started the work at drawing up a new constitution. In the latter part of June the Assembly elected the Archduke Johann of Austria to be Regent. On the 12th of July he assumed the Regency and a responsible Government was appointed. The Federal Diet was dissolved.

In March 1848 the Danish National-Liberal politician Orla Lehmann wrote that when such a power of Nature as a flood arose it would not be worth much, when the waves flooded a man's property, that the man in question appeared with a duly delivered and recorded deed of the piece of land in question.² The flood paid no heed to this. Lehmann referred to the revolutionary commotion, which, indeed, did not stop at the frontiers of the Danish Monarchy. As in Germany the rising started in the beginning of March in the large Holstein towns, where mass meetings were held, practice in the use of arms was organized, and the liberal and radical claims of the time were set up: freedom of the press and of assembly, national levy, a constitution. Considering that in Germany a joint sitting of the Assemblies of the Estates of the constituent states was convened, why should not the Slesvig-Holsteiners call a joint sitting of the Estates in Slesvig and Holstein for the purpose on a small scale to imitate the actions of the German National-Liberals and create a joint constitution for Slesvig and Holstein.

On the 18th of March Deputies of the Estates from Holstein as well as Slesvig assembled at Rendsborg. Only two of the loyal and Danish-minded Deputies of Slesvig presented themselves,

¹ F.O. 34/53: 13/4, No. 30.

² U. Min. Alm. Korr. sager. Litr. K. Krigen 1848-50. Våbenstilstanden i Malmö, etc. 1848-49, læg (sheet) 4: letter from Lehmann to Knuth 31/3 1848.

one of them, the later well-known North Slesvig politician H. A. Krüger, protesting in Danish against the decisions which became the result of the sitting. The debate of the Deputies took place while a mass meeting was held in the auditorium of the theatre of the town. At the meeting an address to the Estates was adopted which characteristically started with the sentence: "We desire and want all that the whole of Germany demands . . ." after which a number of claims were set up. The decisions of "the United Estates" were not quite so comprehensive, but revolutionary enough in relation to the established order. An instantaneous union of the two Assemblies of the Estates was demanded in order that they might deliberate about a "Slesvig-Holstein" constitution, the admission of Slesvig to the German Confederation, the introduction of a national levy, freedom of the press, of association, and of assembly, and dismissal of the President of the Slesvig-Holstein Government. With these claims a deputation was sent to Copenhagen. Before the Deputies parted, a committee was appointed to watch the development and perhaps summon the Estates. The 18th of March, no matter how we look at it, is the day from which the Slesvig-Holstein Revolution must be dated.¹

When the news of the events at Rendsborg reached Copenhagen, the National-Liberal leaders summoned a popular meeting. A resolution was adopted against the claim of the Rendsborg sitting for a Slesvig-Holstein constitution. On the contrary, it was demanded that the connexion between the Kingdom and Slesvig should be secured by a joint constitution, although with a provincial diet for the Duchy and with maintenance of equal rights of the two nationalities in the Duchy. The resolution concluded with a demand for another Government.

The following day a mass procession headed by the City Councillors and the Municipal Authorities of Copenhagen went to Christiansborg to submit an address to the King requesting a change of Government. The address was written by Orla Lehmann and ended by the revolutionarily ringing words: "We implore Your Majesty not to force the nation in despair to take drastic action." But the King was able to state that the former Government had already resigned and that a new Government was

¹ Otto Fock, Schleswig-Holsteinische Erinnerungen (Leipzig, 1863), p. 61.

being formed. This new Government was finished the following day, and the National-Liberal leaders were in the majority. There were, however, several Conservative Ministers, and the previous Head of the Privy Council, Count A. W. Moltke continued as Head of the Government. It is this change of Government which from German quarters is named "the Revolution" in Copenhagen. At any rate it was a bloodless revolution, without any clashes between population and soldiers, unlike conditions in Germany. Before the Austrian Minister in Copenhagen, Baron Vrints, the Conservative Minister C. A. Bluhme, maintained that it was not justifiable to speak about a revolution as the King had dismissed the old Government before the mass procession appeared.¹ Whatever view of this we may have, the formation of the March Government, the summoning of the Constituent Assembly and the free Constitution of the Fifth of June 1849, at any rate introduced a new epoch in Danish history.

On the 22nd of March the Slesvig-Holstein deputation with the demands of the Rendsborg sitting had arrived in Copenhagen. It was received in audience by the King, but not until the 24th in the afternoon did it receive an answer to its request. As might be expected after the change of Government, the answer, formed by Orla Lehmann, was in the negative. As regards Slesvig, it gave voice to the "Eider-Danish" programme: the connexion of Slesvig with the Kingdom under a joint free constitution, although with a special Diet for Slesvig out of consideration for the special conditions of this province. On the other hand, the reply was very obliging as regards the wishes of Holstein for a new constitution, also in the case in which they aimed at support of the National-German plans for reform. The statement from German quarters that this answer meant an "incorporation" of Slesvig into the Kingdom cannot be termed correct. In the first place, the answer only denotes an intention, although expressed distinctly. There was no accomplished fact.² The constitutional incorporation had, indeed, taken place as early as 1721, and the answer does not mention any decisive administrative incorporation. If, furthermore, the wishes of the Holsteiners for a whole-hearted support

¹ Vrints's dispatch 12/12 1851, No. 136 A. The State Archives of Vienna. The dispatch has not been included in I. A. v. Rantzau, *Europäische Quellen zur Schleswig-Holsteinischen Geschichte im 19. Jahrh.* I (1934).

² Hjelholt II, p. 87 (Dumreicher's view).

of a German constitutional development like the one planned at Frankfurt, were to be complied with, this could only be done by loosening the old connexion between the two Duchies – or give up “the insoluble connexion of Slesvig with Denmark.”

In the Duchies they did not wait for the return of the Slesvig-Holstein deputation. When information was received about the change of Government in Copenhagen, the people took action. In the night between the 23rd and the 24th of March the provisional Government was formed at Kiel. The fortress of Rendsborg was taken by surprise, the Slesvig-Holstein troops on the whole joined the rebellion, the great majority of officials did so, too. Legions were organized and volunteers flocked to the Duchies from everywhere in Germany. On the other hand, the Danish population in North Slesvig rose in resistance to the Slesvig-Holsteiners and the Slesvig-Holstein officials. – The provisional Government sent envoys to the German states in order to obtain assistance from them. The Duke of Augustenborg, who had gone to Berlin, already on the 24th of March received a holograph letter from Frederick William IV, with his acknowledgment of the three Slesvig-Holstein articles of faith and a promise to protect the Duchies against possible (Danish) interference.¹ During the following days the provisional Government again and again invoked the Prussian Government’s assistance against the advancing Danish army. The relieving forces were too late to prevent the defeat of the Slesvig-Holsteiners on the 9th of April in the battle at Bov. If Germany had not identified herself with the cause of the Slesvig-Holsteiners, the revolt would have been crushed.

Although more than a hundred years have passed since the outbreak of the Slesvig-Holstein revolution, this is still in German and Slesvig-Holstein historiography described in an untruthful way. A typical example may, e.g., be found in Hans Precht’s book *Englands Stellung zur Deutschen Einheit 1848–1850* (1925), p. 25. There a complete misrepresentation of what happened is given, as will appear from a comparison with what precedes. As stated by the Conservative Austrian Minister in Copenhagen, Baron Vrints, in a dispatch of the 31st of March, the Danish Foreign Minister showed “in accordance with historical truth”,

¹ Haralds, p. 269.

that it was not the events in Copenhagen that had provoked those in Holstein, "as, indeed, the latter had preceded the events here."¹ ". . . any demonstration in the Duchies was here returned by a counter-demonstration, until the rupture occurred." But undoubtedly the Slesvig-Holsteiners were in "rebellion against their sovereign."

In relation to the status quo, the established order, the Slesvig-Holstein movement and the Eider-Danish one on the whole were almost equally revolutionary, the Slesvig-Holstein movement, however, most by its demand for the incorporation of Slesvig into a foreign state to which it had never had any national affiliation. However complicated the history of the Duchies had been, constitutionally and administratively, during the centuries, there was one thing here which easily could be grasped by foreign diplomats. This was also pointed out by Orla Lehmann in some statements in a letter written during his visit to Berlin on 29th of March–4th of April.² Lehmann had already on the 27th of March gone to Berlin in order, if possible, to prevent Prussian support of the Slesvig-Holsteiners. He wrote: "England perhaps hardly knows that Slesvig exists and that its constitutional relations are of such a kind that even he who knows the lesson by heart, must violate his commonsense in order to retain the points in this tissue of sophisms and contradictions. If an English statesman is to deal with it, it will be necessary to reduce the question to a few completely simple and practical points, – if anything, the question whether the German Confederation, whether especially Prussia is entitled to control Slesvig, thus whether an armed intervention made in the name of such a justification is a breach of all international law or not."

3. The Foreign Office and Diplomats of Britain and Some of the Danish and Russian Diplomats.

Only two of the Governments of the five European Great Powers, those of Britain and Russia, were unchanged by the revolutionary commotion. In Russia the Poles did not in 1848

¹ J. A. v. Rantzau, *op. cit.*, p. 59 ff.

² Letter of 3/4 1848 from Lehmann to Knuth. The file mentioned on p. 20, note 2.

venture another rebellion, and the Autocrat of the Russias, the Tsar Nicholas, stood as the symbol of conservatism and reaction. One of the items of the programme of all true champions of liberty was disapproval of or disgust for the government of Russia. The Constitution of England was their great ideal.

In 1846 a Whig Government with Lord John Russell as Prime Minister had come into power. The most influential member of this Government was the Foreign Minister, Lord Palmerston. A recent author¹ has suggested that he, on the whole, would feel quite comfortable in the Podsnap company of which Charles Dickens gave such a priceless description in *Our Mutual Friend*. Undoubtedly Palmerston would have subscribed to Mr. Podsnap's statement: "We Englishmen are Very Proud of our Constitution, Sir. It Was Bestowed Upon Us By Providence. No Other Country is so Favoured as This Country." In his foreign policy Palmerston appeared as a protector of Liberal and Constitutional movements. It is no wonder that Metternich in Vienna, the head of the old system, considered him a dangerous enemy: "Hat der Teufel einen Sohn – So ist er sicher Palmerston."²

However, England was not quite unaffected by the revolutionary fever in 1848. In Ireland there were riots, and in England Chartism set up its claims for comprehensive reforms of the constitution. On the 10th of April a mass meeting was held in London, it being intended to make the masses march in procession to the Houses of Parliament to advance a petition with the claims. The procession, however, was prohibited, and the petition submitted to Parliament in the usual way, thus without Parliament being exposed to any pressure from the masses. The Danish member of the March Government, Orla Lehmann, happened to attend the sitting in Parliament, and this experience of true constitutional life moved him to tears of joy.³

About Palmerston's influence on foreign politics Lehmann stated that there he was de facto sovereign and without responsibility.⁴ This is a somewhat exaggerated statement. The English Crown also wanted to have its say in the matter in cases of for-

¹ Algernon Cecil, *op. cit.*, p. 175 f.

² Herbert C. F. Bell, *Lord Palmerston*, I (1936), p. 97.

³ See the manuscript "Min diplomatiske Reise i 1848" in Lehmann's private archives.

⁴ Letter of 13/4 1848 from Lehmann to Knuth. See p. 20, note 2.

eign politics. At William IV's death in 1837 Victoria had eighteen years old become Queen of England, the dynastic connexion between England and Hanover thus ceasing. In 1840 she married Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, and soon he became her chief political adviser. Like his brother, Duke Ernest, he had a National-German outlook, with a sympathy for plans of a Prussian hegemony. Great contrasts arose between the German sympathies of the Court and Palmerston's policy during the years of revolution 1848-50.¹ The Queen again and again complained of Palmerston's wilful conduct and slight consideration for her opinions. Her statements about him are characterized by great hostility, and her and Albert's highest wishes were to get rid of him as Foreign Minister. His popularity and his influence in Parliament made the fulfilment of the wish difficult. It happened, however, in 1851, but some years later Palmerston returned into power as Prime Minister.

As indicated above, Baron Stockmar from Coburg should be specially mentioned among the German advisers of the Court.² He had been Physician-in-Ordinary to Leopold, the later King of the Belgians, who also originated from Saxe-Coburg and was the uncle of Albert and Ernest. In 1837-38 Stockmar was Private Secretary to the young Queen Victoria, for long periods lived in England and remained an intimate friend of the royal family. He was a warm adherent of the movement in favour of German unity and worked for a close amity between Britain and Prussia. So did Chevalier Chr. Carl Josias Bunsen, who in 1841 by Frederick William IV had been sent to London as Prussian Minister.³ Bunsen, who, for that matter was married to an Englishwoman, of course also was in favour at Court. He was very ecclesiastically minded, was an adherent of the endeavours towards German unity and of Prussian hegemony. As was to appear later, he was furthermore very enthusiastic about the Slesvig-Holstein cause.

¹ See especially Brian Connell, *Regina v. Palmerston. The Correspondence between Queen Victoria and Her Foreign and Prime Minister 1837-1865* (London 1962), p. 67 ff.

² *Denkwürdigkeiten aus den Papieren des Freiherrn Chr. Fr. v. Stockmar* (1872).

³ Christian Carl Josias Freiherr von Bunsen. *Aus seinen Briefen und nach eigener Erinnerung geschildert von seiner Witwe. Deutsche Ausgabe . . .* von Fr. Nippold.

At that time there were no real obstacles to the two Courts' endeavours towards an alliance between Prussia and Britain. From a British commercial point of view, the Prussian Customs Union or the work at extending it to the Hanse Towns were frowned upon. A certain anxiety on the long view might perhaps also be cherished for the Prussian desires towards hegemony as regards Northern Germany (and Kiel) and plans for a greater sea power.

Palmerston's view of the relation between Britain and Prussia clearly appears from instructions which on the 18th of March 1848 were drawn up for the British Minister to Constantinople, Sir Stratford Canning.¹ At that time he was in England, but it was enjoined upon him on his return journey to his post amongst other things to visit Berlin and obtain an audience with Frederick William IV. There were indeed certain disagreements between the two Governments, thus in the view of Swiss conditions and of King Otto's rule of Greece, and Canning was to try to influence the King in favour of the British point of view. But it was emphasized that Britain, considering the revolution in France, felt "that they cannot have too many opportunities of confidential communication with his Prussian Majesty." Indeed, the British Government completely trusted their Minister in Berlin (Westmorland) just as Prussia trusted her Minister in London (Bunsen), so it was not in order to give any new information that Canning was to seek an audience with the King, "but it is only to afford an additional confirmation of those sentiments and opinions," which had already been advanced through Westmorland and to Bunsen. The goal of British foreign policy "is the maintenance of Peace in Europe", and the British Government was glad that this was in agreement with that of Prussia. As will appear below, this statement soon proved to be false. — The instructions praised the Prussian King for the steps he had already taken along the constitutional course, steps showing "that his views as to the best means of securing Tranquillity at Home, are as enlightened as his judgment in regard to the most suitable manner of preserving Peace abroad is sound and wise." Palmerston did not doubt that Canning in Berlin would find the King occupied with the

¹ F.O. 30/117: 18/3, No. 1.

drawing up of a parliamentary constitution. It was "good policy not to delay too long Reforms and Improvements which the spirit of the age and the wants and wishes of a nation require."

Such statements are in perfect agreement with the attitude as the guardian spirit of constitutional liberalism adopted by Palmerston. From this point of view Austria and Russia would seem to him to be the chief opponents. He might, of course, have a fear of the tumultuous France, but on the whole he maintained good relations with the various French Governments during the revolutionary years. For that matter, it was his privately pronounced acknowledgment of Napoleon III's coup d'état in December 1851 which brought about his resignation, so intensely desired by the Queen.

As the year of revolution did not change anything in the British Government, there was no special reason to exchange the British Ministers abroad. The English diplomats who came to deal with the Danish-German conflict, had – with a single exception – held their posts long before 1848. The English Minister in Copenhagen was Sir Henry Watkin Williams Wynn (born in 1783), who had held this post from 1824 and thus was familiar with Danish conditions. He was decidedly kindly disposed towards Denmark, but he cannot have had any particular liking for the change of political system in March 1848 and the new men. It is an unfounded assertion which has been made by a recent German author, that Wynn should have been in constant connexion "with Orla Lehmann and the other leaders of the Danish national party,"¹ unless this is meant to convey that Wynn of course in an official capacity had to be "in constant connexion" with the Danish Foreign Minister, Count Fr. M. Knuth, who was in sympathy with the National-Liberals. In his dispatches he also made very kind statements about Count Knuth.² He felt a closer affinity with the Conservative supporter of the United Monarchy, the landowner Holger Reedtz, who in the beginning of April 1848 under the title of Secretary of Dispatches succeeded Dankwart, the Director of the Foreign Department. As he wrote in a letter of the 9th of April to the Danish Minister in London, he was "quite suddenly, after planting cabbages for

¹ Hans Precht, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

² H.T. 11. r. VI, p. 3 f.

five years and a half", called to Copenhagen and complied with the request "as every good Dane will do in the hour of danger, at the first call."¹

From 1841 the English Minister in Berlin was John Fane, Second Earl of Westmorland (born in 1784). He was an old military man, but besides as a diplomat, he was known as a musician and composer of note. He was held in high esteem in Berlin. The Countess, Priscilla Anne Fane (born in 1793) was a great linguist and an executant artist. Because of his position Westmorland came to take the leading part at the treatment of the Slesvig-Holstein affair.

When in late March 1848 Orla Lehmann arrived at Berlin for the special purpose of trying to prevent Prussian intervention in the Duchies or at any rate have it postponed, he suggested that Westmorland was completely ignorant of the problems of the Danish-German conflict.² If this was true, Westmorland certainly during the following years had plenty of opportunity to study it. As mentioned in the Preface, a comprehensive collection of the more private correspondence about it which he conducted with his colleagues in Copenhagen, Frankfurt, and St. Petersburg, – of copies of dispatches, etc., is available.

At St. Petersburg Baron John Arthur Douglas Bloomfield (born in 1802) had become Minister in 1844; but already from 1839 he had been attached to the Legation and before that for about a dozen years to the Legation at Stockholm. When sixteen years old, he had entered the diplomatic service and remained a diplomat his whole life. The Baroness, Georgiana Bloomfield, after his death published her *Reminiscences of Court and Diplomatic Life* (1883). This book is quite interesting, but regarding the Slesvig-Holstein question there is only a single remark. Nor was it this question, but numerous others – concerning Greece, Turkey, Persia – which during these years provoked disagreements between Britain and Russia.

At Stockholm Britain from the autumn of 1838 was represented by Sir Thomas Cartwright (1795–1850). He had previously been at Munich, the Hague, and Frankfurt a. M. He was said to be an intimate friend of Lord Palmerston.

¹ U. Min. Gesandtskabsarkivet. London. Ordrer 9/4.

² Lehmann's letter of 31/3 to Knuth; see p. 20, note 2.

From 1840 W. Th. Horner Fox-Strangways was British Minister to the Federal Diet at Frankfurt, and Fred. Doveton Orme was chargé d'affaires.

Palmerston's statement in an order of the 25th of March to Strangways that he is in favour of a strengthening of Germany through a closer union of the various federal states, is in good agreement with the views of the Court.¹ But whereas Prince Albert by advice and promptings endeavoured to promote the efforts towards unity and would have liked Britain actively to support these, Palmerston cautiously maintained that Britain's official policy should be not to interfere with Germany's domestic conditions.

On the 8th of July Lord John Russell, no doubt inspired by Prince Albert, proposed to Palmerston to send a special envoy to Frankfurt in order to congratulate the Archduke Johann if he was elected Regent.² Anticipating the events (in 1866–71) Russell asked Palmerston to consider "what to do with the old diplomatic furniture," if the special legations of the various German countries in London were closed. Palmerston looked more soberly at the event. What Johann accepts, he said in his reply to Russell, is solely a temporary post as head of an empire "which yet remains to be created."³ He was, however, of opinion that if "this future German Empire should ever be worked out in Practice," Johann would probably be its head: "But a great Deal remains to be done, and some months may pass away before anything final is settled one way or the other. It would therefore I think be premature to send any special Mission of compliment to the Archduke."

Strangways, however, continued Palmerston, had just returned home from Frankfurt and was going to be pensioned off.⁴ It was important immediately to send somebody else in his place. For this Palmerston proposed Henry Richard Charles Wellesley, First Earl of Cowley (born in 1804), who in February 1848 had been appointed Minister to Switzerland. Cowley, writes Palmerston, who "is still here, and who would much prefer Frankfort to Switzerland. Cowley has served a good deal in Germany, knows

¹ F.O. 30/105: 25/3, No. 1.

² Russell to Palmerston 8/7; cf. 28/3. P.P.

³ Copy of Palmerston's reply 10/7. P.P.

⁴ Cf. F.O. 30/104: 1/7, No. 36.

the language and the People, has shewn himself to be a Man of Capacity and is I think the best Man we could have there, and he would be ready to go off at once." Palmerston knew what Cowley preferred from a letter from Cowley written in late May.¹ Later Cowley was highly to show that he was a Man of Capacity during his long period as a Minister in Paris (1851–1867).

Palmerston had his way. In late July Cowley left London after receiving verbal instruction by Palmerston as well as written instructions.² Before the latter are mentioned, it should be stated that Prince Albert's urge to interfere with Palmerston's arrangements about ten days later evoked a violent burst of anger in the latter, although it was probably expressed on paper only. On the 10th of August Russell sent to Palmerston a suggestion on the part of the Prince concerning a number of changes in the Diplomatic Service.³ Russell remarked that the Prince, when he wrote this, had forgotten "that Mr. Temple is Minister at Naples." To which Palmerston added: "H. R. H. seems also to have forgot that there is a responsible Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which however I am not likely to forget." About the proposal itself he wrote: "I did not take any steps in furtherance of this Extraordinary attempt to interfere with the arrangements of my Department."

The written instructions for Cowley were drawn up on the 29th of July.⁴ In these it is said that under the present conditions the Queen cannot give "Credentials to any diplomatic Agent to be stationed at Frankfort." Cowley's position was of a semi-official character, but he was to voice the profound interest which Britain "takes in the welfare of Germany, and the sincere and earnest wish which the British Government forms that the Deliberations in which the Representatives of Germany at Frankfort are now engaged, may lead to results" beneficial to the German nation. The British Government had neither any right nor any wish to interfere with the future organization of Germany. Cowley, however, if commercial relations were discussed, was to recommend following Britain's example, viz. moderate Import Duties. The only question of European interest which might come

¹ Cowley to Palmerston 20/5. P.P.

² Cowley to Palmerston 28/7. P.P.

³ P.P.

⁴ F.O. 30/107: 29/7, No. 1.

an to Frankfurt, was that of Slesvig-Holstein. What Palmerston stated about that will be quoted below.

In the Kingdom of Hanover Britain from 1838 was represented by John Duncan Bligh, who was also accredited to the Courts at Brunswick and Oldenburg. He had previously been i. a. at the legations in St. Petersburg and Stockholm. As mentioned above, the personal union between England and Hanover had ceased at William IV's death in 1837. His brother Ernest August acceded to the throne of Hanover and William's brother's daughter Victoria became Queen of Britain. After the cease of the personal union Britain's influence, however, remained considerable, and her commercial interests there were important. Hanover had no part in the Prussian customs union.

The post as Chargé d'affaires and Consul-General to the Hanse Towns with residence at Hamburg was, indeed, more commercial than political, but still it was far from being without importance politically. Hamburg was a good observation post as regards conditions of Northern Germany – and the Danish Duchies. From 1841 the post was held by Colonel George Lloyd Hodges. He, who as early as 1806 had entered the British army, had a long military career to his credit. He had fought at Waterloo. Before he came to Hamburg, he had held consulships in Serbia and Egypt. It was maintained (in 1849) that at that time he could neither speak nor read German, but only English and French, which, one would think, did not make him particularly fit to acquire a thorough knowledge of German conditions. A proof of the position held by Hodges in Hamburg is that the Senate there awarded him "their gold medal of honour."¹

Whereas Britain stood as the patron of liberal constitutionalism, Russia was the stronghold of conservatism and reaction, hated and feared by all "true" liberal and radical circles. The two powers, however, had the same actual interest in preserving the Danish Monarchy, the guard of the entrance to the Baltic. Russia, of course, with her strong army and as neighbour of Germany had greater possibilities of intervening in favour of Denmark than the naval power of Britain. But a certain reservation as regards conditions in Germany was at any rate advisable during the first period of the revolutionary commotion, as

¹ According to obituary notice in *The Illustrated London News* 31/1 1863.



LORD PALMERSTON
Photograph from his later years.

perhaps it might be feared that French armies might pour across the Rhine and in Germany be united with radical circles in order that they might turn against reactionary Russia together. After the victory of the Revolution in Berlin and the support of Prussian Radicalism to Polish freedom movements in Poznan, Russia's relations to Prussia were very strained, in spite of the close connexion between the Courts. The Tsar Nicholas was married to a sister of the Prussian King.

The Russian Emperor's hatred of the revolutions is well-known. As a matter of course, the Slesvig-Holstein Revolution also stank in his nostrils, but what had happened in Copenhagen during the days of March was not to his taste, either. About his personality may be quoted what the Conservative Danish adherent of the United Monarchy, the Holsteiner Count Carl Moltke wrote in a letter to his wife when in October 1849 he was received in audience by him: "The impression made upon me by the Emperor is quite indescribable. There is something beneficial in standing in front of a great man, to be impressed by him. I have never had such a feeling of admiration as well as great confidence, I was overwhelmed and still happy . . ."¹ About the Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, who was of German extraction, Carl Moltke said in the same letter that he conveyed the impression of being "a very wise man." But whereas in Britain it was Palmerston's opinions which in foreign politics were decisive, it was in Russia undoubtedly those of the Autocrat, not those of the Chancellor.

From 1847 the Russian Minister in Copenhagen was Baron Ungern-Sternberg. His dispatches to St. Petersburg clearly show that the change of Government in March 1848 seemed revolutionary to him. However, they also contain laudatory words about several of the men of the new Government, and expressions of his eagerness – naturally enough – first of all to serve Russian interests, whether this applied to relations to revolutionary France or the suspicious Scandinavian movement. In Berlin and London Russia was represented by two diplomats of note, although rather different. Like Nesselrode both of them were of German extraction. From 1839 the Minister in Berlin was Peter v. Meyendorff, who has been described as "an extremely excellent, witty, and ex-

¹ Carl Moltke's archives. Letters to his wife: Letter of 14/10 1849.

perienced statesman" and "astonishingly" familiar with "Danish affairs".¹ From 1840 Ph. Brunnow was Russian Minister in London. He had a reputation for being an eminent diplomat. Lehmann mentioned him as a "strangely coarse figure", a complete contrast to Meyendorff, who was characterized as "a fine, somewhat delicate European."² Meyendorff as well as Brunnow came to take an active part in the negotiations about the Danish-German conflict. Both of them appeared as ardent defenders of the maintenance of the Danish Monarchy.

From the point of view of Danish realpolitik it was evident that effective support towards the suppression of the rebellion could much more surely be expected from Russia than from Britain. But the Danish National-Liberals were reluctant to apply for help to a state with a despotic rule. This reluctance clearly appears from statements made by Orla Lehmann, Minister in the March Government, when in late March and early April he went to Berlin on a special mission. Thus from Berlin he wrote on the 31st of March to Count Knuth, the Foreign Minister, after visiting the Russian Minister, "that I should act most irresponsibly, if because of personal likes or dislikes I abstained from anxiously . . . nursing any relation which might offer any assistance to our cause."³ In a letter from him from London it says: "As a mediator we could not accept any one but England and – as ill-luck would have it – Russia."⁴

In spite of the predominance of the National-Liberals in the March Government the diplomatic representation of Denmark abroad remained as it was. It consisted of Conservative adherents of the United Monarchy who continued to give their service to the Danish ship of State then so violently storm-tossed. In London Count Frederik Reventlow (1781–1851) was Danish Minister from 1841. By Lehmann he is characterized as being "neither a genius nor an eminent character nor a learned man, but . . . a respectable man with an honest Danish heart, which, as regards a Danish diplomat, was saying much at that time, and he had

¹ U. Min. Alm. Korr. sager. Littr. K. Krigen 1848–50. Våbenstilstanden i Malmø, etc. 1848–49, Sheet 4: Lehmann's letter 31/3.

² Ibid. Lehmann's letter of 11/4. – Orla Lehmann's *Efterladte Skrifter* II, p. 185.

³ See Note 1.

⁴ Letter 11/4 to Knuth. See Note 1.

much experience of the world and especially an excellent knack of treating the English in their own way . . .”¹ At Stockholm the Danish Minister was the competent diplomat Christian Høyer Bille (1799–1853), who in the autumn of 1849 was installed in the office as Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and hence naturally came to have great influence on the planning of the Danish policy.

At St. Petersburg and Berlin the Danish representatives were two brothers, the Holstein Counts Plessen, in the former place Otto v. Plessen, about whom Carl Moltke stated that to the family of the Russian Chancellor Nesselrode he was “as their own child.”² Moltke, who in the autumn of 1849 had been sent to St. Petersburg as a special envoy, is undoubtedly right in stating that he considers it to be impossible to do anything definite “which Plessen could not do as well as I, and better, as he knows the terrain so closely.”³ The brother at Berlin was Wulff (Scheel-) Plessen, appointed in the autumn of 1847. When the war between Denmark and Prussia broke out in April 1848, his mission, of course, ceased. A third brother was the later so well-known Carl (Scheel-)Plessen, who in 1866 became Lord Lieutenant (*Oberpräsident*) of the province of Schleswig-Holstein after the capture of the Duchies by Prussia. In 1848 Carl Plessen was Deputy in the Exchequer, from the 22nd to the 24th held the post as provisional Minister to the Duchies, but resigned. During the following few years, however, he served the Danish Government in various ways.

The Danish Minister to the Federal Diet at Frankfurt, the excellent diplomat Baron Fr. v. Pechlin (1789–1863) seems to have shown the greatest inclination to leave his post at the change of Government. He did not, however, find it possible to recognize and represent the Provisional Government, as this had invited him to do.⁴ But at the same time he stated that as “the news of the union of the Duchy of Slesvig with Denmark” was incompatible with the declaration he had made before the Federal Diet on September 7, 1846, he had sent in his resignation to the Danish Government. In spite of this statement, however, he remained at

¹ See MS. “Min diplomatiske Reise i 1848” in Lehmann’s private archives.

² Carl Moltkes arkiv. Letters to his wife, 14/10 1849.

³ *Ibid.* Letter of 16/10 1849.

⁴ EE. 1. Letter of 2/4 48 from Pechlin.

his post and in the following period loyally acted on the injunctions of the new Government. On the 4th of April the Federal Diet decided to delegate to Prussia the task, at the head of the states that furnished the Tenth Federal Corps (i. e. Hanover, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Mecklenburg, and the Hanse Towns), to mediate with Denmark in such a way that the demand of Holstein for a constitutional connexion with Slesvig was secured.¹ Pechlin refused to commit himself on behalf of his Government and on the 28th of April he then lodged a rather long, well reasoned protest against the fact that the Confederation assumed any authority at all concerning the relations of Slesvig.² At that time the Confederation had already recognized the envoy of the Government of the rebels as representative of Holstein, and Pechlin's declaration was filed. On the 6th of May Pechlin on behalf of the Government lodged a protest against the hostile step taken by the Federal Diet and stated that the Government considered his mission to be finished.³ The Presidency returned the protest to him.

An English resident of Frankfurt stated about Pechlin in April 1848 that "if he was not the most talented, he was certainly the most honest, straightforward and consistent Member of the Diet."⁴ During the following period he was to render the Danish Government considerable services. As a member of the Commission of the Succession of 1846 he was very familiar with the complicated constitutional conditions of the Danish Monarchy and had a clear conviction as to the incorporation of Slesvig under the Danish Crown in the year 1721.

4. England Tries to Prevent Germany from Opening Hostilities towards Denmark.

a. Hamburg.

Above, attention has been called to the difficulties caused by Queen Victoria's (and/or Prince Albert's) demand for super-

¹ Haralds, p. 273 ff.

² Brevskaber, p. 8 ff. – Aktenstücke zur n. S.-H. Geschichte 2. u. 3. Heft, p. 592 ff.

³ U. Min. I A. Krigen 1848–50. Sager udskilte af andre saggrupper 1958–1959: Copy of Pechlin's letter of 6/5 with note that the Presidency on 12/5 returned the protest.

⁴ R.A.W. J 3/57.

vising and influencing British foreign policy in the relations between her and Lord Palmerston. In extenuation of Palmerston's somewhat off-hand treatment of the Queen's demands it has been pointed out that quick decisions were often required which could not very well await the Queen's considerations: "Telegraphic communication was in its infancy; and the transmission of despatches by messengers (who were by no means constantly available) was at best a matter of days or weeks. But situations at foreign capitals could develop as rapidly as they do now. Hence the need for avoiding all delay was sometimes overmastering."¹

The slowness of the mail and the transmission of dispatches mentioned above also made it natural that the British Ministers should show a certain independence and occasionally act without awaiting instructions from the Foreign Office. For that matter, the British envoys of course were aware what policy the British interests enjoined on them to follow in the situation in question.

Closest to the focus of events was Colonel Hodges at Hamburg. In a dispatch written about midnight on the 24th of March he informed Palmerston about the change of Government in Copenhagen and the formation of the Provisional Government at Kiel as well as the defection of the troops.² "It is needless for me," he concluded, "to state to Your Lordship that those two important Duchies are now virtually separated from the Kingdom of Denmark and in the present political condition of Germany no Sovereign be he who he may would venture to oppose the popular will."

Some few days later he learnt that the Senate of Hamburg during a lengthy nightly sitting (from 8 o'clock in the evening of the 26th to 4 o'clock the following morning) had debated an appeal from the Provisional Government for military assistance.³ This caused him to look up the Syndic Merck, who during the Syndic Banks's absence at the Federal Diet at Frankfurt attended to the Foreign Affairs of Hamburg. In agreement with what he thought was the wish of his Government, Hodges strongly advised against interfering in any way with the conflict between Denmark and the Duchies. If Hamburg did so, it "might afford a pretext for Russian interference, which in the present disorganized state of

¹ Bell, *op. cit.* I, p. 437 f.

² F.O. 33/113: 24/3, No. 17.

³ *Ibid.* 27/3, No. 20.

Europe might produce the most lamentable consequences." Referring to the revolutionary commotion Hodges added that "the force at the disposition of the Senate was barely sufficient for the maintenance of order within their own walls."

Hodges's suggestion in so far bore fruit as Merck in the evening of the 27th informed him of the evasive reply of the Senate to the Provisional Government: they could not of their own accord send troops, as their contingent in connexion with those of Hanover and Oldenburg were part of the Tenth Federal Corps, but they had sent to Hanover and Oldenburg for instructions. Merck hoped that England could approve of this reply, which, for that matter, he thought, would "bring on us the reproach of a want of Nationality at a time when the King of Prussia is using every effort to send troops for the protection of the Duchies." Hodges again strongly recommended that Hamburg should observe a strict neutrality so that there would be no occasion for reprisals on the part of Denmark, which might "complicate the great difficulties that Great Britain has now to contend with in her endeavours to maintain the Peace of Europe." Merck then assured Hodges that the Senate would do everything to follow his advice and as soon as possible wanted to be informed of Palmerston's views. Hodges ended his dispatch by stating "how reluctant I am to take unnecessary responsibility upon myself but considering the urgency of the circumstances I have only to hope that in this instance Your Lordship will not disapprove of my having done so."

Hodges's independent action to prevent the interference of Hamburg in the conflict was approved by Palmerston in a letter of the 12th of April.¹ Four days before he had requested Hodges to ask the Hanse Towns to consider how unfortunate it would be if the disagreements between the King of Denmark and his subjects in the Duchies should give rise to "a civil war. There are so many elements of disorder and confusion afloat in Europe that it would be a cause of deep regret if this question were to lead to war."² Hodges referred to this request when some days later he reported that during a conversation on the 12th of April with the Lord Lieutenant (*Oberpräsident*) of Altona, Count Joseph

¹ F.O. 33/112: 12/4, No. 12.

² *Ibid.* 8/4, No. 9.

Reventlow-Criminil, who had recognized the Provisional Government, had come to an agreement with him about an attempt to make the parties suspend hostilities.¹ It was to the effect that Reventlow-Criminil should make the Provisional Government keep its troops behind the frontiers of Holstein, while Hodges would "use my utmost endeavours with the Government of the King of Denmark to induce them to suspend hostilities for such time as would enable me to receive instructions from Her Majesty's Government on the subject." The suggestion must no doubt be considered futile, not only because of the two men's slight influence. The Danish Government, whose army on the 9th of April had decisively defeated the Slesvig-Holsteiners in the battle of Bov, indeed, had no desire to make the army advance into Holstein. But after the Federal Diet on the 4th of April had made the decision mentioned above, the Provisional Government could confidently count on German assistance and reject attempts at a solution of the conflict by compromises.

As remarked by Hodges in one of his dispatches, he had no doubt that "a great many" of the people of Hamburg sympathized with the Slesvig-Holsteiners. But in commercial circles there was no slight anxiety as to the inconveniences that might be caused to navigation by a war between Germany and Denmark with her strong fleet. Hodges mentions several examples of this, and the Hamborg Board of Commerce in early April sent an envoy to London in order to make the British Government "protect the German Flag from Danish Cruisers" in case of war.² But although Great Britain was highly interested in the undisturbed continuation of commerce, she was in principle, as a naval power, averse to limiting the rights of blockade. The best way, Palmerston wrote on the 12th of April, to protect the flag of the Hanse Towns "from being molested by Danish Cruisers would be for the Hanse Towns not to be Parties to any hostile measures against Denmark."³

The Hanse Towns hardly had any possibility of avoiding such measures. Merck stated this to Hodges on the 14th of April.⁴

¹ F.O. 33/113: 13/4, No. 33. – F.O. 33/112: 18/4, No. 14. – EE. 3: Reventlow-Criminil's letter of 12/4 to the Provisional Government.

² F.O. 33/113: 28/3, No. 21; 3/4, No. 24, and 6/4, No. 29.

³ F.O. 33/112: 12/4, No. 12.

⁴ F.O. 33/113: 14/4, No. 34.

The influence of the Hanse Towns "in political questions of such great importance," he wrote, "can only be of a subordinate character." After the Federal Diet had taken up the case, the Hanse Towns had no choice but to discharge their duties to the Confederation. But the Senate shared the British Government's hope "that this difficult question may yet be settled by negotiation," and with the co-operation of Britain. The Senate wished "to maintain on all sides the pacific and friendly relations, in which the City of Hamburg will always find the best guarantees for its prosperity." Merck relied on Hodges to his Government to present "the delicate situation of the Senate of Hamburg under prevailing circumstances." — The Hanse Towns showed that they were not inspired by any belligerence through the fact that their Federal contingents did not set out until well over a month later.¹

b. Hanover.

The Kingdom of Hanover had, of course, greater political influence than the Hanse Towns. In spite of his disgust at Liberalism, the March movement forced Ernest August to appoint a new, liberal Government with Count Alexander Levin v. Bennigsen as Prime and Foreign Minister. As Bligh wrote in one of his dispatches: "No State however small can escape the political infection which is so rapidly overspreading Germany."² And Frederick William IV's prostration before the revolution and his proclamation of the 18th of March would, of course, make a highly depressing influence on Ernest August: "He was particularly cast down by the King of Prussia's Proclamation, succeeded as it was by the fearful tragedy in Berlin . . ."³ The King wrote to Prince Albert, "What is to become of poor Germany the Lord alone knows for either treachery or cowardliness seems to have been prevailing everywhere, and the mad idea of universal Parliament in Germany if not happily prevented must lead to universal Anarchy and bloodshed."⁴

On the 28th of March Bligh could inform his Government that Hanover was prepared to comply with the appeal of the Provisional Government for military assistance, if this was approved of by

¹ F.O. 33/113: 14/4, No. 36, and 23/5, No. 52.

² F.O. 34/53: 11/3, No. 14.

³ *Ibid.*: 21/3, No. 17.

⁴ R.A.W. I 3/35.

the Federal Diet.¹ When Bligh learnt that preparations to that effect were being made, he considered it his duty to apply to Count Bennigsen without awaiting instructions from London.² Bennigsen of course brought up the Slesvig-Holstein fabrication of "the oppressed King": "The King-Duke was at Copenhagen and not a free Agent." Furthermore he gave Bligh the grotesque information that the Provisional Government suspected that "Danish free Corps which they would be unable to resist, without the assistance of the other Members of the German Confederation, might invade the Dutchies."

In his statements to Bennigsen, Bligh, however, placed things in the proper light. From a Danish point of view it would have been desirable that all British diplomats had been as clear-sighted as he. "It could hardly," he said, "be in the competency of foreign Governments to pronounce the Sovereign of another Country not to be Master of his own actions unless He himself informed them of it; and that consequently the Provisional Government at Rendsburg ought, under present circumstances, to be considered as Rebels; that it might be questioned whether the German Confederation could decide disputes between the King of Denmark and his Subjects in Holstein even, as long as He fulfilled his duties as Member of the Confederation; but, that at all events, they could have no possible right to interfere between him and his Subjects in Slesvig, which was not included in the Confederation; that if they did, it would in my opinion be a decided infraction of Treaties; the first practical illustration, from an unexpected quarter, of the Principle propounded respecting that of Vienna in M. Lamartine's Manifesto."³ Bligh furthermore added that he considered it unwise of the German Governments, "who had enough employment for their Troops, at this moment, in maintaining internal tranquillity, to send them on Foreign Expeditions without absolute necessity."

Bennigsen's reply to these representations of Bligh's was that the troops would "in the first instance only be placed in obser-

¹ F.O. 34/53: 28/3, No. 23.

² Ibid.: 31/3, No. 24.

³ The reference is to Lamartine's circular letter of the 4th of March, in which it was said that "the Treaties of 1815 in the view of the French Government had no more any justifiable existence;" A. Stern, *Geschichte Europas von 1848 bis 1871*. I (1928), p. 8 f. See also Evelyn Ashley, *The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston*. I, p. 86 f.

vation upon the Elbe, would not enter the Dutchies unless the Danes attacked them; and at all events not without the orders of the Diet."

Bligh ended his dispatch by stating that by thus having stated before Bennigsen "my own decided opinion of the injustice of a proceeding which the Hanoverian Government appear so forward to carry out if authorized by the Diet" he had prepared it for "a more formal denunciation of it" if "Her Majesty's Government should coincide in my view of the matter." In this case he expected instructions from his Government or that such were submitted to the British mission at Frankfurt.

Not until the 10th of April did Bligh receive Palmerston's assurance that the Government completely approved of his warnings to the Hanoverian Government against acting in support of the Slesvig-Holstein rebels.¹

Meanwhile, Bligh had on his own responsibility continued his efforts to prevent the Governments to which he was accredited – besides Hanover, Oldenburg and Brunswick – from military operations. On the 2nd of April he submitted to the Foreign Ministers of the latter two countries the following verbal note:² It was notorious that preparations were made with part of the Tenth Federal Corps to assist "those persons in Holstein and Slesvig who have formed themselves into a Provisional Government," and it appeared from a proclamation from the King of Denmark that "that Government are acting in opposition to their Sovereign the Duke and consequently are in a state of Rebellion." Bligh therefore had to give expression to his opinion, viz. that "any assistance which may be given by the Armies of the German Confederation to the so-called Provisional Government . . . cannot be justly given as regards Slesvig which forms no part of the Confederation."

Bligh of course weakened his protest somewhat by pointing out that for want of instructions from his Government he only advanced his own opinion and that he believed that the troops of the countries in question would not advance into the Duchies without the order of the Federal Diet "with which I have no concern." But he ended with the following reference to the com-

¹ F.O. 34/53: 10/4, No. 29.

² Ibid.: 6/4, No. 25.

mercial interests of Great Britain: "The disastrous consequences which must ensue to the maritime Commerce of Germany from a collision with Denmark and to which no maritime nation can be indifferent will doubtless have suggested themselves to Your Excellency."

In the dispatch of the 6th of April in which Bligh informed Palmerston of his verbal note, he stated that Hanoverian troops were advancing towards the Elbe and that Prussian troops the day before yesterday had arrived at Altona "to assist the Provisional Government . . . in what appears to me Rebellion against their legitimate Sovereign." The Prussian King, Bligh rightly remarked, "must in this matter be acting without reference to the Diet, and I suppose in his self-assumed capacity of Head of the German Nation." Bligh thought that the Governments that furnished contingents for the Tenth Army Corps would all "act with more deference to that which is, as yet, the only acknowledged authority for the Confederation." Bennigsen as well as the Duke of Brunswick had assured him that their troops would not advance into Holstein without "orders from the Diet." As, however, Bligh did not know his Government's view yet, he wrote, "as in fact I am not aware whether any notice was taken by us of the resolution of the Diet of Sept. 1846 [Federal Resolution of the 17th of September] which assumed the right of regulating the destinies of the Duchies both of Holstein and Slesvig," he had not felt it justifiable to take further steps than those already mentioned.

But these had not, he thought, failed to be effective. The Hanoverian King "appears much less eager to embark in the business than He was," and the Duke of Brunswick had said to him that his troops "should on no account enter Slesvig." On the other hand, Bligh did not believe, either, that his action had compromised anybody if his Government "should not feel disposed to exert their great influence in this matter." But, added Bligh, "considerable excitement is caused by reports coming from all quarters that this will be exerted; and will be pushed if necessary to the utmost extremity."

In what follows we shall see how little substance there was in the statement "the utmost extremity." But Bligh's appeal of course influenced the Hanoverian Government. The envoy of the

Provisional Government, Baron Rochus von Liliencron, who had come to Hanover in order to speed up the assistance of this country to the Slesvig-Holsteiners, wrote home on the 4th of April, that without an order from the Confederation the Hanoverian troops would not cross the Eider;¹ for a protest from England was feared. Indeed, so far no official declaration had been made, "but the present Minister has stated that according to his private conviction England would consider any assistance furnished to Slesvig as a breach of existing treaties."

On the 6th of April Bligh received a letter from his colleague in Copenhagen, who by Knuth had been asked to request him "to do do all in his Power to stop the Hanoverian Contingent."² This caused Bligh to visit Bennigsen again, who once more assured him that no Hanoverian troops "would enter Holstein without authority from the Diet," which had not yet arrived. As to Bligh's request "to prevent Volunteers passing from this Country into Holstein he [Bennigsen] would see what was to be done as he quite agreed with me that they might be dangerous not only to the Danes and to those whose Allies they ostensibly would be, but might eventually become so to this Country if repulsed from Holstein." There could hardly be any predilection for the revolutionary legionaries in Hanoverian Government circles.

In the dispatch to Palmerston in which Bligh stated his renewed appeal to Bennigsen, he thought it possible to ascertain that the idea of a war against Denmark was "decreasing in favour here, as they calculate the cost, and have ascertained that £ 600,000 worth of Hanoverian Property is at Sea; and that a Power however comparatively feeble on Land, may be formidable to a Commercial people not possessed of Ships of War." Bligh therefore thought that "the discredit of assisting the Rebellious Subjects of the Danish Crown may belong alone to the Prussian Government." He hoped to receive instructions from Palmerston before the Federal Diet had answered Hanover.

He did not. Only on the 10th of April in the morning did he receive Palmerston's information that he completely approved of

¹ EE. 2.

² Westmorland I, p. 47: Wynn to Westmorland 3/4. – F.O. 34/53: 6/4, No. 28.

his warnings to the Hanoverian Government.¹ Palmerston enjoined on him "earnestly to recommend the Hanoverian Government to pause before it embarks unnecessarily in operations beyond its own Frontier the Consequences of which may be more extensive and serious than may at first sight appear." Bligh hastened to inform Bennigsen of his Government's "salutary advice" and also informed Brunswick and Oldenburg about it. Although the Hanoverian Government already was acquainted with the decision of the Federal Diet of the 4th of April, "which entrusts to a Government so eager to act as that of Prussia has shewn itself in this matter, the negotiation with Denmark and the concert with the Powers, forming the 10. Corps of warlike measures, if deemed necessary to resort to them," Bligh felt convinced that the Hanoverian troops will not pass the Elbe, if it can be avoided.

Three days later Bligh in his dispatches to Palmerston – on the 13th he sent no less than four – had to admit that no doubt this could not be avoided, indeed, that even the Eider could be crossed.² At popular meetings in Hanover, as elsewhere in Germany, the people demanded that German troops should advance into the Duchies in order to revenge their "brother's" defeat, the ignominious defeat of the Slesvig-Holsteiners at Bov on the 9th of April.

In the first of the above-mentioned dispatches Bligh picturesquely, as stated above, characterized the activities of the committee of 50 members appointed by the Pre-Parliament. In the following dispatch he stated that his warnings obviously had been futile: "The Die is however now cast." In the morning of the 13th April he had had it confirmed by Bennigsen that the Hanoverian General Halkett had been ordered to advance into Holstein and perhaps into Slesvig as well. Bligh strongly complained to Bennigsen that Hanover "was about to enter upon a course fraught with danger and loss, more especially as I considered it was made the Cat's Paw, in the first instance of Prussia, which had Troops the memory of whose discomfiture at Berlin it might be desirable to obliterate by active service upon a popular expedition, and by the South of Germany, which hoped to

¹ F.O. 34/53: 10/4, No. 29. – Palmerston's note on Bligh's dispatch 31/3, No. 24.

² Ibid: No. 30–33.

add a Province to the Fatherland, without having the penalty of a Maritime position in obtaining it." At the end of his dispatch Bligh remarked that as in Hanover they would reluctantly come into conflict with Britain, "if not too late, a strong Protest from us against invading Slesvig might possibly keep, at any rate, the Hanoverian Contingent on this side the Eider."

In the third dispatch Bligh states that Prussia sent Baron Alex. v. Schleinitz as an envoy to Hanover in order to influence the attitude of this country. Bligh, however, justly thought that "the influence of such a person will not be needed to drag this Country in the course pursued by Prussia, as, unfortunately under the circumstances of the Times, whither the latter leads Hanover must, I fear, follow."

Finally, in his fourth and last dispatch of the 13th of April Bligh sent a copy of Bennigsen's note of the 12th to him about the advance of Hanoverian troops into Holstein. Bennigsen stated that on the 6th of April he had sent a courier to the Minister of Hanover in London, Count Adolph Aug. Fr. v. Kielmansegge in order to ask the latter to request Palmerston to use his influence with the Danish Government in order to come to "un arrangement convenable entre les Duchés de Slesvig Holstein et le Danemark." Bennigsen was, he pointed out, obliged to yield to the decision of the Federal Diet of the 4th of April: No German Government could fail to do so "à moins qu'il ne voulut mettre en danger l'existence même de la confédération menacée déjà si sérieusement par les graves Événements menés . . . par la fougue d'un esprit public qui paraît loin d'avoir achevé son tour de l'Europe."

In compliance with his Government's orders Kielmansegge on the 11th of April had a talk with Palmerston, to whom he submitted a note of the following contents:¹ "Events may arise," it said, "imposing upon the German Confederation the duty to oppose by every means and in case of Danish aggression [!], even by force of arms, any encroachment on the right of the two Duchies to maintain their indissoluble union and to preserve their independence." Therefore Hanover had ordered some of her troops to be prepared to advance into Holstein. Kielmansegge asked Palmerston whether this would result in a break between Hanover and Britain, and "whether Hanoverian subjects and commerce

¹ F.O. 34/55: Letters of 10/4 and 11/4 from Kielmansegge.

would be treated differently from what they have hitherto been." Hanover would, he assured, with great gratitude "acknowledge the determination of the British Government to adjust, without loss of time, by its influential mediation the differences between the Crown of Denmark and the Duchies of Slesvig-Holstein."

Palmerston's oral reply was to the effect that Britain's wish was that every step should be avoided which might lead to hostilities between Denmark and the German Confederation, and that Britain would be willing to mediate, as it had informed Berlin and Copenhagen.¹ He did not send a written reply until the 18th of April.² It contained the usual warnings to Hanover against participating in hostilities, and furthermore it was stated that Bligh had been instructed "to offer the good offices of Great Britain with a view to the amicable settlement of these differences, and to express the hope that nothing will in the meantime be done that will lead to a collision." Furthermore Palmerston sent to Kielmansegge a copy of Great Britain's Guarantee of 1720 to the Danish Crown concerning Slesvig, but obviously left it to Kielmansegge himself to judge what this meant.

Palmerston's instructions to Bligh to offer mediation by Great Britain was received by Bligh on the 15th of April.³ He immediately prepared a note to that effect to Bennigsen and dispatched similar notes to Brunswick and Oldenburg. He communicated Palmerston's offer for mediation in order to obtain "the amicable settlement of a matter which is threatening to disturb the Peace in this part of Europe, and to express their [the British Government's] hope that nothing will in the meantime be done that will lead to a collision as thereby the chances of a speedy accommodation would be immensely increased." Bligh pointed out that "the entrance of the Troops of the Confederation into Slesvig would almost inevitably destroy" the possibility of a peaceful arrangement.

Bligh took his note with him when he visited Bennigsen for a further talk with him about the affair. Bennigsen declared himself to be extremely satisfied with Britain's offer of mediation, about which he had also been informed through Kielmansegge,

¹ This is Bunsen's account of Kielmansegge's information to him. See Bunsen's dispatch of the 13th; cf. 14th of April.

² F.O. 34/55.

³ F.O. 34/53: 15/4, No. 34.

and expressed his hope that "the Danes, flushed with the success which had attended their first operations in Sleswig, would not, by attacking Holstein, frustrate the good intentions which Her Majesty's Government have in view." Bligh "strongly urged Him to delay, if not to prevent altogether the invasion of Slesvig by the Confederate Troops. He promised the former if possible," but was sceptical as regards the latter. When Bligh later heard that a cease fire had been agreed on, which ended on the evening of the 16th of April,¹ he again visited Bennigsen in order to make him try to have the cease-fire prolonged. Bennigsen promised to send an officer to Rendsburg "so as to arrive there by 3 P.M. tomorrow with instructions to endeavour to give effect to it." Furthermore, Bennigsen stated that he had taken steps to inform Prussia "of the earnest desire entertained here that" the offer of Britain "should be taken advantage of."

Some days later Bligh informed Palmerston of the written replies to his notes received from Bennigsen and Brunswick.² In the former was expressed, as remarked by Bligh, "an unmixed desire for an amicable arrangement with Denmark." Bennigsen wrote that Hanover had with great pleasure received the information about the offer for mediation by Britain and recommended it in Berlin, so that it was to be hoped "que rien n'arrive du gré des Gouvernements Allemands qui put entraver la médiation bienveillante de la Grande Bretagne." Hanover would gladly have ordered her troops not to enter Slesvig if the decision rested with her alone, but the decisions of the Federal Diet of the 4th and 12th of April gave her no free hand.

The reply of Brunswick given by v. Schleinitz, the Prime Minister, a brother of the new Prussian Minister in Hanover, on the other hand, was not very obliging. Bligh says about the reply that it shows "the reflex of opinions which I have heard, since his arrival here, from Baron Schleinitz, the new Prussian Minister, who passed some days at Brunsvic on his way; namely the necessity of avenging upon the Danes their late defeat of the Germans: or at any rate insisting upon the evacuation by the former of Slesvig, by way of establishing the *status quo ante*, as a pre-

¹ We can hardly speak about "armistice", but the Chief of the Prussian troops, Colonel Bonin, had presented an ultimatum which expired on the 18th (not the 16th) of April in the evening.

² F.O. 34/53: 19/4, No. 36.

liminary to negotiation." Bligh admits that the resolution of the 12th of April by the Federal Diet, "however unjustifiable it may be on their part" authorizes the German states to adopt this attitude. But, adds Bligh, "the Danes might certainly more fairly insist upon the dissolution of the Provisional Government at Rendsburg, the maintenance of which militates more against that *status quo*, than their occupation of any part of the Danish Monarchy."

The willingness of Hanover to meet the endeavours of mediation of Great Britain appears from the instruction given on the 15th of April to General Halkett, Chief of the Tenth Federal Corps.¹ For in Item 4 of this it is said that Great Britain had offered to mediate, as Hanover to-morrow [the 16th] will inform Prussia. "The British mediation will be made easier if the Danes are not attacked in their positions north of the Eider." But such an instruction, it was maintained by the Government of the Rebels in Rendsburg, militated against the decisions of the 4th and the 12th of April by the Federal Diet as well as against the Prussian King's order of the 10th of April to advance into Slesvig. Therefore the Provisional Government refused to place the Slesvig-Holstein troops under Halkett's command. Furthermore they complained to the Federal Diet of Halkett's and Hanover's behaviour, from which it is seen, so they wrote, that Hanover "endeavours to make the cause of the Duchies Slesvig-Holstein, which by the high German Confederation had been declared to be a German cause and placed under its protection, dependent on the attempts of mediation of a foreign great power, the Royal British one." Interference of foreign great powers could not be permitted, they wrote to Prussia at the same time. The conflict was solved in favour of the aggression, the Federal Diet just on the 15th of April deciding to request Prussia to appoint a Commander-in-Chief for the Prussian troops as well as those belonging to the Tenth Army Corps. This Commander became General Wrangel, under whose command General Halkett was placed.

In accordance with Palmerston's orders Bligh on the 22nd of April made a last attempt at keeping Hanover from opening hostilities to Denmark.² In a note which he on that day submitted

¹ EE. 18.

² F.O. 34/53: 24/4, No. 39.

to Bennigsen (similar notes were sent to Oldenburg and Brunswick) it said that, as Hanoverian troops threatened to advance into Slesvig, "I think it of the utmost importance to lose no time in calling your most serious attention" to the British Government's view of the case. Presumably on the same day he saw Bennigsen in order to make oral representations and call his attention to the Treaty of Guarantee of Great Britain of 1720. Bligh of course admitted that Bennigsen was right in his statement that Hanover could not act independently, but he was of opinion that she should exert all her influence on Prussia in order to obtain a peaceful solution, to which Bennigsen replied that Hanover had been "as earnest as possible in endeavouring to avert the Hostilities which now appeared imminent, and had even exposed Herself to Obloquy from the rest of Germany, for appearing backward in a cause which has excited so much Patriotic Enthusiasm."

At the Royal table on the 23rd of April the King, Ernest August, exchanged some words with Bligh, amongst other things saying that Palmerston "did not seem at all to understand the matter respecting Holstein and Slesvig by protesting against his operations there." When Bligh pointed out that the purpose of his appeals was to prevent "hostile proceeding against Denmark," the King said sharply, "Well, at any rate they (meaning Hostile operations) will probably begin tomorrow." Bligh permitted himself to express his regrets at this, for "it was far easier to begin than to terminate such matters."

In his dispatch to Palmerston recorded here Bligh expressed his disappointment at having failed to keep Hanover out of the conflict. For, he said, "independent of general considerations, if the Danes have not degenerated and if they decide upon defending their just cause to the utmost, this Country [Hanover] must be a loser by their obedience to the dictates of the Diet, or more properly speaking of the Fifty Men, who, assembled at Frankfort, and pretending to be the Organ of the Popular Will, are in fact the Provisional Government of Germany." On the other hand, Prussia's intentions regarding its conduct in the matter, wrote Bligh, were easy to understand: "to reinstate itself in the public opinion of Germany, to make another bid for

Supremacy, to encourage the late crestfallen Garrison of Berlin by an Expedition flattering to the National Vanity.”

At the Royal table on the 23rd of April King Ernest August had said that hostilities probably would be opened the next day, but they had, in fact, already been opened. On the 23rd the battle of Slesvig was fought, and the Danish retired northwards. As a last attempt at keeping Hanover from participating in the war, the Danish Government had sent the Secretary of Dispatches Fr. Reedtz there with an offer “not to molest Hanoverian Shipping or Trade in any way provided that no Hanoverian Troops crossed the Eider.”¹ Reedtz did not arrive at Hanover until the 25th, the following day negotiated with Bennigsen and on his own responsibility extended the offer to apply even if the Hanoverian troops had already advanced into Slesvig, “provided the Hanoverian Troops would halt immediately.” The Hanoverian Government, as might be expected, refused to initiate separate negotiations.

Reedtz had brought with him a letter from Wynn to Bligh, asking him to assist Reedtz so that Bennigsen would receive the latter immediately. Bligh indeed arranged this, but certainly also said to Reedtz “that I could not, under present circumstances, anticipate the slightest success from his endeavour to separate Hanover in this matter from Prussia.” In proof of this Bligh showed Bennigsen’s note in reply of the 23rd of April to his own note of the 22nd to Reedtz. In the note in reply reference was made to the letter from Arnim, the Prussian Foreign Minister, (of the 19th; cf. below) to the British Minister in Berlin, and it was said that Hanover was in complete agreement with Prussia. The contents of the reply of Brunswick, which was not sent until the 25th of April, were the same.²

After the Danish defeat on the 23rd of April, Bligh thought that Denmark would soon evacuate Slesvig, “and that thus the *status quo ante*, insisted upon by the Diet and by Prussia having been established, there will be no more excuse for not negotiating under the mediation which has been offered by Her Majesty’s Government as well as by Russia.” – Bligh’s own view of Prussia’s notion of the *status quo ante* has been mentioned above.

¹ F.O. 34/53: 27/4, No. 40.

² Ibid.: 5/5, No. 43.

c. Prussia.

The power on which the decision mainly depended whether Germany should support the Slesvig-Holstein rebellion or not, was Prussia. After the victory of the Revolution in Berlin on the 18th–19th March and King Frederick William's declaration of the 21st to head the movement towards German unity, there could hardly be any doubt about the attitude of the Prussian Government. On the 24th of March the King in letters patent to the Duke of Augustenborg, who had gone to Berlin, announced his approval of the three Slesvig-Holstein tenets and promised "to protect the Duchies Slesvig-Holstein from possible interventions and attacks with the most suitable means."¹ On the 2nd of April the Prussian Colonel Bonin arrived at Rendsburg and informed the Provisional Government that 4,000 Prussian soldiers would arrive one of the following days.² He was not authorized to advance into Slesvig until the 9th of April.³ On the 4th of April the Federal Diet had approved of the measures made "in defence of the Federal frontier in Holstein" by Prussia and by the states who furnished the Tenth Federal Corps, and requested Prussia to undertake a mediation "on the basis of the unabridged rights of Holstein, especially also rights to a constitutional connexion with Slesvig."⁴ Hostilities ought immediately to be suspended and the *status quo ante* to be restored.

A few days after the Revolution in Berlin, the town was visited by the Eider-Danish politician who had played so great a part at the change of Government in Copenhagen, Orla Lehmann, Minister without Portfolio. In instructions of the 26th of March drawn up by himself, he had by the Council of State been given the task of going to Berlin, Vienna, and London in order to obtain information about the intentions of the powers in question and inform the Danish Ministers in these towns of "our own situation."⁵ It was enjoined upon the Danish Minister in Berlin to provide Lehmann with an opportunity of discussion with the Prussian Foreign Minister. On the 27th of March Lehmann left Copenhagen. Two days later he was in Berlin.

¹ Haralds, p. 269.

² EE. 15. – Haralds, p. 37.

³ Schleiden says the 10th. See Haralds, p. 49.

⁴ Haralds, p. 275.

⁵ Lehmann's private archives. C. 13.

Although Lehmann in Berlin as well as in London – he did not go to Vienna – appeared together with our Ministers there, there is reason to doubt the expediency of his mission. It may be considered that as a National-Liberal he had certain qualifications to negotiate with the new Prussian Government, but at any rate nothing came of it, and how much sympathy could be expected from the Conservative Russian and English diplomats on whose support he was dependent.

When Sir Henry Wynn on the 22nd of March informed his Government of the change of Government in Denmark, he wrote that it had been “forced on the Sovereign by expressions of public opinion such as the hitherto absolute sway of this country afforded no previous example of.”¹ But he added that after the events at Rendsburg on the 18th of March it could not be expected that “the Danish Party should remain inactive.” Two days later he stated about the Government that its chief, Count A. W. Moltke, gave respectability to a Government which had been “formed from necessity, in part of the most violent of the radical party.”² He characterized Lehmann as “a lawyer more distinguished by his powers of Oratory than judicial learning.” On the 29th of March Wynn wrote to his colleague in Berlin: “I am assured that he [Lehmann] has no distinct Mission, and the object of his colleagues seem to be honorably relieved at the present moment from so radical a member.”³ On this letter Westmorland himself (later?) added that Lehmann “was a red hot Radical who in the liberal movement in Copenhagen had got to be a Minister.”

About his first talk with Lord Westmorland Lehmann said that he was received with “the utmost courtesy,” and that he fully explained to him “our whole cause, of which he had not the least idea beforehand.”⁴ He answered that he had no instructions “on that occasion”. Soon after, however, he was informed by Wynn about the “occasion”.

On the 27th of March Wynn in a conversation with Count Knuth had suggested that Great Britain and Russia together

¹ F.O. 22/162.

² *Ibid.*: 24/3.

³ Westmorland I, p. 21 ff. The same view is expressed by Ungern Sternberg in a dispatch of the 29th of March, No. 41. *Russiske Akter*. X. 1848.

⁴ Lehmann's letter of 31st of March to Knuth. The file mentioned on p. 20, Note 2.

should issue a declaration warning Prussia against interfering with the conditions of the Duchies.¹ This was an initiative taken by him without awaiting instructions from Palmerston. He talked with Ungern Sternberg about it and met with his approval. The following day Knuth had a discussion with the two Ministers, for which Oxholm, Lord of the Bedchamber, was summoned, too.² Knuth gave information about the menacing news from Berlin received through Plessen. Wynn "expressed my opinion that some check might be imposed on the course adopted by the King of Prussia by a joint Representation of Her Majesty's and the Russian Minister at Berlin of what they conceived would be the view of their respective Government, and I offered to convey this request to Lord Westmorland in the hopes that he might think himself justified in being active previous to the receipt of Instructions." Sternberg promised to write to Meyendorff for the same purpose. When Knuth of course would like to know whether Great Britain and Russia could not be supposed to offer more than moral support, the Ministers replied that they had no opinion as to that. Perhaps they might send ships, each in the same number, uttered Knuth. In his dispatch to Palmerston Wynn did not state his reply to that. Sternberg, however, reported as follows: Wynn said: "Je crois que mon Gouvernement regardera comme un cas d'intervention toute agression hostile au Danemark de la part d'une autre Puissance, et le Ministère britannique aussi bien que la Russie sauraient faire respecter leur protestation contre la violation des traités. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement anglais croirait devoir envoyer à cette fin des bâtiments de guerre sur les côtes du royaume de Danemark," it would probably invite the Russian Government to send a similar force. "La présence seule de ces vaisseaux servira à contenir les velléités des autres puissances."

Knuth drew up a *procès-verbal* on his talks with Wynn and Sternberg.³ According to this he had first pointed out that the King as a Member of the German Confederation for Holstein had to associate himself with the general wish for a German Parlia-

¹ F.O. 22/162: 27/3, No. 25.

² See Wynn's dispatch of 29/3, No. 26. F.O. 22/162. – Ungern Sternberg's dispatch of 29/3, No. 41. Russ. Akter. X.

³ Brevskaber, p. 1 ff.

ment. Consequently Slesvig, which did not belong to the Confederation, had to be administered separately. The King had already made a statement to that effect. Then Knuth before the Ministers had mentioned the outbreak of the rebellion and Prussia's hostile attitude towards Denmark and expressed a wish that Russia and Great Britain issued a joint declaration about non-intervention in the interior conditions of Denmark, and that the difference between Holstein and Slesvig was expressly stated. Furthermore, Knuth expressed a wish that the two Ministers by their Courts were authorized to conduct negotiations with him about the best way in which such a declaration could be supported. The Ministers promised to inform their Governments immediately.

Wynn remarked about this procès-verbal when he sent a copy of it to Palmerston, that although there were some inaccuracies and omissions in it, it was in the main correct.¹ The essential thing was Knuth's "application for common *moral* assistance and our consent to apply for it without in any manner engaging our Government." If Sternberg's report is correct, it seems, however, that Wynn at any rate to some degree found that he could lay his Government under an obligation.

It is in agreement with Lehmann's statement made above that Westmorland in a dispatch of the 29th of March informed his Government that he had turned down Lehmann's and Plessen's appeal to approach the Prussian Government.² He did so on the ground that Count Arnim had assured him that the Prussian transportation of troops to the frontier of Holstein was solely a "means of preserving peace." Some days before Arnim had stated that the sending of the troops was made for the purpose of preventing "any collision between the Danish troops and those of that country (Holstein) or the Entry into it of any German Free Corps."³ Similar "peaceful" assurances were submitted to the French Minister in Berlin, Circourt, who also promised to request his Government not to oppose the Prussian march of troops.⁴

¹ F.O. 22/162: 30/3, No. 28.

² F.O. 64/285: 29/3, No. 87.

³ *Ibid.*: 26/3, No. 83.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 27/3, No. 86.

The day after Lehmann's arrival at Berlin he and Plessen had a conference with Count Arnim.¹ About the result of this talk Arnim informed Lord Westmorland that it "had been satisfactory, that he had persuaded these Gentlemen that the present time was not a fitting opportunity for a military invasion of those Duchies, and he proved to them that the advance of the allied troops was only destined to prevent hostilities which was as much in the interest of Denmark as of the rest of Europe." Westmorland, however, had quite a different report on the course of the conference from Lehmann, who was "entirely dissatisfied with the language held by" Arnim. Lehmann's only hope, he said to Westmorland, was now centred in Great Britain. He found "the Prussian Cabinet to be too weak and too much under the influence of German agitators to take a line in accordance with what was due to the rights of other Nations." In the dispatch from which these quotations have been taken, Westmorland mentions that King Frederick William IV had also discussed the matter with the British diplomat Stratford Canning (later created Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe), who on his way to his post in Constantinople broke his journey in Berlin.² To him the King had mentioned a request to Great Britain "to mediate in this business." Westmorland did not know how much importance was to be attached to this statement. At any rate Arnim had not said anything to him about it.

Stratford Canning, who was mentioned by Westmorland, had before his departure from London had a number of special tasks assigned to him (see above, p. 27).³ But during these days so great upheavals took place that the instructions no longer corresponded to the present circumstances. Metternich, whom he was to have seen, had already on the 13th of March had to resign. All the good advice which Lord Palmerston had included in the instructions, that the Princes ought to be obliging to the Liberal currents, had become superfluous. The revolutions had made the Princes go much farther than Palmerston had been dreaming. When Canning late on the 26th of March arrived at Berlin, he

¹ F.O. 64/285: 30/3, No. 92. — Lehmann's letter to Knuth 31/3. The file mentioned on p. 20, Note 2.

² Haralds' statements on p. 41 about Canning are corrected by what has been stated above by me.

³ F.O. 30/117: 18/3, No. 1.

wrote: "So vast a change has taken place in the situation and policy of this Government since I left England, that my instructions have now little room for application."¹

One or two days passed before Canning obtained an audience with the King. Several important questions were discussed, but I shall here keep to Canning's discussions with the King and Count Arnim about the Slesvig-Holstein question. In his dispatch of the 30th of March to Palmerston² Canning reported that the King and Arnim for the purpose of obtaining Great Britain's mediation had "severally opened themselves to me on the subject of Holstein and Slesvig. I have received His Majesty's communications and also that of His Minister *officially*." The question was of great importance.

Canning then gave an account of the German view of the question: that it was the Danish King's decision to separate Slesvig from Holstein which had provoked the Rebellion, which was only intended "to assert their right to a separate existence in union with each other under that Crown [of Denmark]. The King of Prussia, consistently with the position which He has recently taken with respect to the German Confederation, has detached a body of troops . . . jointly with Hanover, Brunswick and Mecklenburg – under orders to stop in the first instance at the frontier, and in case of an attack upon either of the Duchies by Denmark, to cross the frontier and to drive out the Danes." The Prussians had not awaited any mandate from the Federal Diet at Frankfurt. "They assert that Holstein belongs to Germany – that Slesvig is inseparably united with Holstein, and that the Salic Law prevail in both Duchies."

In the following mention by Canning of the Danish point of view there is a single misunderstanding which I shall pass over. But he correctly mentions that the Danish view was to the effect "that Slesvig has been long invariably and permanently united to the Crown of Denmark," and that in 1720 "the Duchy was confirmed and guaranteed to Denmark by France and England." From Danish quarters (Plessen and Lehmann) he had been informed that the King was determined to give either Duchy a separate administration and "that He is also determined to put

¹ F.O. 30/117: 26/3, No. 5.

² *Ibid.*: 30/3, No. 9.

down the insurrection by force of arms." Therefore, continued Canning, a collision between German and Danish troops could easily occur; "nor can I doubt that in a general point of view it would be agreeable to Her Majesty's Government if such a contingency were avoided. It is likewise far from impossible that motives for preventing hostilities between Prussia and Denmark would be found in the incidental injury which they might be expected to inflict on English Commercial interests, and particularly on those of English Underwriters, should Denmark apply her naval resources to obstruct the commerce of Prussia."

Finally Canning stated that the only reply he had given to the King's and Arnim's appeals was that no particular objection "to the proposed Mediation strikes me at first sight, and that it would be highly desirable, more especially in the present state of Europe, to find some means of avoiding the chances of a collision."—If from Canning's dispatch it should be possible to make a conclusion as to his own view of the controversial issue, it seems to me, if anything, to be in favour of the German opinion, an opinion starting from a false chronology with regard to the outbreak of the Slesvig-Holstein Revolution. No utterance in the dispatch indicates that Canning should have appeared as an advocate of the Danish point of view.

In Lehmann's report on his and Plessen's conference with Arnim on the 30th of March it says that Arnim "by no means" had made "any confidence-inspiring impression" on him. All Lehmann's arguments for affiliation of Slesvig to Denmark and for the necessity of its separation from Holstein when the latter was to become a province of the projected Germany, were lost on Arnim. I got the impression, wrote Lehmann, "that the Government was obliged to act like this, willy-nilly, and that Europe was in such a state of dissolution that it would be forced to endure it, whether it approved of it or not . . ." It was Prussia's advice, Lehmann finally wrote, that Denmark should not cross the Kongeå river, but enter on the road of negotiations (with the Provisional Government and Germany). "His Majesty's Government will now, *causa cognita*, be able to make their decision if this has not already been made." In a postscript Lehmann added that he had just learned that the dice were cast. The Danish army

had crossed the Kongeå and advanced into Slesvig in order to help the loyal and suppress the revolt.

On the 31st of March Wynn's dispatches reached Lord Westmorland, who immediately reacted to Wynn's request by applying to Meyendorff.¹ However, Meyendorff declined to participate in the address suggested by Wynn (without awaiting the instructions of their respective Governments) to the Prussian Government "with the view of arresting the progress of the measure of military surveillance on the frontiers of Holstein which they had adopted." For Meyendorff found that nothing would come of such an address considering the state of weakness of the Prussian Government. Indeed, even if he received instructions from his Government, he said, he would be reluctant to act upon them because of the strained relations between Russia and Prussia, provoked by the attitude of the latter towards the Poles. He characterized the conduct of Prussia towards Denmark as "the most unjust course they were pursuing."

Westmorland, however, followed Wynn's urgent request: on the 1st of April he had a prolonged talk with Count Arnim.² As he had no instructions, he said, he could only point out "the natural advantage which would arise from an understanding upon such a question having been arrived at between our two Governments before any hostilities should take place." Arnim replied that neither Prussia nor Germany would tolerate that Danish troops occupied Holstein. But he was willing to make an arrangement to the effect that the German troops who were now marching to the assistance of the Provisional Government, "should not go beyond the Eider if the Danish troops would agree not to pass this frontier." If Plessen approved of this, he, Arnim, would propose this to his colleagues and the King, and they would no doubt agree to it. And if Denmark would appeal to Great Britain to mediate, he would gladly accept such a mediation. After the talk with Arnim Westmorland learnt from Plessen that he would accept the Eider line, "particularly if Prussia will consent in return not to pass the Frontiers of Holstein." Plessen would also write to his Government and invite it to apply for Great Britain's mediation, which he said that he was sure they would accept.

¹ F.O. 64/286: 1/4, No. 95. - Cf. Lehmann to Knuth 2/4. The file mentioned on p. 20, Note 2.

² F.O. 64/286: 1/4, No. 96.

Evidently, according to Westmorland's reports of Arnim's and Plessen's statements, there is the difference between these that the former would make the German troops advance into Holstein, whereas Plessen naturally did not want them to cross the frontiers of the Danish Monarchy. But both of them presupposed that the Danish troops came to a halt on the Eider. In a verbal note left by Lehmann with Stratford Canning after he and Plessen had given him detailed information about "quæstionen" (the question), it says that the first (German) soldier who crossed the frontier of Holstein meant a violation of the principle of non-intervention "porté au nom de l'insurrection contre le pouvoir légitime."¹ Furthermore, any attack on the Eider, "la limite éternelle entre l'Allemagne et le Danemark," would be a *casus foederis* especially to the powers (Great Britain and France) that had guaranteed the Danish possession of Slesvig.

The Danes in Berlin made a draft for a declaration which was intended to be signed by Plessen and Arnim.² In this draft Prussia declared that her troops would not set foot on Danish territory unless Danish troops advanced into Holstein. In return Plessen declared in the name of his King that, if so, the Danish would not cross the Eider. Prussia promised to try to make Hanover, Mecklenburg, and Oldenburg accede to the declaration. It was assumed that Denmark's German neighbours would prevent the formation of legions and their advance into the King's countries.

It soon appeared that Prussia would not accept such an arrangement, nor did the English diplomats, in whom Lehmann and Plessen centred all their hopes, succeed in stopping the avalanche. On the 2nd of April Westmorland wrote to Palmerston that he had done all that he dare do without instructions to make Arnim promise "not to pass the frontier of Holstein till he had learnt the sentiments of Your Lordship. But I fear his anxiety to occupy that country before the arrival there of Danish troops will prevent his agreeing to any delay."³ The following day Lehmann informed him that Arnim had turned down any arrangement "by which the entry of the German confederate troops

¹ Lehmann's archives. C. 13. — See also *ibid.* a copy of Lehmann's letter of 1/4 to Count Reventlow.

² Lehmann's archives. C. 13.

³ F.O. 64/286: 2/4, No. 102.

into Holstein might be arrested," and that also Stratford Canning's endeavours had been in vain.¹ As a postscript to the dispatch in which he gave Palmerston this piece of news, Westmorland stated that he understood that the Prussian regiments which were leaving Potsdam "are to proceed at once to Rendsburg, they will have orders not to pass the Eider if they are not attacked and Plessen has assured me he will exert all his influence with his own Government to prevent the passage of that River by the Danish troops." Undoubtedly Plessen could easily give this assurance. – In a simultaneous letter from Lehmann to Knuth it said: "At this moment Sir Stratford gives the message that Prussia would not desist from the decision to occupy Rendsburg and to do so immediately."² In the letter Lehmann – presumably out of consideration for Great Britain – warned against hastening blockade or captures: "For we probably all agree that England is our best support and – even though the word itself has not been pronounced – the final arbitrator in our case." He would now go to London – he left Berlin the same evening – and there, he thought, the task must be to make England declare it a *casus belli* if a Prussian soldier set foot on Slesvig soil. This could more easily be done if they knew that Prussia "at present does not intend to do so at all." Therefore Lehmann hoped that Stratford Canning would write to Palmerston that Prussia at least at present did not intend to cross the Eider!

Canning did so in his simultaneous dispatch.³ He had, he wrote, in the questions of Poznan and Slesvig before the King as well as Arnim "endeavoured to narrow the chances of collision, and to gain time for the operation of Your Lordship's influence, should it be deemed advisable to employ it on those questions. A similar request from the Danish Minister and his temporary Colleague, Monsieur Lehmann, who goes on to England to night, enabled me to act in the same sense on both parties. Each will send troops – Prussia into Holstein and Denmark into Slesvig." But "as the Mediation of England is desired by both," he hoped that "they will not cross the River Eyder, which separates the one Duchy from the other, before there is time to hear from

¹ F.O. 64/286: 3/4, No. 103.

² 3/4. The file mentioned on p. 20, Note 2.

³ F.O. 30/117: 3/4, No. 10.

England." Major v. Wildenbruch, who accompanied the Prussian troops, was to negotiate with Denmark, and Arnim "assures me that if the offer is accepted, the Prussian troops will not go beyond Rendsburg; – and the Danish Representative appears to acquiesce in the notion that his countrymen will do best to keep out of Holstein for the present." At the end of the dispatch Canning expressed his anxiety for "the future destinies of Prussia, and by a natural consequence, of Germany and of Europe."

The prospect of a military collision between Prussia-Germany and Denmark gave rise to anxiety in German commercial and shipping circles. This has already been indicated at the mention of the positions of Hamburg and Hanover. During his stay in Berlin Lehmann thus had a visit by two merchants from Stettin who had been sent to Berlin to plead for the cause of commerce.¹ "Much alarm," wrote Westmorland on the 2nd of April, "exists in the public here and amongst the persons interested in the navigation of the Baltic . . ."² At the sitting of the 4th of April in the United Prussian Diet Bismarck-Schönhausen called attention to the matter and said that the Danish question gave rise to an uncertainty which weighed heavily on the commerce of the Baltic coast.³ Westmorland, who attended the debate, correctly reported on Arnim's reply that he denied that Prussia should be at war with Denmark: "a military expedition had been sent to uphold German Rights in a country belonging to the Germanic Confederation."⁴ The reasons for it were found in the decision of the Federal Diet in September 1846, and "circumstances were of so pressing a nature that previously to carrying the determination of the Government into effect there had not been time to refer to the Diet at Frankfort and await its decision, but its competency had been reserved." Arnim did not expect that Denmark would take hostile steps against the commerce and shipping of Prussia, and he feared the less a collision between Prussia and Denmark "as he had reason to hope that a friendly Power would undertake a mediation to which it had already shewn

¹ Orla Lehmann's *Efterladte Skrifter*. Udg. af Hother Hage. II. (1873), p. 149.

² F.O. 64/286: 2/4, No. 102.

³ Horst Kohl, *Die Reden des Abgeordneten von Bismarck-Schönhausen*. 1842–52 (1892), p. 46 ff.

⁴ F.O. 64/286: 4/4, No. 107.

itself favourably disposed." Westmorland testified to the fact that the reference to the mediation by Great Britain was well received by the assembly. – The missing mandate given by the Federal Diet to Prussia which was mentioned by Arnim was given by the above-mentioned Federal Resolution of the 4th of April.

Whereas Westmorland still had to wait for instructions from his Foreign Minister, Baron Arnim could feel greatly satisfied with the information he received from the Prussian Minister in London, Bunsen, about Britain's attitude. According to Bunsen's dispatch of the 31st of March Palmerston thus in an occasional talk on the 27th should have said to him that if the population (in the Duchies) decides on "the union" (a state Slesvig-Holstein?) and can hold its own, nobody will have any objection.¹ In part – though only in part – corresponding to such a point of view is Palmerston's order to Wynn to recommend the Danish King to make "such reasonable concessions to the Feelings of his subjects in the several Portions of his Dominions as may be sufficient for the Purpose of keeping together under His Majesty's Crown the territories and states of which the Danish Monarchy is composed."² In a conversation on the 5th (or 4th?) of April between Westmorland and Arnim the latter stated that Bunsen had informed Palmerston of Prussia's decision to "advance troops into Holstein" and that Palmerston "had not objected to it."³ Arnim's statement was – consciously or unconsciously – wrong.⁴ He furthermore mentioned the proposal by the Danish Government "to regulate a line of demarcation in the Duchies of Slesvig-Holstein beyond which neither the troops of Prussia nor Denmark should advance,"⁵ but said that now it was too late "to enter upon any such arrangement." The reason why in the Diet he had mentioned a possible English mediation was, explained Arnim, that "a statement had been published by the Spenersche Zeitung . . .

¹ Bunsen's dispatch 31/3. – Precht, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

² Palmerston's memorandum of 31/3. F.O. 22/167.

³ F.O. 64/286: 5/4, No. 110; cf. 6/4, No. 113.

⁴ Bunsen's dispatch of 31/3 (cf. above) does not contain any basis of the statement.

⁵ The reference is presumably to the Danish Government's confidential communication of the 1st of April to the Prussian Minister (Brevskaber, p. 6 ff.) about the establishment of a line of demarcation between the Danish troops and those of the Provisional Government, whereas those of Prussia should not be allowed to cross the frontier of Prussia.

which represented England as having announced that the passage of the Eider by German Federal troops would be considered by Her as a declaration of War.”

Two days later (the 7th of April) Arnim informed the British Minister that the Prussian troops had entered Rendsburg, and that he would suggest to the King and the Cabinet “the propriety of ordering them to advance into the Duchy of Slesvig, and to take possession of it in spite of any resistance by the troops of Denmark.”¹ Westmorland requested Arnim to wait issuing such an order, until information was received about Palmerston’s “opinions upon the questions regarding the Duchies both of Holstein and Slesvig.” Westmorland thought that he would receive such a message by the courier from Hamburg the next day. Arnim promised to wait.

But the next day, when Arnim summoned Westmorland in order to learn whether he had now received instructions, Westmorland had to answer in the negative.² Arnim then said “that he could no longer delay the order to the Prussian troops to advance into Slesvig, to the support of the troops of Holstein which had assembled at Flensburg.” All Westmorland’s attempts at making him await information about Palmerston’s attitude were in vain. – Simultaneously Westmorland stated that the Duke of Augustenborg had paid a visit to him in order to explain his position and ask for British support. “He stated that if England would mediate so as to secure the Southern and German part of Slesvig as belonging to Germany, which would include a line covering Apenrade and Tondern he thought it would satisfy the German population and might re-establish the tranquillity of these countries.”

Canning had no more than Westmorland, as he stated in a dispatch of the 9th of April, any success regarding his efforts “in order to obtain a suspension of military operations leading to collision, until Your Lordship’s sentiments could be made known as to the question of Schleswig.”³ Arnim, he wrote, “told me this morning that, although the Government had withheld its definitive orders during the last two days, it was now impelled by fresh

¹ F.O. 64/286: 7/4, No. 116.

² Ibid.: 8/4, No. 118.

³ F.O. 30/117: 9/4. (Private and Confidential).

advices from Rendsburg to direct the immediate entrance of the federal troops into Schleswig." And, as Plessen had told him, the Danish army would "resist any actual attack upon its position with all its strength."

When Canning, probably the following day, left Berlin it was with an impression "that a feeling of dejection, an impression that no resistance could be safely offered for the moment to popular clamour, prevailed even in the minds of those who were not acting under the responsibilities of office."¹

During his stay in Berlin Canning was under great influence from German and Slesvig-Holstein quarters. Thus the envoy of the Provisional Government, Professor Waitz, in the evening of the 9th of April had a long talk with him.² According to Waitz Canning by no means made any statement to the effect that Britain would intervene for the benefit of Denmark, but still he found the admission of Slesvig to the German Confederation inadvisable and stated that a war in the North now would be the greatest disaster. There could be no doubt about Prussia's will to help the Slesvig-Holsteiners, wrote Waitz. The only thing that had a restrictive influence was the regard for Britain.

Westmorland did not receive the anxiously looked-for communications from London of Palmerston's attitude to the matter until the 10th of April.³ They consisted of a communication of Bligh's dispatch of the 31st of March (see p. 41 f.) and of the instructions which had then been given him, and finally of a statement that "the maintenance of General peace ought at all times be one of the first objects of the solicitude of all European Statesmen," and indeed so at present. Westmorland immediately applied to Arnim and declared that he had by Palmerston been authorized to request him "not to begin hostilities against Denmark." The Slesvig-Holstein question, said Westmorland, "would surely admit of a pacific arrangement," and "there were elements enough of discord afloat in Europe without adding this to the number." He read Bligh's dispatch and Palmerston's instructions aloud to Arnim, who would not, however, budge an inch

¹ F.O. 30/117: 24/4, No. 11.

² EE. 10: letter from Waitz 10/4.

³ Westmorland's dispatch of 10/4, No. 123. F.O. 64/286. — Orders 6/4, Nos. 81 and 84. F.O. 64/282. — See also Evelyn Ashley, *The Life of . . . Viscount Palmerston*. I, p. 85 f.

from his decision, "which is to order the advance of the Prussian troops into Slesvig and the occupation of that country." From the exchange of words between them it should be noted that Arnim expressed a hope that Palmerston would consent to be mediator, which would "be a much easier task, when Germany was in position of all she had a right to, than if you [P.] had to obtain the evacuation of territory by the Danes." Westmorland of course completely rejected the weight of this argument if what was wanted was "a fair adjustment of the question in dispute," and again pointed out Palmerston's wish for avoiding hostilities.

The negative result of the talk made Westmorland send Arnim a note with recapitulation of his statements the following day.¹ It was Palmerston's urgent request to Prussia that she abstained from hostilities towards Denmark; there was conflict enough without that: "La politique la plus sage pour l'Europe centrale doit certainement être de rester unie dans un moment où des dangers peuvent surger de tous côtés, et bien sûrement il serait avantageux d'éviter l'exemple d'une intervention armée contre un Souverain et son peuple, qui dans le temps actuel ne peut être que dangereux."

Westmorland's note caused Arnim to ask the following day whether the note was to be considered "comme une ouverture officielle, par laquelle Vous seriez autorisée à intervenir dans l'affaire en question" or only as a confidential communication from the British Government. In reply Westmorland the same day sent a copy of an order of the 8th of April from Palmerston, at the same time requesting another talk with Arnim. Palmerston's order to Westmorland was identical with the one simultaneously sent to Hodges (see above), of course with the difference that the representations about the calamities of a war should here be directed to Prussia.²

In the renewed talk (on the 12th of April) between the British Minister and Arnim the latter first attempted to doubt the official character of the Minister's note. Westmorland, however, confirmed it. Arnim then continued by saying that "he could not alter the course he was pursuing, that he was backed by the authority of the Diet, that the orders to the Prussian troops to

¹ F.O. 64/286: 13/4, No. 129. — Arnim's letter of 13/4 to Bunsen.

² F.O. 64/282: 8/4, No. 86.

occupy the Duchy of Slesvig were given, that he was supported by the popular feeling of Germany, and that he would not be intimidated," to which Westmorland remarked that Britain had confined itself to give friendly advice. Arnim admitted that, but added that Britain had intimidated Hanover (cf. above). The Government of that country had frankly declared this, and now wanted to withdraw its troops "from joining in the common action which had been agreed upon." Britain in this way would make Hanover unpopular in Germany, but he had sent Schleinitz there to bring the country back to its first decision (i. e. participation in the war against Denmark). Westmorland deprecated the expression "intimidation" about the advice Palmerston had given Hanover.

During the talk Arnim informed Westmorland about the defeat of the Slesvig-Holstein troops at Bov, and added that Bonin did not feel strong enough "to cross the Eider to their support." Westmorland thought that then the moment was suitable for negotiations with Denmark. Arnim furthermore declared that he agreed with Palmerston "in principle" (non-intervention), "but its application under present circumstances was a different thing." According to Bunsen's report, he said, Palmerston was "not choosing to accept the mediation which he was ready to have agreed to, but which you had not been asked to undertake by Denmark." Arnim was of course satisfied with Bunsen's statement that Palmerston had declined Denmark's wish for having a British fleet sent to the Baltic.

Arnim's written answer, also dated at the 12th of April, to Westmorland's note contained the German (Slesvig-Holstein) postulates that it was not the rebellion on the part of Slesvig-Holstein but Denmark that was the cause of the conflict. This was a case, wrote Arnim, "*dans laquelle les droits et l'honneur de l'Allemagne entière sont engagés.*" He ended by stating that he did not think that he would hurt the good relations between Prussia and Great Britain by performing his duty to the German Confederation "*dans une cause Allemande.*" – The reply clearly expressed Prussia's firm will forcibly to occupy Slesvig, and did so with the hypocritical assurance that it was not Prussia who opened hostilities against Denmark, and that her task was mediation and negotiation.

In his dispatch of the 13th of April Westmorland informed Palmerston about his futile appeal to Arnim and in a private letter he gave Wynn similar information at the same time.¹ Arnim, he wrote, "is looking to popularity with German patriots," and he was "very much disturbed to find Hanover has (in consequence of our representations) shown a hesitation as to the advance of her troops." Westmorland furthermore, as in the dispatch, mentions Schleinitz's mission, "but I hardly think he will succeed." As mentioned above, the Slesvig-Holsteiners of course were extremely dissatisfied with the "temporizing" of Hanover. Meanwhile the Prussian General Wrangel had become Commander-in-Chief, and in the Easter Battle on the 23rd of April at Slesvig he after a long and stubborn fight defeated the outnumbered Danish force. The Germans occupied the whole of the continental part of Slesvig.

Between the Easter Battle and Westmorland's above-mentioned dispatch of the 13th of April there was a span of ten days. These days, too, were used by Westmorland for urgent appeals to the Prussian Government on no account to open hostilities. Although we now know that these appeals were made in vain – and perhaps would be so because of the revolutionary state of Germany – it is reasonable in some detail to mention these activities of Westmorland and the instructions from London concerning them. A few days before the Easter Battle Russia, for that matter, again gave up the passiveness she had enjoined upon herself during the culmination of the revolutionary storms.

On the 11th of April Palmerston ordered Westmorland to inform the Prussian Government that Great Britain "would willingly employ its good offices with a view to bring about an amicable arrangement of this unfortunate difference, if the two Parties should concur in accepting the friendly intervention of Her Majesty's Government."² On the 15th of April Westmorland passed this information on to Arnim.³ Arnim answered that, indeed, he had already through Westmorland declared himself to be willing to accept the mediation of Great Britain: he was still so. The Danish Minister, Plessen, furthermore had declared before him that Denmark "had applied for this mediation." Therefore

¹ Westmorland. I, p. 75.

² F.O. 64/282: 11/4, No. 90.

³ F.O. 64/286: 15/4, No. 134.

he did not understand what Palmerston "was waiting for." "The only questions were whether I [Westmorland] had clearly stated to Your Lordship that he was willing to accept the mediation if proposed by Denmark, and next whether Denmark had applied for it." According to a letter from Bunsen of the 5th of April, Denmark had not yet done so, and in Arnim's opinion this must be the cause of Palmerston's "doubt."¹

When Westmorland informed Plessen about Arnim's statements, Plessen on the 16th of April sent a note to Arnim "stating his impression derived from a knowledge of the views of his Court that ere this period a formal demand for" England's mediation "has been made on the part of Denmark, and suggesting to His Excellency [Arnim] to take, under these circumstances, such measures as he may think proper" in order to stop bloodshed.²

As Westmorland on the 17th of April had a reliable courier to Hamburg and need not use the ordinary mail, he sent Palmerston some critical comments on conspicuous contradictions in Arnim's note of the 12th of April.³ Amongst other things he said, "If the directions he [Arnim] is to carry into execution were to conquer the Duchy his hostile proceeding against it would be explained – but it is by mediation that he is directed to operate with regard to it which would appear to be in direct opposition to the conquest he is meditating. – If an object is to be obtained by mediation it is understood not to be intended (during the period the mediation lasts) that it should be obtained by force." Arnim's statement that the order to occupy Slesvig had been given in order to prevent a bloody combat (!) was commented on by Westmorland by saying that the only combat that can arise was about the possession of Slesvig. "By this measure therefore there seems to be no chance of saving the bloody contest . . . on the contrary it renders it inevitable." Arnim was of course aware of this, added Westmorland, but anxious as he was to execute the decisions of the Diet at Frankfurt, it did not change anything in his procedure.

¹ The question is not mentioned at all in Bunsen's dispatch of 5/4.

² F.O. 64/286: 16/4, No. 135. – A copy of Plessen's note of the 16th of April is found beside his dispatch of the same date, No. 47. Dpt. f. u. Anliggender. Preussen II. Depecher. In the note, for which Plessen took the full responsibility, it is assured that Denmark's peaceful intentions will formally have been communicated to Britain in order to obtain her mediation. But Arnim said that it was too late!

³ F.O. 64/286: 17/4, No. 140.

The most important of the directions sent from London to the British Minister in Berlin was undoubtedly Palmerston's order of the 14th of April.¹ It enjoined upon the Minister to the Prussian Government to express the hope of Britain that Prussian troops did not advance into Slesvig, "or that if it has been, orders may be sent immediately for the Prussian troops to retire from Slesvig." At the same time Westmorland was to submit to Arnim a copy of the British Treaty of 1720 guaranteeing Denmark's undisturbed possession of Slesvig. The fact, sad to Denmark and reassuring to Prussia, was that in the order nothing whatever was stated as to the way in which Britain intended to fulfil this guarantee.

On the 18th of April Westmorland executed the orders given and also sent Arnim a copy of Palmerston's order "because I felt that, in so important a communication, he ought to be acquainted with the words Your Lordship had used, although I had embodied them in my communication."² But neither Palmerston's "authentic words" nor Westmorland's talk on the 19th with Arnim made any impression on the latter. Arnim now pleaded that the decision rested with the Diet at Frankfurt, but promised to inform the Diet about Palmerston's dispatch. On the guarantee, it said in Arnim's note in reply that Prussia "*connaît et reconnaît parfaitement cette garantie, mais il est d'avis que le différend actuel n'y touche en aucune manière.*" In the same way as Arnim here recognized Britain's guarantee for Denmark's peaceful possession of Slesvig – and at the same time intended to expel the Danes from there – he recognized in the note the Danish King's sovereignty "*sur son Duché de Slesvic-Holstein*" (a duchy which was only a Slesvig-Holstein fiction) – and simultaneously rushed to the assistance of the Provisional (rebellious) Government at Rendsburg.

From the talk with Arnim Westmorland furthermore reports that Arnim had told him that Meyendorff had offered him, Arnim, to get the Russian diplomat Dashkoff "to unite with me in any mediation the Prussian Government might agree to accept." But Arnim had answered "that no such mediation could

¹ F.O. 64/282: 14/4, No. 91.

² F.O. 64/286: 19/4, No. 146, with enclosure. – Westmorland's note of the 18th of April to Arnim and the latter's reply of the 19th have been printed in *Actenstücke*, p. 8 ff.

now be of any avail till the Duchy of Slesvig was evacuated by the Danish Troops, after that was effected he should be delighted to see that mediation employed towards inducing the King of Denmark to agree to the terms the German Diet was determined to exact." This was to make fun of the mediators, the two great powers Great Britain and Russia! Westmorland indeed pointed out to Arnim that "he was taking a course which must frustrate the object Your Lordship had most at heart, which was the prevention of hostilities between Countries so nearly connected with each other, and the result of which in the present state of Europe, it would be impossible to calculate upon." Later in his dispatch Westmorland remarked that it seemed evident that "the Prussian Government has determined at all risks to undertake the military occupation of Slesvig with the view of engrafting itself with the German feeling upon this subject . . ." "The chances of War which may arise out of the hostilities which must be the result of this measure do not appear to be sufficient to arrest or even to delay its determination to carry it into effect." – As to his talk with Arnim, Meyendorff told Westmorland that he found him "so unreasonable upon the Slesvig question that he had a very angry discussion with him, but he obtained nothing . . ."

On the 20th of April Westmorland again had a talk with Arnim;¹ for Palmerston had ordered him to say that it did not seem "a very consistent course for Prussia to talk of Mediation, and at the same time to pursue hostilities."² This obvious truth must no doubt have dawned upon Arnim in advance, and Westmorland did not, indeed, profit by his new attempt at making him "delay the invasion of Slesvig and the commencement of hostilities." Arnim pleaded that the decision rested with the Federal Diet at Frankfurt. Nor was it of any avail that Westmorland informed him of a letter he had received from Wynn. In this letter Wynn told him that Palmerston had instructed "me *officially* to offer the Mediation which he had *privately* told me he was ready to undertake."³ Wynn added: "If the Prussian Government were sincere in their application to you, actual hostilities may still be prevented." His note with the offer was

¹ F.O. 64/286: 20/4, No. 148.

² F.O. 64/282: 15/4, No. 93.

³ Westmorland. I, p. 87: Wynn to Westmorland 16/4.

sent to Knuth, the Danish Foreign Minister, who was staying at headquarters, in the hope that Colonel Bonin had received "as much" from Berlin that an armistice could be concluded as "the first step to an arrangement." But Arnim answered that the offer for mediation could neither be accepted by Bonin nor by himself. He would, however, go the length of forwarding a note from Westmorland with the proposal to Frankfurt. — By this means there were, of course, no prospects of stopping the Prussian invasion into Slesvig.

During the talk Westmorland according to his own report of it is to have made very urgent representations to Arnim. He said to him "that he appeared to have determined upon a course which involved a heavy responsibility, that hostilities once begun there could be no means of judging in what manner they might be put an end to, that the effusion of blood which must be the consequence would be an eternal reproach to its author if with honour it could be avoided, that where great interests were at stake such a sacrifice must be made, but where a minor question was at issue and where negotiation to effect its settlement was offered by so friendly a Power as Great Britain, I could not but deprecate the precipitancy with which it seemed to be rejected," to which Arnim remarked that the superiority of the German Regular Army would soon put an end to the hostilities, and that furthermore Westmorland must "take into consideration the present position of the Prussian Government, that its Members had been threatened with personal violence and that even His Majesty's position was not exempt from danger." Westmorland doubted this, but moreover thought that if this was so, "it was not to be avoided by the adoption of measures which were impolitick or unjust."

After his conversation with Arnim, Westmorland had a talk with Meyendorff, who read to him a dispatch about his interview with Arnim (on the 19th of April). He would send Brunnow a copy of this dispatch, and Westmorland thought that Brunnow would no doubt show it to Palmerston. From this Palmerston would see that Arnim "as decidedly evades the proposal of present mediation from Russia as he does from England . . . I fear that his great desire to secure to himself and to his Government the popular approbation of Germany, by the conquest of Slesvig and

its annexation to the Confederation, will lead him to adopt every means within his power to effect those objects.”

On the 24th of April Westmorland had another talk with Arnim.¹ It was amongst other things about a former statement by Arnim to the effect that according to Bunsen Palmerston would not accept the mediation. Bunsen, however, in his dispatch – of which an extract had confidentially been communicated to Palmerston – had said exactly the opposite, viz. that Palmerston “did not hesitate to say that [Great Britain] would with pleasure take upon herself the office of Mediator.”² Westmorland then was given the explanation by Arnim that “what he had said as to Your Lordship’s not choosing to accept the mediation must have been a reflexion of his own.” Westmorland in this connexion remarks that Arnim’s “whole conduct . . . with respect to this proffered Mediation since the date of my despatch No. 129 [the 13th of April] is a proof that he was unwilling to receive it . . .”

During the interview Westmorland also asked Arnim what had come of his note about Wynn’s offer for mediation which Arnim had promised to forward to Frankfurt. Arnim answered that “he had received no answer, but that it could now lead to no result.” To Westmorland’s further question whether the Prussian and Danish Headquarters had negotiated about Wynn’s offer, Arnim replied that they now “ne se recevoient que de balles.” On the Danish declaration about embargo on Prussian ships (the 19th of April) Arnim stated “that it was a sort of piracy, that it was not in accordance with the civilization of the age, and that Denmark would see reason to repent of it.” For the rest, Arnim assured “that he had nothing further to do in this business, that it had fallen entirely into the hands of the Frankfurt Diet, and that . . . Wrangel was directed to take the oath to the German Confederacy . . .”

The day before this talk Arnim had sent Westmorland a pamphlet prepared in a great hurry by Bunsen, *Memoir on the Constitutional Rights of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein* (see below). Arnim hoped that it “would rectify many of the facts enounced by the adversaries of the cause he was called upon to

¹ F.O. 64/286: 22/4, No. 153.

² The statement is found in Bunsen’s dispatch of 8/4. Bunsen’s advice in the same dispatch not to place the matter in the hands of Great Britain, was not, of course, included in the extract communicated to Palmerston.

defend.” Curiously enough Arnim a little later mentioned “that he had not yet himself been able to read it [Bunsen’s pamphlet].”¹ – Westmorland in the talk about the pamphlet remarked that he had read it “with much interest”, but thought “that a case was made out for mediation but not for hostilities.” As an appendix to his dispatch to Palmerston he sent a copy of a German map of Slesvig with nationality boundaries indicated (Joh. Val. Kutscheit’s linguistic map; the second impression was published in Berlin in 1848). Furthermore, he called attention to the fact that Roman Law reigned in Holstein, the Jutlandic Law in Slesvig.

In the evening of the 24th of April Westmorland received a leaflet of the *Allgemeine Preussische Zeitung* with a semi-official article on the Slesvig-Holstein question.² He hurried to send it to London, but summarized the contents of it in his dispatch. In the article it was established that the Prussians had advanced into Slesvig, and that in all probability a decisive battle had taken place (the Easter Battle on the 23rd of April). It was maintained that Prussia “has . . . in this matter only executed with good faith and zeal the Resolution of the German Diet; she has not been guided by any interested views of her own . . .” Furthermore it was said that “the only object of the Mediation of a Foreign Power [Great Britain] to which allusion had been made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs could in a purely German question be to persuade the King of Denmark of the necessity of not departing from legal course with respect to Slesvig and of the firm determination of the Confederation not to violate His Rights whilst it upheld its own.” The rights of the Danish King, it was maintained, were not violated by the injunction that Slesvig ought to be admitted to the German Confederation. “The annexation of that Duchy is not to be brought about by force; the German Governments are not desirous of conquering a Foreign Territory, but they think it to be sound policy, by means of prudent negotiations and in a peaceable manner and one conformable to international law to cause the National feelings of Germany and the wishes of the German Population of Slesvig to be duly respected.” – Westmorland did not comment on the article – there

¹ F.O. 64/286: 27/4, No. 159.

² Ibid.: 24/4, No. 155. – The article is mentioned in the *Departementstidende* of 3/5 1848.

might, indeed, be every reason to do so – but mentioned that as a consequence of that and of the Danish embargo on Prussian ships the Danish Minister, Plessen, would leave Berlin the following day. The war between Denmark and Germany was a fact.

5. Palmerston's Negotiations with Reventlow, Lehmann, and Bunsen.

The Parliamentary Debates on the 17th and 19th of April.

On the same day as the Provisional Government was formed, the Danish Minister in London, Fr. Reventlow, in a letter to the Danish Foreign Minister written under the impression of the revolutions in Berlin and Vienna, stated: “je suis dans des trances inexprimables sur l'influence qu'exercera ce mouvement irrésistible sur les deux grandes divisions de nationalité dont se composent les sujets de notre souverain.”¹ He found the only consolation in this critical situation in the wisdom and moderation characteristic of the statesmen who surrounded the King. But at that time these statesmen had already been replaced by other, in part inexperienced men.

When the news of the rebellion became known in London, Reventlow immediately on the 28th of March called on Palmerston without awaiting instructions from Copenhagen.² Palmerston was still ignorant of the events. Reventlow represented these from a Danish point of view and in this way hoped to have counterbalanced the language which Bunsen, “grand enthousiaste de l'unité Allemande et de ce qui se passe maintenant en Allemagne,” undoubtedly would use. Afterwards Reventlow had had a talk with Edward John Stanley (the later Lord Eddisbury), Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, for the same purpose. In his dispatch of the 30th of March Reventlow mentioned other talks with Palmerston and Stanley and mentioned that he had indicated the possibility that Great Britain's mediation might be called upon.

On the 31st of March J. F. Sick, Groom of the Chamber, official in the Danish Foreign Office arrived in London with the long-desired instructions (of the 25th) from the new Foreign

¹ U. Min. England II. Dispatches: 24/3.

² Ibid.: 28/3.

Minister, Count Knuth.¹ Reventlow was requested to make Palmerston read the dispatch, in which there was first an account of the scheme of 28th of January for a United Monarchy and then a description of the Slesvig-Holstein Revolution and the King's reply drawn up by Lehmann. It was denied that the King wanted to "incorporate" Slesvig: "Nous voulons conserver intact notre intime union avec ce duché . . . sans toutefois lui ôter en rien sa légitime indépendance et ses immunités locales." As an international basic principle of law it was laid down that the King was justified in arranging his internal relations himself. If he was forced to use force, he hoped that Great Britain would "ne souffrir à point qu'une intervention armée d'une puissance étrangère quelconque vînt paralyser les justes et légitimes efforts du Gt. du Roi pour rétablir l'ordre et la paix dans les Duchés." He did not base his hope on Great Britain's solemn guarantees for Slesvig. The time for appealing to these had not yet come. But it was important to know Great Britain's "vues et dispositions . . . à notre égard."

Reventlow immediately called on Palmerston and although in his report he wrote: "C'était étonnant et pénible de voir comme ce Ministre trahissait de l'ignorance sur beaucoup de faits essentiels de la question des duchés," he thought that he had made the case itself and its importance intelligible to him. Palmerston did not, however, fail to show Reventlow a dispatch from Wynn in which the "abolition" of the German Chancellery was regretted.

On the 1st and 3rd of April Reventlow again had an interview with Palmerston.² On the 1st of April he delivered a copy of the above-mentioned dispatch and a note in which it is stated that a *casus foederis* between Denmark and Great Britain might arise at any time. Therefore Reventlow wanted to know "quelle sera l'étendue, la mesure et la forme de l'assistance, que mon Gouvernement pourra en ce moment attendre de la part de la Grande Bretagne." At the interview on the 3rd of April he delivered to Palmerston a note requesting Great Britain's speedy intervention. In his report of the 4th of April to Count Knuth, Reventlow stated that he had not asked Britain for ships or troops at present, but for moral support, for urgent appeals to Berlin and other Ger-

¹ Reventlow's dispatch of 31/3. — Brevskaber, p. 152. — Cf. Haralds, p. 60 f.

² Reventlow's dispatch of 4/4, No. 22.

man courts. He thought that he had impressed Palmerston. On his way back from Palmerston he met Stanley in the Green Park, and on a long walk they discussed "largement notre grande affaire."

On the 4th of April Reventlow received letters from Knuth with information showing that in Copenhagen they had from their *realpolitik* chosen to appeal for support from Liberal Great Britain as well as Conservative Russia (cf. p. 54).¹ About this question Reventlow the same day wrote to Knuth: "I have always been of opinion that under such critical circumstances R. . . had to be managed, R's continued amity not be rejected; but I knew the difficulties which you had to fight! I did not doubt that public opinion in the face of such a menacing danger would come to weigh with another balance than that of likes or dislikes!" He had himself realized that he had to see the Russian Minister, Brunnow, about the matter and had already requested an interview with him; it was to take place the following day. "I shall now suggest that from the very beginning it had been my Government's order that I should appeal to him in order to effect Russia's and Great Britain's *co-operation* in the maintenance of our independence . . ." – Brunnow received Reventlow with open arms and promised to support him with Palmerston.² The fear of Russia, said Brunnow, was a good ally to Denmark, and during the talk he pointed out that on the wall where the King of Prussia's picture had been hanging there was now an empty space!

In the evening of the 8th of April Reventlow again saw Palmerston, but only for a moment, as Palmerston was very busy with negotiations about the Chartist meeting, which was to take place on the 10th.³ Palmerston assured Reventlow that Great Britain would do everything in her power to prevent a collision between Denmark and Prussia. For that purpose he had just drawn up orders to the British Ministers in Berlin and Hanover (and Hamburg) "in the strongest terms."⁴ – In a simultaneous order to Wynn, Palmerston stated that the British Government was in

¹ Reventlow's dispatch: 4/4 (without number).

² Ibid. 7/4, No. 23.

³ Ibid. 9/4.

⁴ The reference must be to the orders of the 8th, although in Reventlow's summary of Palmerston's statement it says "hier", which presumably must be interpreted as the 7th of April.

touch with the Prussian Government "on those affairs" and very much hoped "that no steps may be taken for the present by either side which could be calculated to bring on a collision and to lead to hostilities between the troops of the respective Parties."¹

Reventlow's interview with Palmerston in the evening of the 8th of April took place in the latter's salon. Reventlow had there an opportunity to introduce Orla Lehmann to the British Minister for Foreign Affairs;² for Lehmann had reached London in the evening of the 7th of April, and had of course immediately looked up the Danish Minister, whom he in letters from Berlin had informed of his futile efforts there.³

From Berlin Lehmann had brought a letter from Meyendorff to Brunnow. In a letter of the 11th of April to Knuth, Lehmann told Knuth that the only quite serious conference he had had out of the Legation so far was with Brunnow.⁴ He was given a "most friendly" welcome, and Brunnow agreed with him on "all my constitutional and political assertions" and urged me not to "relinquish one hairsbreadth of our indubitable right to Slesvig."

After the Chartist meeting on the 10th of April was over without trouble, Palmerston invited Reventlow to a conference on the 12th of April, asking him to bring Lehmann, too: "I could see you and your newly arrived Danish Envoy at the Foreign Office this afternoon at halfpast six o'clock."⁵

The conference lasted for well over two hours, Lehmann being the Danish spokesman. Lehmann was no doubt right in his opinion that the only practical profit was what Palmerston had already stated in his notes, viz. Great Britain's willingness to "use her good offices to bring the matter to a peaceable conclusion, as

¹ F.O. 22/160: 8/4.

² Reventlow's dispatch of 11/4, No. 24.

³ See Lehmann's letters (copies) of 1/4 and 2/4 to Reventlow. Lehmann's private archives. C. 13. — On Lehmann's arrival in London see his letter of 8/4 to Knuth. The file mentioned on p. 20, Note 2. — Lehmann's *Efterladte Skrifter* II, p. 161 has erroneously the date of the 6th of April, and in Reventlow's letter of 9/4 it says, also erroneously, that the arrival took place "yesterday", i. e. on the 8th.

⁴ See the file mentioned on p. 20, Note 2. — Cf. Lehmann's *Efterladte Skrifter* II, p. 185 ff.

⁵ Reventlows dispatches of 11/4, No. 24, and 13/4, No. 25. — Lehmann to Knuth 13/4. The file mentioned on p. 20, Note 2. — Palmerston's note of 12/4 to Reventlow in Lehmann's archives. C. 13.

soon as she was invited to do so by the parties in question." On the other hand, Palmerston of course recognized Denmark's right to resort to reprisals by means of her naval power if Prussian troops set foot on Danish soil. But he praised the moderation shown so far and recommended that it should be continued! He did not know the effect of his notes to Prussia and Hanover yet, but was convinced that Prussian soldiers would not advance into Slesvig.

When Palmerston during the talk touched on the Slesvig-Holstein assertions concerning the inseparability of the Duchies and the male succession prevailing in both, it offered Lehmann an opportunity, as Reventlow reports, "de bien éclaircir ces deux points graves par un exposé aussi lucide que chaleureux." After which Palmerston said that he understood completely – a statement which may be doubted. – Palmerston also wanted to know Denmark's view of the British Treaty of Guarantee of 1720, which was also explained to him. He admitted, Reventlow wrote, "avec une rare franchise que la crise où se trouvent l'Angleterre et toute l'Europe ne lui avait pas permis d'étudier les actes de la garantie; ce qui explique en même temps" that he had not yet answered Reventlow's note of the 3rd of April.

In his report on the conference to Count Knuth, Reventlow highly praised Lehmann's "eloquence and knowledge" and expressed his great appreciation of the assistance furnished to him by Lehmann in his difficult task. For this reason he regretted Lehmann's plan to return to Denmark the next day by the steamship "The Ranger". Lehmann got onboard the steamer, but just as she was going to put to sea, information was received about the Battle at Bov.¹ Lehmann then decided to return to London "in order to make the necessary arrangements with Reventlow." This decision was no doubt based on his having a feeling that war with Germany now was inevitable. In his letter from Berlin of the 2nd of April to Count Knuth he had on the basis of the impressions he had received there written: "... if peace is to be saved, this will imply that there has been no bloodshed, at least no more than it will be possible to ignore it . . ."² Indeed, there had not been much bloodshed at Bov, but plenty of young

¹ Letter of 13/4 from Lehmann to Knuth. The file mentioned on p. 20, Note 2.

² Ibid.

students who had gone to the war for "Slesvig-Holstein" had been sent to Copenhagen as prisoners of war. The Prince of Nør had been conspicuous by his absence on the "Day of Glory" heralded by him.

In the talk of the 12th of April Palmerston had been able to advance the Slesvig-Holstein points of view, but had emphasized that he had not adopted them. These points of view had been eagerly and in much detail defended before him by Bunsen, the Prussian Minister, and Bunsen at any rate had their ear at Court. Reventlow as well as Lehmann highly feared his influence. In a letter in which Lehmann reported the conference with Palmerston on the 12th of April, he embellished Bunsen with the following flowers of speech: ". . . our learned and wily friend, the Don Quixote of the German realm and all other pietism, Arnim's colleague, the King of Prussia's evil genius and the foe of Denmark."

In the preceding chapter I mentioned Bunsen's dispatch of the 31st of March and what, as maintained by Arnim before Westmorland, it contained about Britain's attitude towards the Danish-German conflict (p. 63). On the 5th of April Bunsen wrote to Arnim that he was preparing a pamphlet about the matter "in the German spirit" (im deutschen Sinne) and hoped that he could publish it at the end of the week. It was important to reassure Palmerston and the British Cabinet and win it over "if possible completely to the German view."

Three days later Bunsen in a three hours' talk with Palmerston could present to him his *Memoir on the Constitutional Rights of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, the Right and the Duty of the German Confederation, and the Purport of the English Guarantee of 1720*.¹ During the talk Palmerston warned against the advance of the Prussian troops into Slesvig. "It did not seem to him that an incursion into Slesvig was in any way justifiable." If the activities of the Confederation should be extended to Slesvig, one might as well make them apply to Hungary or Poznan. In reply to Bunsen's emphasis of the fact that it was important to prevent a war at sea [where, indeed, Denmark was superior!], Palmerston remarked that Denmark was entirely justified in countering an incursion into her territory with letters of marque

¹ Bunsen to Arnim 8/4.

and reprisal.¹ Nor did Bunsen's reference to the damage the British capitalists would suffer impress Palmerston. "They would have to look after themselves," he thought.

Palmerston's statement about Great Britain's willingness to act as mediator was mentioned above in connexion with the negotiations between Arnim and Westmorland (p. 68 ff.). Bunsen, however, in his dispatch to Arnim strongly advised against placing the matter in Britain's hand. Sympathies in Britain were not for Germany and the Duchies, but for Denmark. In Bunsen's opinion Prussia should as soon as possible set up so great a force on the Eider that she could at one blow – the sooner the better – defeat the Danes and force them to make a peace at which Slesvig was incorporated in the German Confederation. Bunsen would himself, he wrote, solve the conflict by a division of the Duchy, so that South Slesvig (two thirds of the whole Duchy) with the islands became a German Duchy, North Slesvig a Danish one, incorporated in Denmark. – Bunsen thought it possible to assure Arnim that Britain less than ever thought of intervening, occupied as she was at present by the disturbances in Ireland and by the Chartist Movement. For that very reason it was important that Prussia decided the matter as soon as possible.

On the 10th of April an envoy from the Provisional Government, Theodor Wille, came to London.² He immediately looked up Bunsen in order to deliver a letter from the Provisional Government with a request for his collaboration. Bunsen readily granted this. On the 12th of April he succeeded in introducing Wille to Stanley, the Under-Secretary, who was moved to receive the long justification of their conduct brought by Wille from the Provisional Government.³ It is now being translated, wrote Bunsen the following day to Arnim, in "the Royal Chancellery" (probably meaning Prince Albert's?) and will be submitted to Palmerston.

Wille brought to Bunsen a copy of the Proclamation of the 31st of March from the Provisional Government to "the Danish nation" with the offer that North Slesvig should be allowed freely to choose whether it would belong to Denmark or Germany.⁴ Bunsen considered this proclamation to be very important as it

¹ Denmark, however, omitted issuing letters of marque and reprisal.

² Letter of 11/4 from Th. Wille. EE. 3. – Bunsen to Arnim 13/4.

³ See also Wille's letter of 14/4. EE. 3.

⁴ Cf. H.T. 11. r. IV, p. 593 (E. Ladewig Petersen).

served to show Great Britain the Provisional Government's "justice and moderation."

In a letter of the 18th of April to the Provisional Government Bunsen expressed his pleasure at the proclamation mentioned: "I am convinced that this address includes the only satisfactory solution of the conflict."¹ He considered that the British Government would soon realize that from German quarters a poorer basis of mediation could not be accepted than the one according to which the whole of Slesvig "including Lyksborg, Flensburg, Tønder" should be incorporated in Germany, "if the mainly Danish rural population in the rest of the province want a *Danish Duchy*." He had, he wrote, defended the good cause "with the fervour which the German heart infuses." He asked the Provisional Government to consider him an "advocatus patriae, whose office and calling it was to adopt the good German cause. In this way I do nothing but follow my Government's declared will. I should have liked to have done so before; but only the present Government has authorized me to do so." "God be with the United Slesvig-Holstein and the whole of the glorious German Fatherland!"

It appears from Bunsen's dispatches that he was somewhat doubtful about the "informal" of Prussia's lightning action in favour of the Slesvig-Holstein rebellion. On the 10th of April Arnim, however, sent him the resolution of the Confederation of the 4th of April, and Bunsen communicated the essential contents of Arnim's letter to Palmerston.² Bunsen most energetically contested that it should have been the Confederation that started hostilities and explained that Britain's guarantee of 1720 was no longer binding. Palmerston stuck to his opinion: the unpleasantness of the peace being disturbed. — On the 18th of April Bunsen informed Arnim that he negotiated with Palmerston, Russell, Stanley, and other members of the Government every day. He had become convinced "that here they have taken sides in the matter. They are *against* war, and they have Danish sympathies." "Nobody mentions the rights of the Duchies and Germany." In a postscript to this letter Bunsen mentions the fact that Palmerston has just shown him a dispatch from Bloomfield at St. Petersburg about Russia's displeasure at Germany's conduct: she had no right to interfere with conditions in Slesvig.

¹ EE. 3.

² Bunsen's dispatch of 14/4.

On the 19th of April Bunsen submitted to Prince Albert a copy of the pamphlet in which his memoir of the 8th to Palmerston had been printed.¹ To this was added a postscript written in a few hours in the morning of the 15th, "after I had been made angry," stated Bunsen in the letter to the Prince Consort. The anger was public opinion in England and Danish contributions to *The Times*, and indeed the postscript is neither without passion nor misrepresentation of facts. Bunsen thought that "John Bull understands Cousin Michel better when he (Michel) gets angry." The pamphlet *Memoir on the Constitutional Rights of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein . . .* was published by a German man of letters Otto von Wenckstern, whom Bunsen had succeeded in getting a job on the staff of *The Times*. Besides Bunsen's own Memoir and postscript it contained an English translation of a pamphlet on the succession in the Danish Monarchy published anonymously in French in Paris in 1847 by the German diplomat Justus v. Gruner,² the letter of the Provisional Government to Palmerston and a number of official documents on the question, all translated into English. The pamphlet was sent to all Ministers, Members of Parliament, and the corps diplomatique.³

After Lehmann's return to London he – with Reventlow's approval – sent Palmerston the following urgent appeal: "C'est à Vous de dire, s'il y a un intérêt Européen à ce, que le Danemarck, tant de fois démembré, ne cesse puis d'exister, un intérêt éminemment Anglais à s'y ménager une ressource d'un allié fort et fidel."⁴ The same day Reventlow sent Palmerston a letter with information about the victory at Bov, but stating that Hamburg papers announced that the Prussians would revenge the defeat and cross the Danish frontier.⁵ If so, he wrote, a *casus belli* between Prussia and Denmark would be certain.

¹ R.A.W. I 3/82.

² The title of the pamphlet is *De la succession dans la monarchie danoise considérée principalement sous le point de vue du droit public*. On the title page it is called M. de Gruner's Essay, and on p. 79 the name has become M. V. Gruner (Mr. v. Gruner?).

³ Bunsen's dispatch of 18/4.

⁴ Copy of letter of 14/4. Lehmann's archives, C. 13. – Letter of 18/4 in the file mentioned on p. 20, Note 2.

⁵ Copy of the letter of 14/4 in Reventlow's dispatch of 18/4. Enclosed in this dispatch also a copy of Lehmann's letter of the 14th of April sent to Palmerston, but here dated at the 16th!

When Reventlow on the 14th of April in the morning saw that J. Wilson, M.P., had stated that he would put a question to Palmerston about the Danish-German conflict, he hurried in the same morning to look up "mon ami Mr. Disraeli pour lui demander l'appui qu'il avait promis à notre cause."¹ Disraeli, the Leader of the Opposition readily promised this, in so far as allowed by circumstances. Reventlow provided him with material on the case. Probably the same day Reventlow had a talk with Brunnow, who said that he at negotiations the day before [with Palmerston] energetically had requested the latter to adopt a more active attitude in favour of Denmark. Palmerston had to Brunnow characterized the Slesvig-Holstein question as highly complicated, but Brunnow had replied that he found it extremely simple: Holstein belonged to Germany, Slesvig did not, and it was now intended to rob it from Denmark "qu'avait déjà tout souffert à la dernière pacification générale."

Wilson's question was put at the 17th in the evening. But before that Reventlow had received Knuth's dispatch of the 11th, in which it was stated that Prussia had ordered her troops to advance into Slesvig, and requested Reventlow categorically to claim Great Britain's fulfilment of the Guarantee of 1720.² Reventlow did so in a note, and he succeeded in having an interview with Palmerston before the sitting of Parliament. It was, he said, the extreme time for Great Britain, if she wanted to prevent bloodshed. Furthermore, he declared that Denmark would make the commerce and shipping of Prussia and the other attacking states feel the superiority of the Danish naval power, but would spare those of neutral and friendly powers if this was consistent

¹ Reventlow's dispatch of 14/4, No. 26. — Lehmann's archives. C. 13: Disraeli to Reventlow 14/4.

² In Lehmann's letter to Knuth of 18/4 (Lehmann's archives. C. 13) it was said that it was the dispatches which were received in the morning of the Monday (i. e. the 17th) which enabled Reventlow "quite categorically to claim the fulfilment of the Guarantee. This was done even before the sitting of Parliament . . ." — In Reventlow's dispatch of 18/4 it said: "Immediately after Herr Puggård yesterday at noon [i. e. on the 17th] had reported to me with the dispatches you had entrusted to him, Herr O. Lehmann and I agreed that I ought without delay to submit a copy of the following note [missing] to Lord Palmerston." — In the archives of the Legation. Correspondence with the Foreign Office etc. 1848, the draft for the note the expressions of which correspond to Knuth's dispatch of the 11th, however, was dated at the 16th, i. e. the Sunday. The question how these discrepancies had arisen, is without actual importance in the present connexion and I shall leave it out of consideration.

with military custom. If Britain would lend Denmark effective assistance, we should consider favouring her flag.

At the sitting of Parliament on the 17th of April Wilson asked this question of Palmerston: "whether any communication had been received from the Danish Government on the subject of the entry of the Prussian troops into Holstein, and with the object of soliciting the interference of this country by mediation or otherwise."¹ It seems, he said, as if the Prussian troops had already crossed the Eider and advanced into Slesvig, which did not belong to the German Confederation.

Palmerston replied that "we have intimated both to the Danish Government and the Prussian that if our good offices can be useful for that purpose, we shall be most happy so to employ them. I should hope from the disposition which has been expressed by both parties, that that overture may be accepted." – When Disraeli afterwards asked whether Denmark had claimed Great Britain's support pursuant to the Guarantee Treaty of 1720, Palmerston affirmed this; but he remarked, "that the interference of the German Confederation in these matters does not profess to an interference with a view of conquering, it is an interference with reference to internal questions which have arisen between the Danish Government and the inhabitants of Holstein-Slesvig."

Palmerston's reply to the questions on the 17th of April could not in Reventlow and Lehmann arouse appreciable satisfaction. Still, Palmerston, as Reventlow wrote in his report to Knuth, recognized Denmark's "full rights to employ our naval power against the shipping and commerce of Prussia and the other aggressor states."² This was in accordance with Great Britain's own naval power policy, but from German quarters they had, the German states in this field being inferior, wanted such conduct to be branded as piracy. As to the reply to Disraeli, Reventlow stated that "such replies are always as meagre as possible; but Palmerston's replies are also characteristic by being made as obscure as possible." In Reventlow's opinion, which was shared by Brunnow, Palmerston wanted "on the one hand to scare

¹ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, XCVIII. 3. Ser. 7th of April–26th of May 1848, p. 444 ff. – Haralds, p. 71, does not mention Wilson's question and erroneously refers Disraeli's question of the 19th of April to the 17th (misprint?). – Olsen, p. 236, also has the wrong date 17th instead of 19th.

² Reventlow's dispatch of 18/4.

Prussia from waging war against us by mentioning the danger of the ruination of German commerce and shipping, on the other hand to keep us inclined to negotiate by not openly recognizing Britain's obligation as a guaranteeing power." With Brunnow I say, wrote Reventlow, "there is nothing which Lord Palmerston would not do, no evasion he would not attempt in order to avoid the outbreak of the war, and that therefore the power that is ready to make the greatest concessions is most welcome to him regardless of legal questions."

In Lehmann's letter to Knuth about the Parliamentary debate mention is also made of "the obscure phrases in which he [Palmerston] always understands how to wrap himself."¹ He has, wrote Lehmann, invented a "new exception to the guarantee", "his or the Law Officers of the Crown's or Bunsen's." Lehmann was convinced "that Parliament will kiss the person who can hit upon any fairly human reason that can relieve the same of the alternative of being faithless or waging war." In Lehmann's opinion the Whig Government is so loath to be overthrown "that they did not need a Palmerstonian conscience to reassure itself by less than that."

Bunsen was more satisfied with Palmerston's statements in Parliament than Reventlow and Lehmann. The following morning he thanked him especially "for the satisfactory explanation you gave of the inapplicability of the guarantee to this case."² He thought that Palmerston would feel convinced of the peaceful sentiment of Prussia by reading Arnim's enclosed instructions for Major Wildenbruch, and that he would furthermore take into consideration Arnim's "highly responsible and difficult position in the face of the public opinion of the whole of Germany. He is almost treated as a traitor on account of the delay." Bunsen did not want to go into detail as regards the Slesvig-Holstein question, but "I cannot help hoping, that if you give two hours reading to the *printed* Memoir of the 8th, enlarged and followed by a Postscript of the 15th, which will be sent to you *in a few hours*, you will be entirely of my opinion."

The question whether Palmerston spent two hours at reading the pamphlet, which he is said to have called "clumsy and

¹ 18/4. The file mentioned on p. 20, Note 2.

² F.O. 64/292.

tedious," must be left open. As a matter of fact, he did not adopt Bunsen's "opinion". This appeared in the Parliamentary debate which took place on the 19th of April before the sittings of the House of Commons were adjourned, and which was provoked by a question by Disraeli, who on the day before had asked for a talk with Reventlow and Lehmann in order to obtain further information about the question.¹ Lehmann states about it in a letter to Knuth that Disraeli had in advance discussed his question with Palmerston, who to Disraeli had pronounced "the greatest sympathy for Denmark and the greatest disgust at Prussia's conduct, but also had acknowledged the decision most bravely to ward off the recognition of any *casus foederis*." For that matter, Lehmann on the 18th of April wrote to Palmerston and with reference to the resolution of the Federal Diet of the 4th of April, inquired whether the Guarantor Powers did not find that the *casus foederis* or perhaps a *casus belli* had set in.² Palmerston's reply was a receipt of Lehmann's inquiry, the contents of which were noted!

As might be expected, Disraeli's speech at the sitting of the 19th of April was a powerful plea in favour of Denmark.³ He described the origin of the Provisional Government and said that "there is probably no event in modern history more unjustifiable than the conduct of Prussia under these circumstances." But, he stated, "Germany wants a coast. That is the real reason why Denmark, supposed to be weak, is to be invaded in this age of liberty on the plea of nationality." He criticized Bunsen's pamphlet, especially his account of the Guarantee Treaty of 1720: "we have entered into engagements, and there is no doubt that we shall be called upon to fulfil them. No doubt! . . . We must either fulfil the guarantee, or we must give good reasons for refusing it, or, to take a third course, we may prevent the necessity for fulfilling it, and yet maintain the just interests of all."

Finally, Disraeli referred to the fact that Great Britain in 1815 had guaranteed parts of Saxony to Prussia. He thought that if

¹ Reventlow's dispatch of 18/4. – Lehmann's letter of 18/4 in the file mentioned on p. 20, Note 2.

² Lehmann's private archives. C. 13: a copy of the letter and Palmerston's reply of the 18/4.

³ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. XCVIII. 3. Ser. 7th of April–26th of May 1848, p. 510 ff. – Haralds' summary on p. 71 f. does not seem to me to cover the facts very well.

Prussia understood that by pursuing her present course she annihilated this guarantee, "you may rely upon it that she will hesitate yet before she will allow herself to be impelled by dreamy professors and hairbrained students to violate all public law, and all the rights of nations, by perpetrating in the face of Europe, an act of such injustice and such flagrant wrong, as the invasion of Denmark." He ended his speech as follows: "May God defend the right, and may the peace of Europe be maintained by the justice and by the power of England."

In his reply Palmerston first mentioned the unhappy consequences to Denmark of the Napoleonic Wars and acknowledged Great Britain's guilt: "It has been the lot of England, at no very remote period, to be thrown by circumstances, which were deemed at that time unavoidable into acts of hostility towards Denmark which were unquestionably alien to all our ordinary ideas of international relations, and therefore this is a question which is especially calculated to interest the feelings of the people of this country." But as Britain had assumed the role of mediator, he found it wrong to make any statement as to the side on which "I may think the right preponderates." He held in his hand the original Treaty of Guarantee, but as Disraeli had quoted it correctly, he found no reason to recapitulate it. "It is not fitting," he said, "that a country like England should repudiate her existing engagements."

As regards Disraeli's attack on Bunsen, Palmerston stood up for him: "I think the censure cast . . . upon the Prussian Minister was not altogether well-founded." And he mentioned Bunsen as "a person for whom I have the honour to feel the greatest respect and attachment."

It appears from the following statements made by Palmerston that he would not recognize the applicability of the Treaty of Guarantee to the present case: "The purpose for which the Prussian troops have entered Holstein, and the purpose for which they will cross the Eyder into Slesvig, is, not to wrest the Duchy of Slesvig from the Danish Crown, but to support a party in Slesvig, who hold that the ancient constitution and laws of the Duchy entitled them to be incorporated and attached to Holstein, instead of being incorporated and attached to Denmark. It is, therefore, no attempt to conquer Slesvig; it is, however, no doubt

an intervention in the internal affairs of the Duchy, with reference to the future line of succession which ought to prevail." Palmerston did not give a correct description of the revolutionary development of the events. There he was presumably highly influenced by Bunsen. He concluded by expressing his hope for mediation and peace. – David Urquhart, M.P., an opponent of Palmerston, then made a statement that, indeed, Germany had already made an actual invasion.

Whereas Lehmann attended the Parliamentary debate of the 19th of April at Westminster Abbey, Reventlow "because of a certain sense of tact" was not present. But the day after he wrote to Count Knuth: "If the way in which the attention of Parliament, and I may add, its warm sympathy have been attracted as regards our just cause, has met with your approval, I should consider it the greatest reward for having made a good choice in persuading Disraeli to be our advocate, and for Mr. Orla Lehmann's and my combined efforts to make him acquainted with the facts of our cause, if Mr. Disraeli's speech and Lord Palmerston's reply were given the greatest possible publicity . . ."¹

Reventlow undoubtedly was right in assuming that Bunsen can have felt no particular joy at the debate. However, on the 22nd of April he thanked Palmerston for the noble way "you have stood up for me against the Son of Israel [Disraeli], and for the lucid manner in which, with all the reserve inherent to your and England's position, you have established the *controversial point* between the Germanic and Danish party, against his misrepresentations."²

In the morning of the 20th of April Lehmann left London. Bunsen perhaps was not quite wrong in his supposition that Reventlow was "overjoyed that Orla Lehmann was gone."³ As it has been mentioned above how Lehmann regarded Bunsen, it may be reasonable to mention that inversely Bunsen described Lehmann as "half mad and very spiteful."

During his stay in London Lehmann through H. F. R. Bielke, Secretary of Legation, who was in touch with a man on the staff of *The Times* (Mr. Dasent), succeeded in having four articles

¹ Reventlow's dispatch of 20/4, No. 1.

² F.O. 64/292.

³ EE. 3: letter of 25/4 to Reventlou-Preetz.

printed there in defence of the Danish standpoint.¹ They appear as Letters To The Editor under the signature of *Q A* in the numbers of the 13th, 15th, 20th, and 21st of April. In *The Times* of the 25th Bunsen then under the signature "A German" had a counter-article accepted, as he assumed that the four letters, "although remarkable for nothing but the rudeness and violence of language in which they are written, and therefore, not deserving of any direct reply, yet may have baffled the good sense of some readers by the extraordinary boldness of their assertions."

In the same number of *The Times* there was a letter of the 19th from Lehmann to Bunsen and the latter's answer of the 21st, which the two gentlemen had asked the editors to publish. Lehmann's letter had been provoked by the fact that Bunsen in his above-mentioned *Memoir* had quoted Lehmann's "famous word" – according to the highly corrupted German version – "that it is necessary to write with the sword, the Danish law, on the backs of the Schleswigers and Holsteiners" and furthermore mentioned Lehmann as author of his two anonymous articles in *The Times* of the 13th and 15th of April.² Lehmann rightly stigmatized Bunsen's rendering of his "famous word" as wrong and furthermore complained that Bunsen ascribed to him the above-mentioned anonymous articles. As to the latter point Bunsen remarked that the articles contained what might be expected "from the character of your public speeches on this subject, a great deal of violence and personal abuse, coupled with very little argument." – We shall leave open the question whether a similar judgment must be passed on Bunsen's own *Memoir*.

6. Great Britain's Offer of Mediation is Accepted.

The First Proposal for an Armistice.

In the Foreign Minister, Count Knuth's "account of the negotiations of Denmark in 1848 until the armistice at Malmö" (26th of August) it says: "It is difficult at the representation of diplomatic negotiations conducted between several Courts to gather up the historical thread of the postal communications and the chro-

¹ The articles have been printed in Danish translation in Lehmann's *Efterladte Skrifter*. II, p. 219 ff.

² Bunsen, *Memoir*, pp. 60 and 64. – H.T. 11. r. II, p. 602.

nological labyrinth of crossing dispatches and with logical definiteness to demonstrate the interaction of events and motives.”¹ This is a well-founded statement, but we shall try as well as possible to gather up the thread.

As shown above (p. 70 ff.), Westmorland in Berlin did not get anything out of his frequent appeals to Arnim to stop the Prussian aggression against Denmark. General Wrangel not only forced the Danish army to evacuate the Slesvig mainland, but on the 2nd of May he crossed the Jutland frontier and gradually occupied great parts of Jutland. As a counterstroke against the German attack Denmark, as mentioned above, on the 19th of April had laid an embargo on Prussian ships in Danish ports, and in late April the embargo was extended to the ships of other German states, thus those of Hanover, Mecklenburg, and Hamburg. On the 29th of April the King issued a declaration according to which the harbours, littoral regions, and estuaries of Prussia, Hanover, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, and the Hanse Towns were declared to be in state of blockade. Blockade regulations were issued on the 1st of May.

In his above-mentioned letter of the 22nd of April to Palmerston, Bunsen contemptuously scouted the idea that the German troops should evacuate Holstein. Palmerston had in a dispatch of the 20th of April to Westmorland requested the latter to recommend in Berlin that the Federal troops as well as the Danish troops (of whom, it is true, none were then found in Holstein) evacuated this Duchy, which thus “should be interposed between the troops of the two Parties.”² Should the German troops evacuate Holstein, Bunsen burst out in his over-excited language devoid of logic, when the Danish King has occupied the town of Slesvig: “we might as well leave Berlin and Cologne – and King Ernest Hanover [!].”

Together with the letter of the 22th of April Bunsen sent a French translation of Arnim’s dispatch to him of the 17th of April, as neither Palmerston nor Stanley could read the German hand.³ Arnim’s dispatch shows that the Government of Prussia now thought that they could take a high line with Britain as re-

¹ Knuth, p. 479.

² F.O. 64/282: 20/4, No. 100. – F.O. 22/160: 20/4 to Wynn.

³ Bunsen’s dispatch of 22/4. – Draft for Arnim’s dispatch of 17/4.

gards her offer of mediation. Reference was made to the year 1460 as the incontrovertible legal basis of the position of the Duchies, and Arnim did not omit adducing Lehmann's above-mentioned remarks in their highly corrupted form. If Great Britain would do anything in favour of peace, she should make Denmark evacuate Slesvig. Prussia could only negotiate on the basis of the Resolution of the Federal Diet. For that matter, Britain had not made a formal offer of mediation, and as the position was completely altered, Prussia could not give a definite reply. The Prussian Government had no knowledge of Britain having made representations to Denmark, but on the other hand knew that organs of the British Government had been active in supporting Denmark. Bligh had done so in Hanover and Oldenburg, which had delayed the military operations. How, then, could Prussia expect an impartial and useful mediation by Britain?

As Palmerston had gone into the country, Bunsen on the 22th of April discussed the question with Stanley, whom he found to be much more obliging than previously. When Stanley said that Great Britain now that Denmark had officially requested her mediation and that she was sure of Prussia's willingness, had undertaken this, Bunsen remarked that it appeared from Arnim's dispatch that Prussia refused to commit herself to a decision to that effect. To Stanley's question whether a more southerly frontier than Flensburg-Tønder was not found to be acceptable as a preliminary line of demarcation to the troops and later as a "*frontier between the Danish and German Duchy of Slesvig*" (italicized by Bunsen), Bunsen answered in the negative. In his dispatch he added that he was convinced that Great Britain would accept this basis and demand that it should be accepted by Denmark, "if Germany, as I certainly hope, will be content with this, but absolutely not with anything less."

On the 24th of April Westmorland's futile appeals to Arnim on the 18th and 19th of April (see p. 70) were known by the English Foreign Office as well as Bunsen, and immediate hostilities might be expected. Indeed, they had already been opened. Bunsen sent Palmerston another over-excited letter.¹ "If we have been in the right in 1846," he wrote, "we are ten times more so

¹ F.O. 64/292. — Bunsen's dispatch of 24/4 with copy of the letter to Palmerston.

in 1848," and we could not desist from "driving the King out of the heart of German Schleswig." Several passages in the continuation seem quite Hitleresque: "Hitherto we have promised to secure Holstein to her Duke, but the Federal Power has the right to declare his title *forfeited*, for Holstein as well as Lauenburg; and for every bombardment of a Prussian harbour we shall take a town in Jutland. — We are neither to be bullied nor intimidated nor insulted out of our right. — But treated *equitably* we shall maintain the *basis of mediation*." I do not fully realize whether Bunsen was referring to the Resolution of the Federal Diet of the 12th of April or to the proposal for a partition, but I suppose the latter.

As to Denmark's wish to have Russia implicated in the mediation, Bunsen remarked that this would result in France wanting to join in, which could easily provoke a European war. Bunsen "confidentially" gave Palmerston the following advice: Send tomorrow one or two men first to the Provisional Government at Rendsburg and then to the Danish Headquarters: "You will then be able, perhaps in 48 hours to bring about first an armistice, then the preliminaries of peace." The time is over, he wrote, "when despotic or foreign Governments [he is here referring to the lawful Government of the Duchies] can decide upon partition of countries and populations. The people and their legitimate authorities [the Government of the Rebels!] and representatives must be heard." He stressed the meritorious appeal of the 31st of March by the Provisional Government to the Danish people. Finally he remarked that Liberal English papers had exposed Disraeli's "humbug" and how the Treaty of 1720 was "a Hanoverian intrigue and interest."

The English papers to which Bunsen referred, according to his statement in a letter of the following day to the Provisional Government, were *The Spectator* and *The Examiner*.¹ In a letter to Reventlouw-Preetz sent at the same time² he stated that he, as reported in the letter of the 24th to Palmerston, had called Palmerston's attention to the fact that the question of a possible frontier between a Danish and a German Duchy of Slesvig "can only be answered by the population itself and the Government

¹ EE. 3: 25/4.

² *Ibid.*

representing it. The time is over when diplomats distributed souls!" – "I think it possible to assure you that England will accept the basis contained in the appeal of the 31st of March."

On the 21st of April Reventlow had had an interview with Palmerston and read to him the Danish dispatch of the 15th of April.¹ This dispatch expressed the Government's appreciation of the orders to the English Ministers in Berlin, Hanover, and Hamburg to recommend to the parties concerned an attitude of reserve so that a war was avoided. But the Government, it was said, wanted "mesures encore plus décisives, qui permettront à la Grande Bretagne d'exercer conjointement avec la Russie, leur puissante médiation dans cette affaire." The Danish dispatch was written by Reedt, as Knuth had been summoned to Headquarters, and furthermore it contained information about Colonel Bonin's proposal for an armistice of three days and General Hedemann's counterproposal for one of a fortnight.

Palmerston mentioned the orders to Westmorland with the offer for mediation by Great Britain, if Prussia and Denmark applied for it; but added that Arnim had maintained that Denmark had not yet done so. The applications from Copenhagen and the Danish Legation in London, said Palmerston, had then been examined, and a reply had been sent to Westmorland that Denmark "avait demandé le secours et l'appui de l'Angleterre d'une manière qui toutefois paraissait répondre affirmativement à cette question." Reventlow affirmed this and added that it was evident from Knuth's talks with the Ministers of Great Britain and Russia as recorded in the official report. But as the Danish appeals were directed simultaneously to London and St. Petersburg, said Reventlow, Palmerston would understand that it was not up to him, Reventlow, "d'en faire la demande en excluant la Russie, dont la réponse n'était pas encore arrivée." Palmerston approved of this, but doubted Prussia's willingness to accept Russia's intervention because of the Polish affairs, "mais que c'était là une chose sur laquelle on pourrait s'entendre." – As the seat of the coming negotiations Reventlow suggested Copenhagen, also for fear of Bunsen's connexions "avec un personnage illustre" [Prince Albert], while Palmerston preferred London.

¹ Reventlow's dispatch of 21/4, No. 27. – Brevskaber, p. 22 ff.

In Palmerston's opinion Prussia could not refuse this. If Copenhagen was suggested, she would instead suggest Berlin.

As mentioned by Reventlow, Denmark had also appealed to Russia for support. For this purpose W. Oxholm, Lord of the Bedchamber, had been sent to St. Petersburg.¹ Russia's policy, however, as mentioned above, after the outbreak of the revolutions, aimed at omitting to interfere with German conditions. The Emperor is supposed first to have thought of offering his brother-in-law Frederick William IV military assistance, against the revolution, but, as Nesselrode, the Chancellor, informed Lord Bloomfield, the British Minister, he decided "not to meddle in any way in the internal affairs of Germany."² Nor would Nicholas, according to Bloomfield's dispatch of the 8th of April, intervene in the Slesvig-Holstein question, although "He strongly disapproves of the King of Prussia's letter to the Duke of Augustenburg, and of all the proceedings of His Prussian Majesty in the matter."³

Oxholm arrived at St. Petersburg on the 7th of April, but only succeeded in obtaining a promise of moral support and willingness perhaps to mediate together with Great Britain. And, as Nesselrode said to Bloomfield, "in these days moral support was not likely to be of much avail."⁴ In a farewell audience granted to the Bavarian Minister on the 9th of April, the Emperor is supposed to have said "that He considered the King of Denmark to have been unfairly treated," and that "he was willing to join Great Britain in a mediation for the settlement of the question, but that he most certainly should not allow a drop of Russian blood to be shed, or a Rouble of Russian treasure to be spent, except for purely Russian interests."⁵ At present there was no affair in Europe in which it was to Russia's interest to intervene.

On the 12th of April Nesselrode let Bloomfield read a dispatch to Brunnow about the Slesvig-Holstein question.⁶ Bloomfield reported on the dispatch and his interview with Nesselrode that the latter spoke in favour of Denmark, although he was unwilling

¹ See amongst others Haralds, p. 63 ff.

² F.O. 65/348: 29/3, Nos. 76 and 79.

³ *Ibid.*: 8/4, No. 89.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 8/4, No. 92.

⁵ *Ibid.*: 10/4, No. 95.

⁶ *Ibid.*: 12/4, No. 101.

to be mixed up in a question which plays so great a role in Germany: he "declares the readiness of Russia to enter into a joint pacific mediation with Britain, with a view to an arrangement between the conflicting parties." Bloomfield added that he did not believe that Nesselrode "would be disposed to support His Danish Majesty except by negotiation and there is certainly no wish at the present moment to back the proposed Mediation by an armed demonstration."

After receiving the dispatch (dated at the 13th of April) Brunnow on the 22nd sent Palmerston an extract of it,¹ in order that he could see that the Emperor had authorized him, Brunnow, together with Palmerston to use their good offices in order in a *peaceful* way to have the conflict evened out: "Je pense aussi, pour ma part, que nous n'aurons pas beaucoup de difficulté à calmer les combattants, qui ne demandront pas mieux que de s'épargner la peine d'en venir aux coups, pourvu que leur amour-propre soit mis à couvert. — Avec quelques paroles polies je crois que nous parviendrons facilement à les décider à faire rentrer l'épée dans le fourreau." As they together had succeeded in settling the Turkish-Persian dispute, Brunnow did not doubt that they could also arrange "our Danish pacification." As Palmerston would learn from the extract, Brunnow had been authorized to send Dashkoff, who had been sent to Copenhagen on the occasion of the succession of the new King, but would receive orders on the return journey to stop at Hamburg, the instructions on which he had come to an agreement with Palmerston. If they came to an agreement, the task as mediator would be assigned to Dashkoff. Brunnow signed the letter like this: "Mille et mille amitiés de Votre très dévoué Brunnow."

On the 24th of April Brunnow informed Reventlow that Palmerston, who was staying at Broadlands, had answered him that he thought that the Queen would gladly accept co-operation with Russia in the mediation.² It is questionable how well-founded this supposition of Palmerston's was. If Brunnow would have to do with the matter, he said to Reventlow, all indulgence must be out of the question, "was die Rechte von Schleswig angeht." Furthermore he remarked: "Es muss doch mit dem Teufel zu-

¹ F.O. 65/357: 22/4.

² Reventlow's dispatch of 25/4, No. 28.

gehen, wenn Russland und England sich der Sache annehmen, dass sie nicht in Ordnung käme. Nur fest!" He did not share Reventlow's fear that the German troops in order to please the general feeling in Germany would launch an attack. — This statement by Brunnow was made the day after the Easter Battle, and a good deal more than "quelques paroles polies" was needed to stop the bloodshed that had started.

In a later talk, on the 28th of April, Brunnow told Reventlow that Palmerston had *not yet* answered him as regards the proposal for a joint Russian-British mediation.¹ He strongly recommended that Denmark used her naval power. Reventlow had also spoken to Dashkoff, who had come to London; but his description of conditions in Germany showed that from there they could neither expect "moderation nor justice."

On the 29th of April Brunnow visited Palmerston. Their negotiations resulted in a "Protocol signed between Britain and Russia on the Schleswig question."² It was signed by Palmerston and Brunnow. The latter dropped the proposal for a joint Russian-British mediation, it being said that this is conditioned by the fact that both parties request it; but so far Germany through Prussia had only requested Britain's mediation. Palmerston had communicated to Brunnow his proposals for an armistice, and if these were accepted, the mediation would be started either by Britain alone or by both powers, if the respective parties "en exprimeront mutuellement le désir." The, indeed, improbable possibility had been left open that Russia should later enter as mediator power.

It is uncertain whether Prince Albert already knew this Protocol when in a letter from Osborne of the 1st of May to John Russell he expressed his concern for the Slesvig-Holstein question.³ "The Schleswig-Holstein question causes me much anxiety," he wrote, "as I am afraid that we may be dragged by Danish and Russian, perhaps even French insinuations and diplomatic efforts into an open opposition to Germany." Later in the letter he complained that "the attacks made upon Germany with regard to Schleswig by our Press and in Parliament have already told most injuriously."

¹ Reventlow's dispatch of 28/4 (Private).

² Copy of protocol 29/4. R.A.W. I 3/114.

³ R.A.W. I 4/7.

In his reply of the 2nd of May Russell mentioned that the day before he had had a long talk with Palmerston about the question.¹ Palmerston thought that Bunsen was content with his proposal for an armistice. About a possible Russian co-operation at the mediation Russell wrote: "We cannot object to the Mediation of the Emperor of Russia, but we do not wish it, and it appears the Emperor of Russia is not anxious for it." As to the result of the mediation he thought that probably it would "be more favourable to the German than to the Danish View of the question, but I confess I do not know the Danish case." Russell's statement that he had said to Palmerston "that we must first obtain the release of all Prussian vessels, and this he agreed in" must have had a pleasant ring to Prince Albert. Whether it was very informative is another question. On the other hand Russell clearly informed him that it was not in his power to prohibit *The Times*, still less Disraeli to adopt their own view of the case. He thought, however, that the Germans would understand that *The Times* and Disraeli did not constitute "the whole of Britain."

On the 1st of May Bunsen had a talk with Palmerston in which, according to his own report, he made the following four proposals:² (1) To consider the mediation of Britain as accepted by Prussia under the "assumptions indicated" by Arnim; (2) To consider the mediation as already having started and to declare to Brunnow that Britain cannot without an express request from both parties share it with Russia; (3) To omit asking accounts by the parties as to their points of view, but immediately state Britain's basis of mediation, viz. the decision of the inhabitants whether they want to go to Germany or to Denmark; (4) the suspension of hostilities and release of prisoners of war and political prisoners; release of captured ships reserving compensation for them; evacuation of Slesvig by the German troops, who, however, remain in Holstein.

Still according to Bunsen's report Palmerston declared himself to be in perfect agreement on the first two points. His statements regarding the attitude of Russia towards mediation corresponded to his and Brunnow's agreement of the 29th of April. As regards Point 3 he said: "this basis seems to me the only possible one"

¹ R.A.W. I 4/8.

² Bunsen's dispatch of 1/5.

(twice underlined by Bunsen), only that he would have to guard against pronouncing on a definite boundary-line. When Bunsen maintained that the will of the people must be decisive, Palmerston after some hesitation also accepted this. As for Point 4, he would not renounce the claim for the evacuation of Holstein. Bunsen then suggested that the troops might occupy a position on the Elbe.

About an hour after Bunsen the envoy of the Federal Diet, Banks, the Syndic, from Hamburg, had a conference with Palmerston, who, as Banks wrote to Frankfurt, had arrived at the *preliminary* view that it was necessary immediately to establish a basis of mediation.¹ He thought that Palmerston the following day would suggest a partition of Slesvig to Bunsen, and, Banks wrote, "here a means presents itself of ending a destructive war, and that with honour, with dignity, with moderation."

The decision of sending a special envoy had been made by the Federal Diet at its sitting on the 20th of April.² For this Banks was chosen, on whom it was enjoined in concert with the Ministers of Prussia and Hanover to explain the Slesvig-Holstein question to the British Government and try to examine the possibilities of obtaining war steamships and other military equipment. But in the instructions to Banks it was pointed out that, indeed, the negotiations about the conflict had been delegated to Prussia by the Federal Diet.

Banks arrived in London in the evening of the 26th of April and on the 29th had his talk with Palmerston.³ About Palmerston's statements to Banks, it was reported by Bunsen to Berlin that they were very amicable to Germany and were to the effect that the affair should have an outcome honourable to Germany! Such expressions do not, as a matter of fact, appear from Banks's own report to have been used by Palmerston. However, he permitted Banks to assure the Federal Assembly that intentions of Great Britain were peaceable throughout, and he did not find that application of the British Treaty of Guarantee was of cur-

¹ Banks's report of 1/5. Frankfurt a. M. BT. I/409. — In Aktenstücke zur n. S.-H. Geschichte 2 u. 2. Heft several of Banks's reports are rendered or mentioned; see pp. 126 ff., 226 ff., 298, and 300 ff.

² Frankf. a/M. BT I/409.

³ Banks's report of 29/4 Frankf. a. M. BT I/409. — Bunsen's dispatch of 28/4, No. 67, and 29/4 (to the King).

rent interest. But he asked Banks why, if the Confederation interfered with the conditions of Slesvig, it did not as well interfere with those of Livonia and Alsace. Both parties would have somewhat to give way, he thought. As regards a possible Danish blockade, he said that Britain would acknowledge it and also letters of marque, as Britain during a war would use such measures herself.

It appears from Banks's report that to Palmerston he had described the dangers to the German Governments if they were prevented from "honourably carrying through their right." This must mean that the revolutionary movements would overthrow the Governments which did not fully keep up with the aggression against Denmark. About this Bunsen used the expression that one could not make peace against the rights of the Duchies, "sans compromettre l'existence de tous les trônes de l'Allemagne."

Banks stayed in London until the beginning of September. He lived at the James Hotel in Jermyn Street. The hotel was situated near Bunsen's residence in Carlton Terrace, with which he maintained a close connexion. During his stay he, of course, attempted to influence the Englishmen he got into touch with, in favour of the German points of view. As mentioned above, he had no official charge to participate in the negotiations, and it did not take long until he expressed a wish to be allowed to go home. On the 22nd of May he thus wrote:¹ "I have no authority to act officially, the negotiations are conducted according to instructions from the Prussian Cabinet by the present Prussian Minister, with whom they are in good hands . . ." Elsewhere he remarks about Bunsen: "This affair could not be entrusted to more competent hands than those of that excellent and highly esteemed man," and he repeatedly told how Bunsen informed him of everything.² As compared with the extreme German-national and Slesvig-Holstein circles Banks must be included among the moderate and sober-minded people, and, as far as can be estimated, Palmerston appreciated discussing the question with him, even though Banks thus could only speak as a private person.

On the 29th of April Reventlow had a discussion with Palmerston after he had received Knuth's dispatch of the 22nd with the

¹ Frankf. a. M. BT. I/409.

² Banks's reports of 1/5, 6/5, and 22/5. Frankf. a. M. BT. I/409.

description of the danger threatening Denmark, and with a request to Britain to fulfil her obligations of guarantee.¹ Reventlow's question whether Britain would not send a squadron was answered by Palmerston by his stating that this would not be in keeping with a mediator's part, "que le Gouvernement comptait poursuivre avec tout le zèle possible." About co-operation with Russia he said that Britain "ne demandait pas mieux pourvu que la Diète y consentit." On a possible aid from Sweden to Denmark he would not, as a mediator make any statement.

Bunsen's optimism after the negotiation on the 1st of May with Palmerston proved to be a little premature. Already the following day, perhaps under the influence of Reventlow's note of the 1st of May (or a discussion with him) (see below), Palmerston desisted from making a proposal for an arrangement: the parties would first have to give an account of their points of view before he could make his proposals.² Bunsen tried in vain to induce him to give up this view, but Palmerston answered, "I am afraid that we could not take two steps at once; it would surely not take much time for each Party to state to us in a few words what each considers to be the question in dispute, what they consider the rightful way of settling it, and why they think so; we should then be able to make a Proposal to both Parties." He must also, he said, have a "Statement" which he could submit to Parliament as "the Danish case."

In the afternoon of the 2nd of May Palmerston had a talk with Reventlow.³ He said to the latter that as Britain's mediation had now been accepted by the Federal Diet and Prussia and requested by Denmark, he would first propose an armistice as a condition of taking on the mediation. The respective troops should evacuate the Duchies, which became a neutral area. Then the procedure was to be as mentioned in the letter to Bunsen. London was to be the seat of the negotiations, and Palmerston mentioned Banks as the negotiator of the German Confederation.

¹ Reventlow's dispatch of 2/5, No. 30. – Brevskaber, p. 34 ff. – Haralds, p. 78 f.

² Bunsen's dispatch of 3/5. – Banks's report of 2/5. Frankf. a. M. BT. I/409.

³ Reventlow's dispatch of 3(?)5, No. 31. A duplicate of the dispatch is dated at the 2nd, which according to the contents must be correct; for there it says that Reventlow "yesterday" received a dispatch from the Foreign Office, from which he on the same day, the 1st, sent Palmerston a copy. – F.O. 22/160: 2/5 and 22/166: 1/5.

In his report on the talk Reventlow maintained that as to the exclusion of Russia from the mediation and the choice of London as the place of negotiation, he defended "mon terrain pouce par pouce." His instructions, he said, did not permit him to accept British mediation without the co-operation of Russia. To this Palmerston remarked that Reventlow would send his proposal to the Danish Government, and he was sure that they would accept it. To Reventlow's various objections Palmerston replied, "Il faut prendre les choses telles qu'elles sont." The opposition to Russia as a mediator issued from the Federal Diet, wrote Reventlow. As the plan for a Russo-British mediation had miscarried, Brunnow would no longer keep Dashkoff in London, but would let him go to Berlin.

In a dispatch a few days later Reventlow stated that Palmerston the day before had said that Bunsen had agreed to the mediation and that he was sure of Denmark's agreement.¹ In Parliament he had even said that both parties had accepted. I shall now, Reventlow wrote to Knuth, make use of your authorization to accept Britain's mediation alone, when and in the way I find most beneficial.

After the talk with Palmerston Reventlow went to Brunnow in order to report its contents to him.² Yes, said Brunnow, Britain attaches more importance to obtaining an arrangement by concessions from the weaker party than to having justice maintained, and therefore he had not insisted on Russia's participation in the mediation. Reventlow, however, thought, he wrote to Knuth, that Brunnow had realized that Germany would not accept Russian mediation, and therefore had given it up in order to avoid the affront of a refusal.

By a note of the 3rd of May Reventlow had requested Britain to send a fleet. Palmerston declined this the day after with a reference to the fact that Britain hoped for a suspension of hostilities for the purpose of resolving the conflict by mediation.³

In his reports to Count Knuth, Reventlow had several times hinted that he did not feel equal to the task of negotiating with Bunsen as his opponent. As it now must be taken for granted

¹ Reventlow's dispatch of 5/5, No. 32.

² *Ibid.*: 6/5, No. 33.

³ 4/5 to Reventlow. Draft. P.P.

that mediation negotiations would be started in London he adjured Knuth in his dispatch of the 6th of May to consider "whether the interests of the country do not demand that you take on the direction of the negotiations yourself in this place!" If you cannot do so, send if possible another in whom the Government and People have more confidence than in me. If you do not want to do so either, I shall do my best, but send me definite instructions.

The sitting in Parliament at which Palmerston had made the statement mentioned above, took place on the 4th of May.¹ Urquhart on this occasion asked "whether the present Government intended to maintain the treaty" [the Treaty of Guarantee of 1720], and "whether any mediation on the part of Britain had been offered, and if that offer had been accepted." Palmerston's somewhat stilted reply in reality was to the effect that the Treaty of Guarantee was not applicable to the existing case. As regards mediation, he said that it had been accepted by both parties, "and communications are at present going on with a view to render that mediation effectual."

Already four days later Palmerston was faced with another question in the House of Commons by Urquhart and Robinson.² The former again inquired about Britain's attitude towards Denmark and wanted to know whether Prussian troops had advanced into the Kingdom, and whether there were any prospects of a settlement of the conflict. Palmerston answered that, as previously stated, both parties had accepted Britain's mediation. He still hoped for an amicable and satisfactory arrangement, for which the British Government would make all possible efforts. The statements were greeted with applause by the Members of Parliament.

Urquhart then brought up the question whether Britain was to mediate alone or together with Russia. To this Palmerston gave the evasive answer that Denmark had applied to both powers, but to his knowledge the German Confederation or its mandatory, Prussia, had only contacted Britain.

Robinson's question was about the Danish declaration of blockade and the influence it might exert on English trade: would it prevent "the ingress and egress of British vessels not

¹ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. XCVIII, 3. Ser. 7/4-26/5 1848, p. 605.

² The Times 9/5. - See also Reventlow's dispatch of 9/5, No. 34.

charged with munitions of war” as regards the German ports for which the blockade was declared. On this Palmerston gave full informations: the blockade would no doubt “according to the law of nations” prevent “the passage of vessels to the blockaded ports, whether charged with the munitions of war, merchandise, or ballast. The terms of the blockade were in the usual form, and he believed it was supported by sufficient force.” – In a later remark Palmerston stated that from Danish quarters it had been communicated that Denmark would not prevent British mail boats which only carried mail and passengers from passing through the blockade.

Three days later Urquhart again had the floor in Parliament, this time in order to ask the question whether the Ministers who had acknowledged Denmark’s right “to blockade the ports of those enemies or pirates who had invaded her territories” still considered that the Treaty of Guarantee was not of current interest.¹ This time the reply was given by the Prime Minister, Lord John Russell: the Government was of opinion that the Guarantee of 1720 “did not apply to the present state of circumstances between Prussia and Denmark.”

As late as the 12th of May Reventlow reported that Palmerston had not yet received an answer from Berlin concerning the mediation. But Palmerston thought that it was accepted, and that the same would take place in Copenhagen, which had caused him in Parliament to declare that it had been accepted by both parties. In the same letter Reventlow mentioned the undeniably sensational fact that Bunsen, the Prussian Minister in Britain, had had himself be elected in the “Slesvig occupied by Prussian bayonets”, which did not belong to Germany at all, as representative to the Frankfurt Assembly! Actually he had been asking for it himself. In a letter to Reventlou-Preetz he had written: “I should not value any honour so much as that of being a Member of that Parliament [Frankfurt].” – “If we should still in time win back Slesvig[!],” he would like to be representative of Slesvig.² When on the 18th of May he thanked for being elected, he wrote that as soon as the negotiations in London had resulted in the

¹ Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates. XCVIII. 3. Ser. 7/4–26/5, p. 835 f.

² EE. 3.

laying down of peace preliminaries, he would hurry to Frankfurt.¹ The condition mentioned here was not fulfilled, and Bunsen was never admitted as a Member of the National Assembly.

In rather a long letter of the 8th of May Reedtz informed Reventlow that the attempt which the British and the Russian Minister at Count Knuth's request had made about the 1st of May at stopping Wrangel's invasion of Jutland (cf. below) had failed completely.² On the mediation Reedtz wrote that Denmark "ne peut et ne veut traiter que sous la médiation de la Grande Bretagne et de la Russie qu'il a réclamée et acceptée." But every moment was precious, and if the mediation were to be of use to Denmark, it must "promptement et énergiquement" intervene between her and her enemies. — Reventlow, having as usual consulted Brunnow, submitted a literal rendering of the essential contents of the letter to Palmerston in a memorandum of the 13th of May.³ Brunnow's support, as Reventlow wrote to Knuth, was "inappréciable par la clarté de jugement et l'énergie de son caractère." Presumably it is also Brunnow's voice which is heard in Reventlow's complaint that Denmark had tempered the blockade:⁴ "Neither the British Government, who has completely acknowledged our right to the strictest blockade system nor our enemies would in this way be made to give us cheaper conditions . . . only a pressure and the suspension by which trade is affected, and the fear of the outbreak of a general war is in our favour." Reventlow was, of course aware that Palmerston for the sake of British trade would like Denmark to give up "all powerful measures."

We must agree with Reventlow when in the letter mentioned he writes: "The task which I have been set, on the one hand to protest against the exclusion of Russia from the negotiations, which the Germans presumably will demand as a *conditio sine qua non*, and on the other hand not to compromise their result if they promise fairly satisfactorily, is certainly not quite easy

¹ Bunsen's letter of 18/5 to v. Liliencron. The letter is found in the Danish Rigsarkiv. — Aktenstücke zur n. S.-H. Geschichte, p. 157, Anm. 1.

² Ges. ark. London. Ordres 1848: 8/5, No. 32.

³ Reventlow's dispatch of 15/5, No. 36 with app.

⁴ Ibid.: 15/5, No. 37. — The reference must be to the Danish declaration of the 8th of May about a delimitation of the blockade. Krigens 1848–50. I, p. 548 f.

and would be quite impossible if Brunnow's whole personality and attitude did not facilitate its execution for me."

As mentioned above, Palmerston had assured Reventlow that Britain was working for the mediation with all possible eagerness. How about her efforts in Berlin and Frankfurt?

After Westmorland had received Palmerston's proposal that both parties should evacuate Holstein – the proposal which Bunsen rejected with contempt (see p. 91) – he visited Arnim on the 26th of April in order to lay it before him and "strongly [to] urge the Prussian Government to suspend Hostilities." In connexion with the talk an exchange of notes took place, Westmorland on the same day in note recapitulating Palmerston's statements about mediation and receiving a reply from Arnim on the 28th of April.¹ I shall first mention the notes before discussing Westmorland's summary of the talk.

During the talk Arnim had said that so far he knew nothing about Denmark's having requested a mediation by Britain. On the 15th, wrote Westmorland in his note, I read to you Palmerston's dispatch of the 11th (see p. 68 ff.), to which you remarked that you could not commit yourself before Denmark had applied for mediation. On the 16th of April Plessen submitted his note to you. On the 20th I sent you a note "stating that Wynn had been directed to offer the British Mediation to the Danish Government which he knew would be accepted." You answered that you would send my note to Frankfurt. When today I communicated Palmerston's dispatch of the 20th to you, you thought that Denmark had not clearly accepted mediation. After my talk with you I have received a letter from Wynn [of the 23rd] in which "he states that in compliance with the application of the Danish Government for the good offices of Great Britain Palmerston had directed him to offer his mediation which the Danish Government had accepted." I hope you will consider this sufficient to accept the mediation and that "the friendly mediation of my Government may be rendered available towards the reestablishment" of good relations between Denmark and Germany.

Formally Westmorland's view of Denmark's attitude towards a British mediation can hardly be termed correct. First of all the Danish Government had claimed Britain's help in pursuance of

¹ F.O. 64/286: 27/4, No. 159, and 28/4, No. 164.

the Treaty of Guarantee of 1720, a help which Britain refused to give. Then Denmark had to be content with mediation, but wanted Russia, who recognized the Danish legal point of view as regards Slesvig, to take part as a powerful support against the aggression of Germany.

Formally Westmorland's statement was not in complete agreement with Wynn's letter.¹ After making various critical remarks upon Arnim, Wynn wrote: "The language which according to your report he holds respecting the mediation is not more to his credit. What can it signify whether the application for English Mediation on the part of Prussia was before or after Denmark asked for it. Arnim knew that application had been made from hence for England's good offices and in what shape could they better be given than in that of mediation which Denmark was sure to consent to."

In his reply of the 28th of April Arnim acknowledged the correctness of Westmorland's "recapitulation." Furthermore, he wrote that Lord Stanley on the 21st had informed Bunsen that Denmark "avait demandé officiellement la médiation de la Grande Bretagne et que Votre Gouvernement l'avait acceptée," and that an "instruction à ce sujet était partie à Votre adresse."² Arnim therefore thought that Westmorland would soon be able to inform him of Britain's offer of mediation "sur la base posée par les résolutions de la Diète Germanique des 4 et 12 Avril." In this case, and if there were a hope of arresting bloodshed, the Federal Diet on the 22nd of April had authorized Prussia to accept the offer of mediation and "d'agir en conséquence."³

In accordance with this note of his Arnim in the talk of the 26th of April had said that when Denmark had accepted the mediation, he would do so, too, on the basis ordered by the Federal Diet, "laquelle base, savoir l'occupation du Slesvig, par les troupes Fédérales," had probably already been obtained by

¹ Westmorland. I, p. 121 ff.

² According to Bunsen's dispatch of 22/4 Stanley's communication to him seems to have been made the same day (not on the 21st). Stanley stated, it said there, that the mail yesterday had taken a dispatch to Westmorland in which it was stated that Denmark "jetzt offiziell die Vermittelung Englands verlangt, und dass England sie, der Bereitwilligkeit Preussens sicher, übernommen." – Arnim's statement about an expected "instruction" was presumably in part a quibble.

³ The resolution by the Federal Diet of the 22nd is printed in Aktenstücke, p. 10.

the German troops. Palmerston's request to suspend hostilities was rejected by Arnim. "He said he expected that War would be put an end to by the fall of the Ministry of Orla Lehmann [!], that when this was accomplished he should very well be able to settle the question in dispute with the party opposed to him and who would succeed him." He blamed Britain for having delayed the German operations, which would otherwise have put an end to the war, by her acting on Hanover. He had written so to Bunsen, too. Hanover by its conduct had "lost much of its popularity in Germany." – The present Government in Copenhagen, "who was stopping the German Shipping, he considered . . . a set of Pirates."

When Westmorland wanted to be informed of the terms made by Arnim in order to put an end to the war, the latter said that this depended completely on the Federal Diet. "He wished in no way to infringe upon the rights of the King of Denmark, but he thought the best measure that Sovereign could pursue would be to alter the succession as it now stood settled for Denmark," thus presumably alter it for the benefit of the Augustenborg family.

In his summary of the talk Westmorland stated what a friend of Arnim's had said to him when "speaking upon this subject," viz. "that Denmark had lost a great opportunity by not at once incorporating Slesvig as well as Jutland in the German Confederation and then by a perpetual treaty uniting the Kingdom with its fleet and merchant Navy to the German Zollverein, that such an arrangement would have made Denmark a great and influential Power (however displeasing it might have been to Britain), it would have secured her the lasting gratitude and friendship of Germany."¹ Westmorland did not know whether Arnim cherished a similar idea, but remarked that it had been advanced in newspapers.

At the end of his dispatch Westmorland laid down that in the whole of Germany there exists "a great and anxious feeling in favour of the supposed German National rights in Slesvig and I have little doubt that great exertions and sacrifices would be

¹ On these plans cf. Troels Fink, *Admiralstatsplanerne i 1840'erne* (Festskrift til Erik Arup (1946), p. 287 ff.) and H. Hjelholt, *Et engelsk forslag fra 1848 om Danmarks optagelse i Det tyske Forbund* (Danske Magazin. 7. r. VI, p. 261 ff.).

made by the whole nation to accomplish their views." Westmorland did not venture to express an opinion as to the question whether these "may be limited to a division of Slesvig into German and Danish," as suggested in Bunsen's pamphlet. When he touched on the question before Arnim, the latter, as mentioned above (p. 74), replied that he had not yet read Bunsen's pamphlet.

In his dispatch of 28th of April Westmorland mentioned German news items according to which Wrangel had been ordered to advance into Jutland.¹ He did not believe that the order had been issued yet, but he did believe that it was Arnim's intention to issue it, as "the general feeling of the persons belonging to the Government is decidedly in favour of the occupation of Jutland unless the Prussian Ships which have been seized by Denmark are given up."

On this dispatch Palmerston on the 2nd of May, i. e. the day when Wrangel advanced into Jutland, thus the day after the fair, made the following menacing note (but it was hardly Britain's power which constituted the menace): Westmorland was to "warn the Prussian Government very earnestly as to the serious consequences which would follow such aggression by Prussia against Denmark, and . . . request the Prussian Government well to reflect that although Denmark may be a small Power as compared with Prussia yet Prussia must not imagine that on that account there are no other Powers in Europe who by throwing their weight into the scale of Denmark might more than redress the Balance." Prussia has, he continued, no reason "to complain of the Reprisals by Sea which Denmark has made in Retaliation for the aggressions of Prussia by land." — As a matter of fact, Westmorland did not get any order of these contents, but some of them were included in the order of the 8th of May mentioned below.

Arnim's above-mentioned note of the 28th of April was answered the following day by Westmorland.² He expressed his

¹ F.O. 64/286: 28/4, No. 164. — According to Krigen 1848–50. I, p. 576, the orders issued by Wrangel on the 29th of April suggested advance into Jutland. Already on the 26th Arnim wrote to Bunsen that Germany perhaps would have to extend her military operations in order to obtain compensation for the damage which Denmark had inflicted upon her by sea.

² F.O. 64/286: 30/4, No. 167.

pleasure at learning from Arnim's letter that both parties had now accepted Great Britain's mediation, so that "it remains for me only to offer on my part to take any measures Your Excellency may desire with the view of giving it effect." Occasioned by Arnim's statement about mediation on the basis of the Resolutions of the 4th and 12th of April by the Confederation, Westmorland called attention to the fact "that the official offer of the mediation [in Palmerston's dispatch of the 11th] is unconditional and I do not conceive that I am at present likely to receive any further directions as to the offer of mediation." Stanley's statement to Bunsen of the 21st of April about "instruction" must in Westmorland's opinion refer to Palmerston's dispatch to him of the 20th, the contents of which were already known to Arnim, and which expressed Palmerston's wish that Prussia should "suspend hostilities in order to enable negotiations to be carried on."

In a postscript dated at the 29th of April Westmorland stated that he had from Palmerston received dispatches down to the 25th which contained "no further instruction," but on the other hand statements that as the mediation had now been accepted by the parties, "should the questions in dispute henceforth be treated diplomatically instead of being left to the decision of Arms." The next step ought to be "to establish an indefinite suspension of hostilities and to interpose some sufficient extent of Country [Holstein] between the Troops of the opposite Parties." Westmorland furthermore referred to the fact that it appeared from notes from Hanover and Brunswick that these countries highly recommended British mediation.

On the 30th of April Arnim rejected Westmorland's urgent representations about the suspension of hostilities and stated that the Federal Diet had authorized Prussia to make the troops advance into Jutland.¹ He had, he wrote, in letters of the 19th and the 28th given information about the conditions on which Prussia in pursuance to the resolutions of the Federal Diet had been authorized to accept Britain's mediation. The conditions had now been fulfilled in so far as status quo [!] in Slesvig had been re-introduced by the evacuation of the Duchy by the Danish troops. The German Confederation therefore might content itself with

¹ F.O. 64/287: 1/5, No. 169. Printed in Aktenstücke, p. 10 f. – Draft for Arnim's letter of 30/4 to Bunsen.

necessary measures as regards the security of Slesvig if Denmark on her part was prepared to give up any fresh attack on this country and of the hostile measures she had taken against German trade and property. But so far Denmark had shown no wish for the suspension of hostilities. Arnim was referring to the seizures of German ships and the blockade of the Elbe. Germany had to try every expedient to put an end to such things and obtain full compensation for the damages. Prussia had been authorized to occupy as much Danish territory as seems sufficient security for the German claim for compensation.

Prussia might, however, so Arnim ended his note, renounce this if Britain made Denmark stop her military actions by land and by sea and guaranteed immediate cessation of the seizures and compensation for damages caused to private property.

When Westmorland sent Palmerston a copy of Arnim's note, he called attention to the fact that Britain's mediation had been accepted "under restrictions which according to Your Lordship's despatch" to Wynn [21/4, No. 19] "you do not appear to have understood were to be imposed upon it." Westmorland had first in his answer to Arnim intended "to make this remark," but gave it up again and contended himself with acknowledging receipt of the note and state that he would immediately submit it to Palmerston. He was sure that orders had already been given "for the advance of the Prussian Troops into Jutland." "I shall," he finally wrote, "be anxious to receive Your Lordship's further instructions as to any proceedings I am to take in this matter, as at present there is no chance of my succeeding in obtaining a suspension of hostilities unless under conditions for the proposal of which Your Lordship has given me no authority."

In his order of the 27th of April to Westmorland, Palmerston laid the responsibility for the bloodshed which would be brought about by the German occupation of Slesvig, on Prussia.¹ "The Questions," he wrote, "are matters which from their very nature are susceptible of being brought diplomatically to a satisfactory solution, because they relate to disputed Rights and to conflicting claims and such matters are surely capable of being determined by argument and Proof as well as by the Sword."

¹ F.O. 64/282: 27/4, No. 105.

Regarding Palmerston's statement about bloodshed Westmorland remarked in his dispatch of the 3rd of May, that he had found Arnim "deaf to all such representations."¹ "I now fear," he continued, "that, as a popular policy in Germany, he will continue the operations of the Prussian Troops and will lead with them those of the German Confederation, in the conquest of Jutland and of the Island of Alsen, and afterwards, if he sees a probability, of Fünen and the remaining Danish possessions." Westmorland stated how Arnim had put off his acceptance of the mediation, and when it finally happened on the 30th of April, it was in "a very restricted form, from the one in which it had originally been asked for." Finally he stated that on account of Wynn's dispatch to Palmerston of the 1st of May – of which he had obtained a copy – he had together with Meyendorff asked Arnim for a conversation in order to give him "a communication of importance." The conversation took place the following day.

In his dispatch mentioned above, Wynn tells about the appeal which Count Knuth under the impression of Denmark's helpless condition had made to the Russian and the British Minister in order to make them propose an armistice to Wrangel.² Wynn and Ungern Sternberg complied with Knuth's wish and on the 30th of April drew up a collective letter about it to Wrangel.³ The proposal was for a three weeks' armistice, during which the armies retained their present positions; the German troops should, however, evacuate Jutland if they had already advanced into it. The blockade should cease and vessels which had been seized after the armistice had been concluded, should be released. Ewers, the Russian Secretary of Legation, on the 1st of May was sent with the proposal to General Wrangel. At the same time Wynn and Sternberg wrote to Westmorland and Meyendorff, respectively, in order to have them make the proposal to Arnim.

Ewers met with Wrangel at Gudsø near Fredericia on the 2nd of May. The German army had already advanced into Jutland. Wrangel's reply was a refusal.⁴ He refused to conclude

¹ F.O. 64/287: 3/5, No. 172.

² F.O. 22/162: 1/5, No. 53. – Russ. Akter. Fuldstænd. eksemplar X. 1848: 1/5, No. 72. – Haralds, p. 116.

³ Printed in Actenstücke, p. 12 f. and in Krigen 1848–50, I, Appendix 26.

⁴ F.O. 22/162: 4/5, No. 57. – Russ. Akter X. 1848: 4/5, No. 77. – Actenstücke, p. 13 f. – Krigen 1848–50, I, Appendix 26.

any armistice unless the Danish troops evacuated Als, and all ships seized were released. In his report Wynn wrote to Palmerston that when Wrangel read the two Ministers' letter "he immediately said that the conditions which we proposed were wholly inadmissible, and that he should proceed as long as he had a foot of land to tread on, unless the ships were released." To Ewers' question whether he would not stop until he had received orders from Berlin, he answered that he was solely responsible to Frankfurt. Furthermore he stated that in Jutland "he should by levying contributions require the price of every ship detained to whatever nation of the Confederation it belonged."

After Wrangel's reply the appeal which Westmorland and Meyendorff only on the 4th of May had an opportunity to make to Arnim, was futile.¹ Westmorland stated that they came to him with "des paroles de paix," "which we hoped would be well received;" then Meyendorff read the contents of the Danish armistice proposal. But Arnim said that the decision lay with Wrangel, who had to follow the orders of the German Confederation, to which he had sworn obedience. The two Ministers thought that Arnim, after all, must have some control over Wrangel and on the whole had greater influence on the affair "than he seemed to believe." Arnim admitted this, but would await a report from Wrangel. Then Arnim and Westmorland exchanged some remarks on Britain's mediation. Arnim thus read the extract of a dispatch from Bunsen according to which Palmerston in an interview with the Swedish Minister should have said that Denmark "had never as yet asked for the mediation of Britain."² He also read a dispatch from Banks, stating that Palmerston had told him that Britain's guarantee for Slesvig "did not apply to the existing differences about that Duchy, and that you desired the present termination of those differences should be honorable to Germany."³ Westmorland also thought that this was Palmerston's view and even as a proof of this adduced Palmerston's above-mentioned dispatch to him of the 27th of April, in which "disputed Rights and conflicting claims" were

¹ F.O. 64/287: 4/5, No. 175.

² Westmorland gives the date of this dispatch as 30/4, but it is 29/4.

³ The reference must be to Banks's report of 29/4 (see p. 99), but should it not actually be to Bunsen's rendering of it?

mentioned.”¹ As Westmorland wrote in his report, Meyendorff had by him been informed that Russia was greatly dissatisfied with Prussia’s conduct in the Slesvig-Holstein questions and “would prepare to take a more active part in them.”²

The Ministers’ appeal was futile, but Westmorland assured Wynn that Arnim “was in a softer mood than I have lately seen him.”³ Wynn was glad to hear that. He wrote in his reply: “I hope that the invasion of Jutland will produce still stronger language from Russia and perhaps [!] from us.”⁴ Wynn’s letter dated from the 10th of May, and on the 4th of May Sweden had informed Prussia of her intention to assist Denmark with the defence of the Kingdom proper.⁵ This is the background of Wynn’s statement in the letter: “The only real friends the Danes have are their *old* Enemies the Swedes, who seem to be most anxious to be *at* the Prussians, but not with sufficient force to be of any advantage unless others do the same.”

On the 7th of May Westmorland again had a talk with Arnim because he had been ordered to inform him of the contents of Palmerston’s dispatch of the 1st of May to Strangways.⁶ The latter was ordered “strongly to urge upon Count Colloredo the expediency of putting an immediate stop to the hostilities now going on,” so that the conflict could be settled by mediation. Palmerston had “this Morning” – the 1st of May – from Bunsen been informed orally “that it has at last been finally settled between the Diet and the Prussian Government that the Prussian Government shall be authorized on the Part of the Confederation to accept the good offices of Her Majesty’s Government” to arrive at a peaceful arrangement. Bunsen had declared himself to be prepared “immediately” to negotiate with Palmerston about it, and the latter would “lose no time in entering into communication on these

¹ 16/5, No. 121 (F.O. 64/283), Palmerston ordered Westmorland to tell Arnim that he, Palmerston, was only responsible for communications to him through Westmorland. Palmerston’s dispatch in question had caused the Queen’s displeasure (presumably because of criticism of Bunsen?) and Palmerston then made a few alterations in it. R.A.W. I 4/34.

² F.O 65/348: 26/4, No. 118.

³ Westmorland I, p. 207 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 219 ff.: 10/5.

⁵ Haralds, pp. 104 ff. and 283 f.

⁶ F.O. 64/287: 8/5, No. 179. – F.O. 30/105: 1/5, No. 7. – F.O. 64/283: 2/5, No. 110. – Haralds’ statement on p. 127 ff. about Palmerston’s proposal for an armistice before 15/5 must be corrected in accordance with my subsequent account.

matters" with Bunsen and Reventlow. Strangways was to urge Coloredo to authorize Prussia or Wrangel immediately to have hostilities suspended, and "in order to show that this Armistice is concluded with a view to a peaceful settlement, and not with a view to the resumption of hostilities, Her Majesty's Government would suggest that a considerable space of territory should be interposed between the Troops of the two parties."

This territory, Palmerston suggested, should consist of Slesvig and Holstein. The Federal Diet had, he wrote, by the Resolution of 4th of April wanted *status quo ante* to be established, and at that time, "I believe," Danish troops had not advanced into Slesvig and German troops not into Holstein. The suspension of hostilities should of course entail "the release of Prussian and other Merchantmen detained by the Danes, either in Port or at Sea, and the raising of any Blockades which may have been imposed, together with the release of all Prisoners and Captives, civil or Military in the hands of either Party." – The contents of this dispatch to Strangways were also communicated to the British Ministers in Berlin, Copenhagen, and Hanover, as well as Hodges in Hamburg.

As appears, the proposal contained nothing about the way in which the Duchies were to be governed during the armistice. Presumably it was presupposed that the established revolutionary Government remained in force. If so, the proposal may be termed extremely benevolent to Germany.

When Westmorland read the proposal to Arnim, the latter, however, made a reference to the Federal Diet's later Resolution of the 12th of April, for which reason he did not find the proposal "at present feasible, nor did he think it possible to entertain it, while Wrangel was negotiating" the Danish proposal for an armistice made through Wynn and Sternberg. Arnim at that time, indeed, ought to have known that Wrangel had completely rejected this proposal and thus was not negotiating. In spite of that, Arnim, when Westmorland pressed hard and amongst other things referred to the fact that the Federal Diet did not want a war and that Hanover would like to see it to be ended, encouraged Westmorland to "hope a favourable result might be expected" from Wrangel's "negotiations". He maintained – according to Westmorland's report – that he had requested Wrangel not to

insist on the condition imposed on him by the Federal Diet, viz. "to occupy Jutland for the purpose of compelling Denmark to give up the German ships it had seized." And as Arnim furthermore did not seem to attach special importance to the demanded evacuation of Als by Danish troops, "he appeared to hope that the suspension of hostilities might very soon be established." I interpose here the remark that in Palmerston's order to Westmorland to submit the proposal for an evacuation of the Duchies to Arnim it finally says, "My Proposal does not of course apply to any of the Danish Islands." I wonder whether he was not thinking of Als (and Ærø).

Arnim told Westmorland that through Bunsen's nephew he had learnt about Palmerston's amicable attitude towards Prussia and that Palmerston had said to Brunnow "that Russia had better not mix herself up with the mediation as to the affairs of Slesvig Holstein on account of her unpopularity in Germany, that you desired to keep this mediation as much as possible to yourself," and that you assumed together with Bunsen and Reventlow "to bring it to a favorable conclusion." – Arnim expressed his great satisfaction with the fact that the negotiations were to take place in London, "and appeared to entertain no doubt that they would be impartially adjusted."

As Westmorland had said to Arnim, Hanover was willing to try to have the war ended as Britain wished. When Bligh had received the order corresponding to that of Westmorland's, he immediately requested Bennigsen as soon as possible "to express both at Francfort and at Berlin the desire of the Hanoverian Government to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the subject."¹ The following day Bennigsen informed Bligh "that he had already written according to my suggestion, both to Francfort and to Berlin" in order to invite the conclusion of an armistice. – Arnim was of course dissatisfied with Hanover's independent action here.²

The fact that Bennigsen looked on the policy of Prussia with great suspiciousness – and not without reason – appears from various statements of his to Bligh, which the latter reported in his dispatch of the 5th of May.³ Once Bennigsen even, wrote

¹ F.O. 34/53: 7/5, No. 45.

² F.O. 64/287: 8/5, No. 179.

³ F.O. 34/53: 5/5, No. 44.

Bligh, when speaking about Hanover's misfortunes in a war against Denmark, went the length of giving expression to his belief that Prussia "would not unwillingly see this Country grievously embarrassed, and thereby affording her a better opportunity for taking possession of it as an Indemnity for her Rhenish Provinces, which he thinks her not unlikely to lose." He was presumably thinking of a war with France. — The suspiciousness towards Prussia was increased, wrote Bligh, by the memory of "how invariably Prussia has, hitherto, at the expense of her neighbours emerged in increased strength out of all her difficulties."

On the 11th of May Westmorland reported that the Swedish Minister in Berlin, d'Ohsson, had informed Arnim of Sweden's Declaration of the 4th of May.¹ Arnim in a note of the 10th of May dismissed the Swedish application and amongst other things assured "que la Russie aussi directement intéressée que la Suède au maintien de l'équilibre du Nord et des traitées sur lesquels cet équilibre repose, n'interviendrait d'aucune manière dans ce différend." When d'Ohsson made Meyendorff as well as Westmorland read Arnim's note, Meyendorff declared to Westmorland that he must protest against the statement mentioned. His Government had never authorized him to make such a statement. He did so on the 12th of May.² Arnim first offered to change it, which, however, proved impossible as a copy of the note had already been sent to the Prussian Ministers.³ Then Arnim on the 13th of May submitted a reply to Meyendorff to the effect (1) that Meyendorff's statements "ne nous ont fait pressentir aucune démarche semblable à celle annoncée par la Suède" and (2) "que Vous n'insistiez pas sur la médiation offerte par la Russie conjointement avec d'Angleterre." Meyendorff had himself, wrote Arnim, authorized him to make the latter statement to the Swedish Minister. He had not, he continued, forgotten the reservations made by Russia "pour une certaine éventualité," but had not considered them an intervention. He still thought that Russia would not intervene, neither by a measure like the Swedish one nor by mediation, "vu que cette mission resterait confiée à l'Angleterre seule." Arnim of course ended his letter with an assurance of

¹ F.O. 64/287: 11/5, No. 185. — Haralds, p. 117 ff. — Actenstücke, p. 16 f.

² Copy of Meyendorff's dispatch of 12/5 in file Frankfurt a. M. BT. I/409.

³ F.O. 64/287: 15/5, No. 192.

Prussia's wish for a peaceful solution, provided that it was in agreement "avec l'honneur de la Prusse et avec les intérêts dont la défense nous a été confiée." — Two days later (on the 15th) Arnim was to have a reason to revise his view of Russia's non-intervention.

In the dispatch of the 11th of May Westmorland had furthermore stated that Dashkoff, whom Meyendorff had sent with dispatches to London, had returned to Berlin. Dashkoff had learnt from Brunnow that Palmerston thought that "in consequence of the more advanced position which had been taken with regard to them [the affairs of Slesvig Holstein] by Russia and the declaration of a more settled conviction as to the Treaty obligations by which She was bound, it would be more advantageous and would hold out a better prospect for the termination of existing hostilities, if the mediation was left solely in Your Lordship's hands" (cf. above, p. 97). Meyendorff, as he had said to Arnim, was of the same opinion. He had also told Westmorland that he had urged Arnim "to put a stop to hostilities" so that mediation could be started. Westmorland made the same appeal in a talk with the Under-Secretary of State of the Prussian Foreign Office, Bülow, referring to the advantage it would be to suspend hostilities, "while it might not appear to have been brought about by the language held either by Russia or by Sweden." He also said to d'Ohsson that Sweden ought to advise Denmark "to conclude the armistice which was in negotiation upon any satisfactory terms."

In a dispatch of the 8th of May Palmerston informed Westmorland that already in the dispatch of the 2nd of May (see above, p. 115) a reply [in advance] had been given to Arnim's note of the 30th of April, apart from the latter's demand for damages "to private Individuals for losses occasioned by the Embargo and detention of Prussian and other German vessels." But, Palmerston stated, as to this Arnim must "surely see that those measures of Naval Warfare were a perfectly legitimate and natural retaliation against Prussia and the other German States for their attack upon the territories and forces of the King Duke. Prussia and the German States cannot expect that Denmark

¹ F.O. 64/283: 8/5, No. 111.

should make compensations for the legitimate exercise of a defensive Belligerent Right.”

Palmerston's statements here obviously were completely in agreement with British public opinion, as expressed by Bunsen in various dispatches.¹ If we reject Britain's good offices, it thus says, making them depend on the *preceding* agreement as to compensation for damages, we shall have *all* against us. This is even Robert Peel's view, who has otherwise completely been won over to us. “It is generally declared,” he writes in another passage, “that the claim for damages for having *detained the ships* is completely untenable.” – It was indeed rather quickly abandoned by Prussia.²

When Westmorland on the 12th of May informed Arnim of Palmerston's dispatch of the 8th of May, he toned down the last sentence, writing that “unless both Parties were to agree to make full compensation for all damage done to private Individuals and their property by Sea and by land . . . it could not be expected that such compensation should be made by one Party alone.”³

On the 15th of May Westmorland sent Palmerston a copy of this note and furthermore stated that he had received Palmerston's orders including No. 117, i. e. several orders of the 9th of May. One of these corresponded to Palmerston's statement to Bunsen in the letter of the 2nd of May in which he requested the two parties, in order that the mediator power might make an acceptable proposal to it to “state what in their view is the question in dispute; what is the proposed mode of settling this question, and what are their reasons for proposing that mode.”⁴ A similar communication was at the same time sent to Wynn in Copenhagen.⁵ The other order was to the effect that Westmorland on account of complaints of the blockade should inform Arnim that “whatever inconvenience the Commerce of Prussia and of other Countries may be subjected to by these blockades,” it was due to Prussia's own aggressive proceedings. Finally Palmerston the same day sent Westmorland a copy of a memorandum “signed

¹ 3/5, 5/5, and 12/5.

² See Arnim's dispatch of 10/5 to Bunsen and Banks's report of 10/5 (Frankf. a. M. BT I/409).

³ F.O. 64/287: 15/5, No. 192.

⁴ F.O. 64/283: 9/5, No. 113.

⁵ F.O. 22/160: 9/5.

by Brunnow and myself [see p. 97] with reference to the wish expressed by Denmark that England and Russia should jointly mediate in the differences."¹ The day before a similar communication was sent to Strangways.²

In the dispatch of the 15th of May Westmorland informed Palmerston that Arnim had read to him part of his letter of the 9th of May to Bunsen,³ from which it should appear that Prussia had already explained "their views as to the mode of settling the existing differences." The most important piece of information contained in Westmorland's dispatch, however, was that Meyendorff had told him about Russia's menacing note of the 8th of May, "that if the Prussian Government persists in the occupation and conquest of Jutland, this proceeding will inevitably lead to a rupture of the friendly relations between the Government of Russia and Prussia." On the same day Meyendorff communicated this note to Arnim. Westmorland had previously advised his Russian colleague at the handing over of the note to tone down the impression of it as being a menace "of a hostile proceeding in case its views were not adopted."

Palmerston received a copy of Russia's menacing note from Brunnow, and from Bloomfield in St. Petersburg he also heard about Russia's active proceeding.⁴ Nesselrode let Bloomfield read the note and said that he hoped that Britain would also speak firmly, but that still "matters may be settled by negotiation." In the note it is said that the future negotiations must take place under the auspices of Russia and Britain.

J. G. Levetzau, the Lord High Steward, who by the Danish Government had been sent to St. Petersburg in order to invoke Russia's assistance, no doubt had an appreciable share in Russia's active intervention. To him the Tsar characterized the Prussian King's, his brother-in-law's, behaviour in the Slesvig-Holstein question as "infamous." In a talk on the 4th of May Nesselrode had informed Bloomfield that if the Germans were pushing forward into Jutland, "Russia would no longer hesitate to interfere by force of arms to prevent the dismemberment of the Danish

¹ F.O. 64/283: 9/5, No. 117.

² F.O. 30/105: 8/5, No. 10.

³ Arnim's dispatch of 9/5.

⁴ F.O. 65/357: copy of the dispatch to Meyendorff. — F.O. 65/349: 9/5, Nos. 140 and 142; cf. 12/5, No. 144.

Monarchy.”¹ It is natural to connect the note of the 8th of May with information of the decision of the Federal Diet to occupy Jutland.² Bloomfield furthermore as regards the talk with Nesselrode told that the latter as basis of negotiation was contemplating a division of Slesvig. When Bloomfield mentioned this to Levetzau, the latter rejected division, and he got an impression that Denmark would only reluctantly accept the cession of any part of Slesvig: it would call for full implementation of the Treaties of Guarantee.

In Copenhagen they were anxiously waiting for the result of Levetzau's mission, but even the declaration of Sweden was encouraging to the Danish Government. On the 10th of May Wynn had a talk with Count Knuth about Palmerston's proposal for an armistice in which Knuth touched on the very decisive point not mentioned by Palmerston, the administration of the Duchies during the armistice.³ Knuth furthermore expressed his regret “that there should be any difficulty as to Russia being joined in the mediation.”

Three days later Wynn in a dispatch to Palmerston mentioned Knuth's and his colleagues' disappointment at Palmerston's note to Reventlow that “Her Majesty's Government could not offer any military or naval aid.”⁴ Knuth had said to Wynn that he did not believe that Britain's mediation, if it was not supported by a military or naval demonstration, would be respected by Prussia or Frankfurt, “who played into one another's hands.”

The same day Wynn wrote a detailed letter to Westmorland.⁵ He found it, he stated, to be of minor importance what the Danish Government were thinking of Palmerston's proposal for an armistice “as I have no idea that the Germans will ever consent to evacuate the Dutchies.” The Government were, of course, disappointed at Palmerston's refusal “of all Military or naval *Appui* . . . but they expect good tidings from Petersborough tomorrow.” Wynn did not think “that the present or any Government would dare to give up the detained Ships for any thing less

¹ F.O. 65/349: 5/5, No. 135.

² Haralds' view (p. 114) that it was Sweden's promised assistance to Denmark that gave rise to Russia's step, does not seem quite well-founded.

³ F.O. 22/162: 10/5, No. 62. — Cf. Statsrådets Forhandlingar, I, p. 296.

⁴ F.O. 22/162: 13/5, No. 63.

⁵ Westmorland. I, p. 235 ff.

than a final arrangement." "They are," he wrote later in the letter, "much annoyed by the proposed exclusion of Russia both on account of the loss of so powerful a mediator and also of the services of Brunnow versus Bunsen, who with or without reason they think has the ear of Lord P. I try to persuade them that England is not in a state to begin a war for objects in which she is not immediately concerned." – "Tomorrow" was the 14th of May, and to his letter Wynn on that day added a postscript with information that the news from St. Petersburg about support of Denmark had caused the Danish Government to feel "able to negotiate on better terms."

Not until the 15th of May did Knuth in a note to Wynn accept Britain as sole mediator at the armistice, but reserved for himself to apply for Russia's participation at negotiations about "the final decision."¹ The point in Palmerston's armistice proposal which aimed at a mutual evacuation of the Duchies was accepted. As mentioned above, nothing had been mentioned in Palmerston's proposal as regards the administration of the Duchies during the armistice. Knuth suggested that Denmark should administer Slesvig, the German Confederation, if necessary, Holstein. For the maintenance of law and order corps of gendarmerie should be established for each Duchy. The blockade should cease and all ships seized after the coming into force of the armistice should be released, but not those detained before, as Denmark had no guarantee for the possible peace and furthermore had suffered much by the German forced contributions in the King's lands.

When Wynn sent his colleague in Berlin a copy of Knuth's note he remarked that he did not give much credence to an armistice.² Two days after sending the note he wrote to Westmorland:³ "Before the offer of support from Russia Count Knuth as far as his own opinion went, agreed with me that the division of Slesvig was the only probable means of settling the dispute, and this as far as I can collect from Sternberg is Count Nesselrode's view of the case. Their ideas are now higher, and they now no longer talk of nationality and language but of the necessity of having a defensible Frontier. Their sole hope and reliance is on Russia, and without her consent they will not do any thing." Wynn pro-

¹ Brevskaber, p. 44 f. – Haralds, p. 127.

² Westmorland. I, p. 243 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 255 ff.

ceeded with reflections on Russia's attitude towards a Scandinavian union. The idea of a union grew stronger day by day, he thought, and it seemed to be based "on more sound principles" than the German idea of unity. "This is however," he wrote providently, "reserved for those who come after us." Presumably – unfortunately – also for those who come after the writer of the present paper.

The same day Wynn wrote to Palmerston in reply to the latter's request of the 9th of May (see above p. 119) for him to try to learn about the "ultimate views" of the Danish Government.¹ But, he stated, "in this early stage, and under circumstances changing from day to day and becoming, as they hope, more favorable to their cause, I foresee difficulty in bringing them to the offer of any sacrifice of Territory." In talks with Knuth before the Russian and Swedish declarations he had found the latter "disposed to agree with me as to the necessity of a Division of Slesvig. His Language has much changed since." Three days later Wynn stated that Knuth had pointed out the difficulty for the Danish Government "in making as unreserved an exposition of their views to Her Majesty's Government, as they could wish," as long as Prussia had not accepted an armistice.²

Although the orders in question from Palmerston to Wynn remained without importance, it should be mentioned that he on the 16th of May authorized Wynn to go to Wrangel's Headquarters if he thought it possible to do something for an armistice.³ On the 16th he also wrote to Wynn that he wanted the Danish Government immediately to send orders to the Danish General to arrange an armistice with Wrangel on condition that Denmark evacuated Als and that the German troops might stay in southern Holstein.⁴ From communications from Bunsen and Banks, Palmerston had been convinced that the German Confederation would conclude an armistice on these conditions. – As appears, the question of the administration of the Duchies during the armistice was still left unmentioned.

Russia's note of the 8th of May brought about that Wrangel's stay in North Jutland became of short duration. On the 18th of

¹ F.O. 22/162: 17/5, No. 66.

² *Ibid.*: 20/5, No. 68.

³ F.O. 22/160: 16/5.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 16/5, No. 31.

May he had imposed a forced contribution of four million rix-dollars to be paid before the 28th of May. Wynn in this connexion remarked to Westmorland: "This is really worse than any Revolutionary French General. It is evident he wants to get all he can out of this unfortunate Country, before the arrival of any Swedes and Russians."¹ But on the 22nd of May Wrangel received orders from the Prussian Government to evacuate Jutland. The withdrawal started on the 25th.

On the same day, the 22nd of May, Westmorland could submit this joyful news to Palmerston from Berlin.² Westmorland thought that the orders for evacuation were produced by a note which he had sent to Arnim on the 21st and which will be mentioned below;³ but this seems completely improbable. It is true that Meyendorff in the talk of the 15th with Arnim did not succeed in making the latter "consent to the evacuation of Jutland,"⁴ but the effect of Russia's action went much further than causing Arnim to be "in a softer mood." In a dispatch of the 18th of May Westmorland stated that Arnim had assured him that on that day he had written to Bunsen that he was eager to see "Your Lordship's mediation put in operation and exercised at once both as to the armistice and the permanent settlement of the general arrangement of these affairs."

Prussia had certainly not previously shown any eagerness for that — on the contrary. Now Prussia suddenly with all her might clung to Britain's mediation, and while she had previously blamed Britain for siding with Denmark, Arnim in his letter to Bunsen mentioned by Westmorland praises Britain for her "unselfish activities" in the interest of peace.⁵ It is desirable, it said, that Britain firmly declares to other powers that she alone is mediator and will finish the task. Only Britain's active mediation "can prevent the greatest complications." It was made abundantly clear that it was Russia's action that could provoke these. The aggressive tone as regards Denmark had been exchanged for an apparently conciliatory one.

On the 21st of May Arnim hastened to inform Bunsen that

¹ Westmorland. I, p. 307 ff.

² F.O. 64/287: 22/5, No. 202.

³ Ibid.: 22/5, No. 203.

⁴ Ibid.: 18/5, No. 198.

⁵ Arnim's confidential dispatch of 18/5.

Wrangel's levying of the forced contribution in Jutland had not been sanctioned by Prussia and that on the 19th of May he had been requested to give it up.¹ Presumably, wrote Arnim, he will tomorrow be able to state that Wrangel has been ordered to evacuate Jutland. So he was. As the reason he did not, of course, state the menace of Russia, but Prussia's wish to facilitate the mediation and be conciliatory.² In London and Frankfurt they would, of course, it said, adduce different reasons for the evacuation.

Westmorland's note to Arnim of the 21st of May was based on Palmerston's orders of the 16th. There the proposal for evacuation of both Duchies by the respective parties was repeated. The Danes were also to evacuate Als, and the Confederate troops were to stay south of Holstein. As to "compensation" for the retained ships it said that as the claim had been abandoned by Bunsen and Banks, it was to be hoped that what had been levied by Wrangel, "will be returned." Such contributions "could only lead to more losses to German Commerce. The German Troops having entered Slesvig, which is no part of the Confederation, and the Danes being weakest by land and strongest by Sea it was very natural that in return for their being driven out of Slesvig they should detain German Vessels and blockade German Ports." If Wrangel levied contributions, Denmark would presumably sell the detained ships and in this way pay the Jutes and so on. Germany would lose most by it.

Westmorland enclosed a copy of Knuth's armistice proposal in his note and furthermore stated that Strangways by the President of the Federal Diet had been informed "that the whole competency of that Body in the affairs of Slesvig Holstein has been made over to the Government of Prussia and is at their discretion to be exercised either at Berlin or in London."

In his dispatch of the 22nd of May Westmorland wrote that as he had informed Meyendorff of Prussia's "concessions" on the same day Meyendorff before his Government used these "to represent the affairs of Slesvig Holstein as being now likely to be brought (under your Lordship's mediation) to a favorable termination." Below we shall see what happened as regards this expectation.

¹ 21/5.

² 22/5 and confidential letter of the same date.

7. Negotiations in London about an Armistice and a Final Settlement.

Bunsen's optimism after the negotiations with Palmerston on the 1st of May proved to be premature, as mentioned above. The next day Palmerston withdrew his statement, and it was not until the 9th that the dispatches were sent to Berlin and Copenhagen with a request for the pleas of the parties.

Bunsen, however, continued his efforts to influence Palmerston. I have to-day, he wrote on the 9th to Arnim, had a conference with Palmerston and have exerted all my strength to get him to act *quickly* according to our wishes. Bunsen proposed the idea of the Duke of Augustenborg's son as the heir to the Danish throne, and was of the opinion that Palmerston was willing to adopt this idea. He mentioned further that the Prince of Prussia, who was in London, had heard from St. Petersburg that Russia had definitely decided to take the side of Denmark. I shall do everything, he said finally, to bring the war to an end, "which now can only do us harm and bring us danger. Feeling is wholly against us."

Three days later Bunsen made an earnest appeal to Palmerston to begin the mediation.¹ At the same time he expressed his regret that Britain had not sent a Commissioner to North Slesvig to ascertain if the population were for or against the Provisional Government: "You have, f. i. in *Ward* a man, known to Germans and Danes, and esteemed by both. Both would listen to him." Elsewhere Bunsen said of the British diplomat John Ward (1805–1890) that he is "the only British agent who is favourably disposed towards us in this matter."²

A letter sent by Bunsen to Prince Albert on the 14th testifies to their close collaboration.³ He writes that the same day he will send or hand to the Prince's secretary, Dr. Meyer, a dispatch received from Arnim yesterday. At the same time he says that Palmerston's demand for the evacuation of *the whole of Holstein* cannot be carried out in Germany. He complains that Palmerston has omitted to follow the advice he gave him three weeks ago, viz. to send one or two men to Rendsburg to preach reason to

¹ 12/5. P.P. – Bunsen's dispatch 12/5.

² Bunsen's dispatch 16/5.

³ R.A.W. I. 4/45.

them there: "We are not strong enough and Prussia's hands are tied by Frankfurt."

In his dispatch of the 9th of May Arnim had informed Bunsen that Prussia was acting on directions from the Federal Diet. But she intended to make the suggestion to the Diet that Wrangel be authorized to evacuate Jutland on the conclusion of an armistice, and likewise Slesvig if the Provisional Government would sanction this. Arnim was pleased that Palmerston had refused Russia's offer of help in mediating, and wanted Britain to prevent Sweden from helping Denmark.

On the 13th when Bunsen informed Palmerston of Arnim's dispatch he found him *very indignant* (*sehr aufgeregt*) at the occupation of Jutland which made the question a European one.¹ He made a sharp (*aufs bitterste*) attack on the suggestion made by Prussia to Frankfurt. "Berlin makes its attitude dependent on Frankfurt, the Federal Diet and Prussia on the Provisional Government at Rendsburg. It looks as if they wish to make Britain's mediation (*Verwendung*) impossible. Slesvig, the whole of Slesvig, not an inch less, must be evacuated." If an attack is intended on the sovereignty of the King-Duke over Slesvig, "*then Britain must and will intervene.*" When Bunsen declared the evacuation of Holstein to be "ganz unzulässig," Palmerston deplored Prussia's tyrannical behaviour in wanting to have everything decided in her own favour; German troops should not bleed white country belonging to the King of Denmark. Denmark had acted in a very moderate manner by not issuing letters of marque. If Holstein was not evacuated he must resign his task of mediation.

According to Bunsen's dispatch of the 16th, which gave an account of the above talk, Palmerston's proposal, given to him verbally, was as follows: (1) The cessation of hostilities on land and sea; (2) The liberation of all prisoners of war and of captured or confiscated vessels; (3) The Danish troops to evacuate Slesvig; (4) The German troops to evacuate Jutland and the Duchies.²

Bunsen noted down his remarks on these points on the 15th and they were sent with the dispatch the following day. He

¹ Bunsen's dispatch 16/5.

² The inaccuracies and misunderstandings to be found in Haralds, p.127 ff. and Olsen, p.243 f. are due chiefly to ignorance of Bunsen's dispatches. I omit detailed criticism.

comments on Point 3 that the Danes must also evacuate Als, which he thinks Palmerston would not demand. He would put this as an ultimatum, but he is very doubtful that Denmark would agree to this. The main point is Point 4: the evacuation of the Duchies. He believes that it would make the matter easier if it could be agreed that the German troops be placed on the left side of the Elbe. Such a concession must be matched by the Swedish evacuation of Funen.

Bunsen also makes a number of political comments in the dispatch. He rightly emphasizes that the best policy for the Danish Government must be to prolong the question, but for Prussia to end it as soon as possible and therefore only agree to a short-term armistice. The Provisional Government ought to continue in office, and should be allowed to send representatives to the negotiations in London. He again advocates division, but on the basis of a plebiscite. As regards the result of a plebiscite, time is against Denmark. "The Provisional Government is trying to influence the Danish population, as the Danish Government has done earlier . . . But don't be deceived: nationality will assert its rights in the long run!"

On the 17th Bunsen again sent a dispatch to Arnim. He had now received Arnim's of the 10th, and wrote that he was compiling a report in agreement with this. Arnim had expressed Prussia's willingness to agree that parts of North Slesvig went to Denmark as a result of a plebiscite as compensation for the rest being incorporated into Germany and having the same male succession as Holstein. On the question of the evacuation of Jutland and Slesvig Arnim expressed himself as in the dispatch on the previous day. Bunsen stressed in his dispatch the importance of opposing false and impassioned opinions in Germany. Britain will, he wrote, without doubt approve the basis, "which satisfies every reasonable wish of the Germans," that is to say, division. "Is it really so little to have reached such a solution of the dispute by a short campaign?" It gives a curious impression that in the same dispatch he suggested buying a small fleet during the armistice and stated that Prince Albert would possibly present a large ship and that he himself would have it fitted out.

In a postscript added at 3 a.m. Bunsen said that he had seen Palmerston at a levee the same day and had reproached him for

doing nothing about the mediation. Palmerston suggested his meeting Reventlow the next afternoon which he declared himself willing to do.

Also at the levee Palmerston drew Reventlow aside and asked him if he could meet him and Bunsen the next day to arrange terms for an armistice, "to which the latter had declared himself willing and authorized."¹ Reventlow thought that he could judge from Palmerston's remarks that the latter "was urged on more at others' instigation than his own," and made no comment on Palmerston's remark, "qu'un armistice était une bonne chose, mais qu'un arrangement final était encore meilleur." With regard to this Palmerston put forward the plan for the division of Slesvig.

Before Reventlow met Palmerston on the 18th at 12.30 p.m. he discussed the draft of his interview with Brunnow. Before the meeting he received Knuth's dispatches of the 13th with the good news from Russia and Sweden.² This news will, wrote Knuth, "give you renewed energy and courage in your difficult task . . . Don't be afraid that we here at home will let ourselves be overpowered so easily." Knuth requested him earnestly not to have anything to do with "any real negotiations or any future arrangements, the division of Slesvig or the like. Perhaps hard necessity may bring it to something like that, but when negotiations are finally opened I shall come myself or send an expert in international law, etc., so, for the moment, you can set your mind at ease." That was to say, an armistice first and negotiations later. And, wrote Knuth, an armistice could not be agreed to on "any worse basis than that which I mentioned in my previous letter." The reference is here to an undated letter (of the 11th?).³ In this was mentioned the evacuation of the Duchies by both parties, and the establishment during the armistice of Provisional Governments in Slesvig and Holstein, in Slesvig by the King, in Holstein by the German Confederation. For the maintenance of law and order gendarmerie corps were to be formed. In the letter of the 13th quoted above, Knuth made the further remark that, of course, "the rebellious troops are to be disarmed."

As Reventlow during his talk with Palmerston, at which Bunsen was not present, definitely stressed that he was not author-

¹ Reventlow's dispatch of 19/5, No. 39.

² Ges. Ark. London. Orders: 13/5 Nos. 35 and 36.

³ Ibid.: No. 33.

ized to discuss a basis for a final settlement, the negotiations dealt only with the terms for an armistice. After discussing each individual term Palmerston made a draft "roughly . . . the same in six points."¹

In the Foreign Office Records this draft is to be found with a title which does not quite cover the contents – "Terms of Armistice – Proposed by Ct. Reventlow 18. May 1848," as far as can be seen written by Palmerston and signed P.² In the official Danish collection of documents "Brevskaber" it is entered more correctly as "Armistice terms approved by Lord Palmerston and discussed with him on the 18th of May."³ The next morning Reventlow requested Palmerston to let him have a copy "de la première ébauche, que nous avons faite des conditions possibles d'un armistice," of which especially Point 6 was of importance.⁴ He asked for a copy only so as to be able to give his Government an account of the talk on the previous day.

Of the six points the five first correspond to those in Knuth's letters of the 11th(?) and 13th, and to his proposal for an armistice of the 15th. On the other hand Point 6 is new and proposed by Palmerston: "All Prisoners and Vessels detained on each side to be released; and all Contributions in money or kind, which have been levied, to be returned or repaid." This admission from the Danish side, the release of all captured vessels, Reventlow agreed to only *sub spe rati*. In the draft at the Foreign Office the words "the King" in Points 4 and 5 have originally been written as "the Duke of Slesvig", but these have been deleted as Reventlow, although with some difficulty, got Palmerston to alter them. On the other hand Palmerston would "by no means" use the phrase "rebellious troops", suggested by Reventlow and corresponding to Knuth's reference to the Slesvig-Holstein army. Finally it was agreed that the proposal should be shown to Bunsen, and Palmerston would then let Reventlow know whether it would lead to "a meeting between him, Bunsen and me, with the hope of a

¹ The dispatch states that they are enclosed. However, they are not to be found here, but in file U. Min. Alm. Korr. Sager. Krigen 1848–50. Korr. Sager 25/3–20/6 1848. They are marked B and copy and it has been added in a different hand that they are the armistice terms approved of by Palmerston and discussed with him on the 18th of May 1848.

² F.O. 22/166: 18/5.

³ Brevskaber, p. 45. In Actenstücker p. 22 f. it is called Reventlow's proposal.

⁴ Reventlow to Palmerston May, "Vendredi Matin." P.P.

favourable result." A remark of Palmerston's, showing that he shared the Slesvig-Holstein view of the succession in Slesvig, gave Reventlow an opportunity of "clarifying Lord Palmerston's ideas on the succession in that Duchy." His efforts probably only had temporary success.

At a court ball on the evening of the 19th, Reventlow asked Palmerston whether Bunsen had approved of the proposal. Palmerston only answered that he sent "proposals to our Government to settle the whole matter at one time." Furthermore he would speak to Reventlow the next day.

The fact that Palmerston had "approved of", and partly himself formed, the proposal for the armistice of the 18th did not mean, as was immediately evident, that he would make any special efforts to have this particular proposal accepted.

After his conference with Reventlow, Palmerston had a talk lasting nearly three hours the same afternoon with Bunsen.¹ As the latter was convinced that Prussia would not obtain satisfaction from an armistice that did not involve peace preliminaries, he had early in the morning compiled three documents: (1) An answer to Palmerston's proposal (of the 13th); (2) A consideration of peace preliminaries; (3) A draft of a note with the necessary information for the two preceding points.

At the talk Palmerston informed Bunsen of the armistice terms that he had just discussed with Reventlow. "It is hardly necessary to say that they were quite *inadmissible*," writes Bunsen in his dispatch the same evening to Arnim. According to Bunsen's account Palmerston seems to have immediately accepted the fact that this proposal be given up. Bunsen explained to him why Germany could not evacuate Holstein, submitted the plan with the peace preliminaries, and referred to Palmerston's own action in Switzerland some time before. We agreed, continues Bunsen, that tomorrow at noon I should send him the three documents; then Palmerston would send a message to Copenhagen the same evening and instruct Wynn to recommend the plan. Bunsen had promised to ask Arnim to authorize Wrangel to evacuate Jutland as soon as Denmark had approved the preliminaries, but he did not think "that it would be so easy for common sense and fairness to be victorious." In the dispatch he asks to have sent a copy of

¹ Bunsen's dispatch 18/5, 6 Uhr Abends.

Kutscheit's language map which Palmerston had shown him. I am, he ends his dispatch, "extremely satisfied" with Palmerston's course of action at this important conference. He had all reason to be.

In his note of the 18th Bunsen remarked that Prussia accepted Britain as a mediator in the name of the Confederation, but that the cessation of hostilities presupposed a certain agreement on peace terms.¹ The reference here is to Palmerston's course of action in 1847 when he mediated on the occasion of the party struggle in Switzerland. The Prussian government, it stated, is completely in agreement with the opinions expressed in Bunsen's Memoir. Denmark's "incorporation" of Slesvig has caused the war, as the German Confederation will not allow such an action. Prussia is ready for a settlement which considers the wishes of the Danish population in North Slesvig, but if certain districts there are to be incorporated in Denmark, the remainder must be incorporated in the German Confederation. If Denmark agrees to this, Prussia will immediately accept Palmerston's proposal for an armistice (of the 13th), and the German troops will forthwith evacuate both Duchies. The two "Denkschriften" mentioned above are enclosed with the note.

In a letter written at the same time to Reventlou-Preetz, Bunsen stated that he had definitely rejected Palmerston's proposal to cease hostilities first, and then make peace with Britain as a mediator.² On the contrary, he had demanded that the war should not end before an agreement had been reached on peace preliminaries. "But your cousin [the Danish Minister] is not authorized to negotiate on these, and so my proposals will be sent to-morrow to Copenhagen.³ If they are accepted, then the British Legation will inform General v. Wrangel directly. But I dare not hope so."

Bunsen stressed the "European complications" caused by the occupation of Jutland and besought Reventlou; (1) not to destroy the relationship to the Duke as the legitimate sovereign. "*In that case Britain will intervene,*" (2) to keep the leading men "with the wise and reasonable opinions," as the proclamation of

¹ F.O. 64/292: 18/5. – Brevskaber, p. 46 ff. – Actenstücke, p. 18 ff. and 23 ff.

² EE. 3.

³ The Belgian minister, Van de Weyer, also mentioned in his dispatch of 20/5, No. 286 that Palmerston had approved of Bunsen's proposal.

the 31st of March expressed it. "The principle that the people themselves, freely and without foreign influence, decide, must naturally be maintained. "Fair Play!" Without letting it depend on such a settlement "no peace is possible." Bunsen mentioned Kutschait's language map of Slesvig: "on this Danish was represented as a wedge from Tondern far south to Flensburg and further on. Is this correct? Of course sacrifices must be made on both sides."

On the 19th Palmerston informed Bunsen that he would send Wynn a copy of his note with the enclosures the same evening.¹ Palmerston made some critical remarks about Bunsen's armistice proposal, and declared that "if you are precluded from exercising any discretion on these points until you have consulted the Diet at Francfort, the Cabinet of Berlin, and the Provisional Government at Rendsburg, I much fear that these questions will be decided in the field instead of by negotiation." But he would – in accordance with Bunsen's proposal – instruct Wynn to advise the Danish government to agree to a division of Slesvig, so that the northern part be incorporated in Denmark, the southern part in Germany. As the two nationalities were very much intermingled it was impossible to draw a line which allowed all the Germans to remain on one side and all the Danes on the other. Palmerston advised against asking the opinion of the population itself.

In his dispatch to Wynn Palmerston first mentioned his negotiations with Bunsen and Reventlow concerning both an armistice and a final settlement.² But, wrote Palmerston, Reventlow is only authorized to negotiate on the first matter, and according to Britain's plan, viz. the evacuation of the Duchies, the question of their administration arises. Reventlow's proposal is to be seen in the memorandum I made yesterday. Bunsen protested as regards Slesvig, as it necessarily assumes the presence of Danish troops in Slesvig, and these should not be there. There seems to be "some force in this objection," says the dispatch. Wynn was to explain this to the Danish Government and try to persuade it to let the Provisional Government administer both Duchies during the armistice. It would be best if both parties evacuated the Duchies,

¹ F.O. 64/282: 19/5. – Printed in Brevskaber, p. 52 ff. Actenstücke, p. 21 f. and Haralds, p. 137 ff.

² F.O. 22/160: 19/5, No. 32. – The dispatch is referred to in Haralds, p. 140 f.

but perhaps the Danes might remain on Als and the Germans in South Holstein. Wynn was enjoined to ask the Danish government to authorize Reventlow to accept the terms, as Bunsen "may reasonably be expected to accept."

However, it was desirable, continued Palmerston, if an arrangement could be made at the same time about the main questions. There were four possibilities: (1) Slesvig's incorporation in Denmark, but it was this that – it was stated historically incorrectly – had caused the rebellion and Germany's intervention. (2) Slesvig's incorporation in the German Confederation, to which the "King-Duke" would not agree, and probably not the Danish population in Slesvig either. (3) Status quo for Slesvig before 1846,¹ but this would be unsatisfactory for both parties. (4) Slesvig's division according to nationalities, "which might perhaps satisfy all Parties and effectually remove all Causes of future Discussion," North Slesvig to be joined to Denmark and South Slesvig to Holstein. Wynn was to recommend this fourth possibility to the Danish government. The line of demarcation could be decided on either by negotiations or by commissioners on the spot. If the male royal line died out, it was added, both Duchies would probably be separated from Denmark. The dispatch obviously approved of the Slesvig-Holstein view of the succession.

Palmerston's proposal, which was so favourably disposed towards Bunsen's points of view, was presumably drawn up before he received a communication of the same date from Brunnow.² Whether this would have changed his proposal remains an open question. Brunnow wrote here that, as he had said at his last talk with Palmerston, Prussia's threat to the Danish monarchy could change the Russian attitude. This had now happened and as evidence Brunnow enclosed copies of Nesselrode's dispatch of the 8th to Meyendorff and his dispatch of the 10th to himself. In this dispatch it was stated that Russia could no longer refuse Denmark material help. She did not want war but peace and invited Britain to speak to Prussia "sinon dans les mêmes termes, moins dans le même sens que nous." Russia addressed herself as can be seen from the dispatch to Meyendorff, only to Prussia not to the Federal Diet. "La Prusse se

¹ Haralds gives this as "status quo before the war."

² F.O. 65/357: 19/5.

retranche évidemment derrière les opinions et les volontés de la Diète pour se donner le temps d'agir et de grosser ainsi dans l'intervalle la somme du faits accomplis. C'est un jeu qu'on ne saurait lui permettre."

On Brunnow's enquiry Palmerston gave him the brief reply on the 20th.¹ "If you will call at the Foreign Office on Monday afternoon [22nd], Mr. Addington will shew you a despatch and its enclosures on the same subject," which had been sent Wynn on the evening of the 19th.

Bunsen's detailed account of the 20th to Arnim shows that he considered Palmerston's acceptance of the plan for division as an important diplomatic victory.² With reference to his temporary account of the 18th he forwarded the documents which he had shown Palmerston, and stated that the latter had sent them by sea that morning to Wynn with a note in which he earnestly recommended the acceptance of the peace basis: "Dies ist ohne Zweifel ein erfreulicher Erfolg." Bunsen had, he wrote, just returned from a long conference with Palmerston, who had informed him of the Russian dispatch to Meyendorff and of a dispatch from the British minister in Stockholm, from which it was clear that "die *dänischen* Sympathien in jenem Lande und in Norwegen eben so stark und feurig sind, wie die *schleswigschen* in Deutschland." To this Bunsen had remarked that Swedish aid would be of no importance on land, and even now Denmark was causing Germany much damage at sea.

Bunsen observed that no sensible man would take the Russian demonstration lightly.³ Britain must, he considered, avert this danger for Germany. Russia's wish to take part in the mediation was "wider alles Recht." Britain was going ahead with the mediation, he himself had accepted it on the 18th. Palmerston was to answer Brunnow: "es müsse der Erfolg der eingeleiteten Vermittelung abgewartet werden." The Russian basis: resistance to the "German" Slesvig's incorporation in Germany was also incompatible with Palmerston's.

¹ F.O. 65/357: 20/5.

² R.A.W. J. 4/78: copy of report 20/5.

³ According to Van de Weyer's dispatch 23/5, No. 292, Bunsen considered it a plot agreed upon by Sweden and Denmark to deprive Germany of the fruits of her military victories. Weyer considered Russia's note to be of European importance.

If Denmark would agree only to an armistice, Palmerston also wished the Germans to evacuate Holstein. However, Bunsen had replied to this: *nimmermehr!* Then Palmerston thought that if the Danes evacuated Als, the Germans could retreat to the South-western part of Holstein. Bunsen said that the matter could be considered.

In his account Bunsen further expressed his conviction that Denmark would not accept the peace preliminaries in spite of Palmerston's earnest recommendation. Was it not best, he asked, to evacuate Jutland at once and instead storm Als? "Das wäre ein ehrenvoller Grund für den Rückzug."

The conclusion of Bunsen's account gives a not unfavourable impression by its restraint, a restraint which, however, is not uninfluenced by Russia's behaviour or by the prevailing feeling in Britain. It is as follows: "Was ich hier erlangt habe, ist was kaum jemand erwartete: *mehr ist nicht zu erlangen*. Und mehr wäre auch kaum mit Billigkeit zu fordern, und gewiss höchst unweise zu verlangen. Die unsinnigen Redensarten und Forderungen der Ultra-Germanen in Frankfurt und in Klubs helfen uns nicht gegen die Dänen und ihre Verbündeten: aber sie entfremden uns mehr und mehr England und verwickeln uns in einen bösen Krieg. Das englische Ministerium hat einmal unsere Basis angenommen: früher oder später muss, wenn wir es mit England halten, Dänemark sie annehmen... jeder Anspruch auf ein dänisches Dorf in Schleswig ist eine Ungerechtigkeit, und jedes Unrecht rächt sich. Und ist's denn nichts, das ganze Schleswig mit Deutschland zu vereinigen, zu welchem es nie gehört hat?"

On the 30th of May the Federal Diet at Frankfurt accepted, on the whole, Prussia's proposal for an armistice and peace preliminaries put forward by Bunsen.¹ It was expressly stated, though, that a possible renunciation of certain parts of Slesvig could take place only after a plebiscite. The Provisional Government's envoy also protested "auf das Feierlichste" against a division of any description.

Prussia's envoy to Frankfurt, Guido v. Usedom, had received from Bunsen, as he wrote in his reply of the 28th of May, important information about the Slesvig question.² Even the Slesvig-

¹ Haralds, p. 142 f. – Actenstücke, p. 23.

² R.A.W. I 4/111: copy of letter of 28/5.

Holsteiners, he observes, “die von deutscher Einheit über dem Wasser gehalten werden, aber nur an sich dabei denken, sehen ein, dass es Zeit ist ein Ende zu machen. Alles hat seine Zeit, spricht Salomon . . .” He had persuaded the Holsteiners not to put forward a proposal for the incorporation of Slesvig in Germany, but added: “demungeachtet sind die Schleswiger Deputierten zugelassen” in the National Assembly. The Provisional Government’s envoy in Frankfurt, Professor Madai, called this: “durch stillschweigende Zulassung der Schleswiger Abgeordneten die Aufnahme [Schleswigs] thatsächlich zu constatiren: die Frage aber offen zu halten” – for reasons of foreign politics!¹

On the 24th of May Wynn informed Palmerston that he had read to Knuth Palmerston’s dispatch of the 19th, which he had received late in the evening of the 23rd.² He was pleased “to find him [Knuth] on the whole more disposed than I had expected to the adoption of the proposals as laid down by Your Lordship. He did not seem to object to the Division of Slesvig being the Basis of a final arrangement, and *being bona fide so understood as that of the Armistice.*” The difficult question was the administration of the Duchies during the armistice. The Danish Government would abide by Reventlow’s proposal, though modified in such a way that the Provisional Government could retain the administration in Holstein and with the promise “that tho’ the Royal authority should be reestablished in Slesvig, no changes or dismissals should, during the existence of the armistice, take place.” Wynn wrote that, contrary to Bunsen, the Danish Government were of the opinion that “the Royal Government could, and the Provisional Government could not, maintain itself [in Slesvig] without troops.” As far as a possible division was concerned, “an amicable arrangement of the Frontier,” Knuth, according to Wynn’s dispatch, had approved of Palmerston’s proposal, “as an appeal to the individual feelings of the people would tend more to civil war than to Peace.” Finally Wynn stated that difficulties would not arise with regard “to either of the arrangements Your Lordship proposes for the evacuation of the Duchies either wholly or partially with the retention of the island of Alsen.”

¹ EE. 8: Madai’s letter of 23/5.

² F.O. 22/162: 24/5, No. 71. – Westmorland. I, p. 315.

The same day that Wynn sent this dispatch a Danish Cabinet meeting was held, and after this Wynn had a further talk with Knuth: he gives an account of this in a dispatch of the 24th.¹

Knuth communicated the draft of the armistice which Rev-entlow "had drafted with Lord Palmerston" to the Council of State, and the whole Council agreed to the proposal.² From the account of the meeting it does not appear what Knuth had said about his talk with Wynn. But it is this that was the cause of Knuth's wish to be given "a certain freedom and latitude" at the possible peace negotiations: he had to "let it transpire that it might be possible to cede a small part of German Slesvig [the southern part], as otherwise any negotiations were impossible." He was also granted this "latitude", although the King declared that it must not look as if he had granted it, and that he wished to have nothing to do with "whatever may be preliminarily arranged."³

At his talk with Knuth after the Council meeting Wynn found "great hesitation on his [Knuth's] part in making any distinct offer of a cession of Territory with the idea that it might be turned against them by the opposite Party, who would not at last consent to the terms proposed." On Wynn's pressing the point, Knuth drew a line on a map of Slesvig from Flensborg to Husum, both towns being north of the line, and said that they could not agree to a more northerly one. The King considered it, wrote Wynn on the basis of his talk with Knuth, as "a great sacrifice he was making in addition to the ships and that he would only consent to it under Your Lordship's Guarantee that it should lead to a final arrangement." Finally Knuth consented that during the armistice South Slesvig as well as Holstein might be administered by a Government appointed by the Federal Diet. The Prince of Nør, however, must not be a member of such a government, as no power in the world would make the King himself or his Government enter into communication with the Prince.

Wynn's account tends to show that Knuth has interpreted fairly broadly the latitude granted him at the Council meeting.

¹ F.O. 22/162: 24/5, No. 72.

² Statsrådets Forhandl. I, p. 303 f.

³ The account of the meeting in H.T. 11. r. IV (Ladewig Petersen), p. 602, does not appear to me to cover the matter.

A few days later, as we shall see, Wynn's dispatches took on quite a different tone.

On the 24th Wynn sent his colleague in Berlin a copy of his dispatch of the same date to Palmerston.¹ This made Westmorland optimistic as to the settling of the affair. He wrote to Wynn on the 28th: "The evacuation of Jutland having taken place and the ground of the decision by nationalities having been accepted as a basis, I hope all minor points will be arranged by Lord P."²

But on the 27th Wynn was obliged to contradict his statement, both to Palmerston and Westmorland, that the idea of division had been accepted as a basis for peace by Denmark. Knuth's change of attitude was presumably due to both the favourable news of the evacuation of Jutland brought about by Russia, and to the strong Danish feeling against division.

On the 27th Wynn informed Palmerston that Reventlow will hardly receive instructions which will make mediation easier.³ He did not believe that the present ministers dared take upon themselves "the enormous responsibility" of agreeing to a division. Both he himself and Ungern Sternberg had, he wrote, made representations, but he could not indulge in the hope that he had succeeded in "maintaining the ground which I certainly had every reason to think had been gained in persuading Knuth" of the impossibility of reaching an effective arrangement without South Slesvig's incorporation in the Confederation. They considered, he continued, the withdrawal from Jutland "as being *de facto* an Armistice, and that they have all to gain by delay and the effect of the continued pressure on German Commerce by the Blockade."

In a dispatch the following day⁴ Wynn mentioned that the difficulties with a cession of any part of Slesvig "have augmented to such a degree as to overrate in the council⁵ any disposition which Knuth may have felt for such an arrangement, and he has this morning avowed to me that under the present circumstances,

¹ Westmorland. I, p. 311 f. and 315 ff.

² Westmorland. I, p. 337 f. – Cf. p. 345 ff. – The 3/6 Bunsen wrote to Prince Albert: "In Berlin hat man, durch Wynn, Nachricht, dass Dänemark die Basis von Theilung Schleswigs annehmen will." R.A.W. I. 5/11.

³ F.O. 22/162: 27/5, No. 73.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 28/5, No. 74.

⁵ No meeting of the Council had been held since the 24th.

he did not dare to make any propositions which might hereafter be thought to be so unfavorable to the King's just rights." Wynn mentioned that Reedtz would go to England to help Reventlow, but regretted that he would not be empowered to "settle any distinct basis for a definitive negotiation the necessity of which they before admitted." The only basis which could "perhaps" be possible was, believed Wynn, "the Independence of Slesvig with a separate Constitution."

On the 29th Wynn wrote to Westmorland¹ about the evacuation of Jutland that it would not have "its *due* effect as *Young Denmark* or the Ultra Danes do not conceal their regret at the Danes having lost the opportunity of *driving* their Enemies out of the Country even without waiting for the Swedes . . . Neither the King, Ministers nor indeed the People seem now disposed to listen to any proposed separation of Slesvig, and rather to wait for the chapter of Accidents turning in their favor, by disturbances in Germany and Commercial pressure in consequence of the Blockade." In the letter Wynn stated that Reedtz, "perfectly capable of entering the field against Bunsen," has left for London the same day to help Reventlow at the conferences, as the responsibility was greater than Reventlow "would like to undertake."

The attack on the Hanoverians at Sundevad on the 28th of May testified to the wish of the Danes to drive the enemy out of the country by themselves. The attack took place in spite of the fact that, on the evening of the 26th, the Minister of War for reasons of foreign policy sent his adjutant to the Commander-in-Chief with orders to abandon it.² On the 27th Wynn had been consulted by the Minister on the matter and had mentioned "the bad effects of such an attack."³ It goes without saying that Lehmann, with whom Wynn spoke on the morning of the 28th, was displeased with Wynn's advice. The attack was strongly criticised by Palmerston.⁴ Wynn explained the matter by saying that the troops began "to be unmanageable, from being so long inactive, – that the General found it necessary to shew them the Enemy, and that they only applied to me in the hopes, that I

¹ Westmorland. I, p. 341 ff.

² Krigen 1848–50. I, p. 729 ff.

³ F.O. 22/162: 28/5, No. 75.

⁴ F.O. 22/160: 2/6. – Cf. Reventlow's Dispatches of 4/6 and 9/6.

should not have expressed myself as decidedly as I did on the question.”¹

Wynn's report, premature as we have seen, of the 24th stating Knuth's willingness to agree to a division of Slesvig if the line be drawn south of Flensburg and Husum pleased Palmerston greatly.² But he asked Wynn to inform the Danish Government that a more northerly line was more reasonable as seen from a national standpoint, and that Bunsen would certainly suggest one much more northerly. Britain must try to compromise. Perhaps an understanding could be reached if Denmark would agree to a line from near Flensburg and drawn across country. It was desirable that Reventlow be granted “a latitude of discretion on this Matter since without it there can be little Prospect of a final Arrangement.” Palmerston did not believe that Denmark would receive much support from Russia and Sweden if she refused to accept a sensible division of Slesvig. In a later dispatch of the 15th of June,³ he requested Wynn to tell the Danish Government that as long as Reventlow and Bunsen were tied by orders from their respective governments any mediation was in vain. If Denmark and Prussia really wished a solution they would be obliged to give their negotiators “some latitude of discretion.”

As this did not occur, the negotiators in London more or less marked time, but one result, however, was, as we shall see below, a new proposal on the 23rd of June from Palmerston.

On the 25th of May P. Howard asked in Parliament how Britain's mediation was getting on.⁴ Palmerston replied that there was reason to expect a peaceful solution. He based his reply on the facts that “while on the one hand the Danish Government have taken off some of the blockades which they began by imposing⁵ on the other hand I have been informed within the last hour that the Prussian Government does not mean to enforce the order made by General Wrangel, for levying a forced contribution on Jutland: there appears therefore to be a desire for conciliation

¹ F.O. 22/162: 12/6, No. 83.

² F.O. 22/160: 2/6 (confidential).

³ *Ibid.*: 15/6.

⁴ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. XCVIII. 3. ser. 7th Apr.-26th May 1848, p. 1414.

⁵ Presumably a reference to the Danish declaration of the 8th of May about the reduction of the blockade. See *Krigen 1848-50*. I, p. 548 f. Cf. p. 172.

on both sides." The information Palmerston mentions as having received "within the last hour", is presumably Westmorland's dispatch of the 22nd (see p. 124).

Prussia's "desire for conciliation" arose no doubt only from the threat in Nesselrode's note of the 8th of May to Meyendorff. The deep impression made on Bunsen is shown by the letter sent by him to Palmerston on the 21st of May.¹ At a long conference the preceding day the latter had mentioned at length his fear that the war could take a very serious turn for the worse, and insisted on the evacuation of Holstein if Denmark agreed only to an armistice.² Since our talk yesterday, Bunsen now wrote on the 21st, Nesselrode's note has been "the constant theme of my meditation." It is an undisguised threat of war, as it not only mentions the occupation of Jutland but also "an extension of the limits of the Germanic confederation," as a *casus belli*. If it is to be taken literally, "it plans itself in *open contradiction* with Britain," who before the dispatch recommended a division. Russia's mediation would thus make an understanding impossible. Bunsen asked Palmerston to get Brunnow to accept the basis of which Prussia approved and which Palmerston himself had recommended to Denmark [on the 19th]. If you are successful, he wrote, and if you can get Germany to accept Britain's and Russia's joint mediation peace will be assured, as Denmark "resists now only because she relies upon the unconditional support of Russia." Germany cannot – whatever happens – drop this matter which has caused unrest in the Duchies for thirty-three years and "agitated" Germany for six years. Bunsen depicted the dreadful consequences if Britain did not get Russia to participate in the mediation on the British basis.

The next day Bunsen sent Arnim a copy of his letter to Palmerston together with a commentary on its contents.³ At the same time he stated with pride that he had sent Palmerston Arnim's note of the 18th "in deutscher Urschrift," but with an English translation; he believed it was the first German note which the German diplomatic body in Britain had presented. Of the possibilities which presented themselves in the present

¹ F.O. 64/292: 21/5. – Bunsen's dispatch of 22/5.

² Bunsen's dispatch of 20/5.

³ Bunsen's dispatch of 22/5.

situation he considered the acceptance of Russia's mediation as absolutely the best, seen from a "purely diplomatic standpoint," but she would have to approve of Palmerston's basis, viz. division, and he doubted that she would do it. In the dispatch he made some sharp comments on "the street politicians" and on the tense feelings to be found among the members of the Provisional Government and the German-minded inhabitants of North Slesvig – feelings which were noticeable in "the ever less sensible letters and demands reaching me from there." As regards Russia's plans he remarked that there was no belief in London that she would go to war immediately.

The same day Bunsen sent Arnim another dispatch, as a safe opportunity presented itself of having it delivered. The dispatch gave further particulars of Palmerston's "peculiar note" of the 19th. Bunsen stated that Palmerston had taken complete responsibility for this note. John Russell had not learnt of it until yesterday morning, and was "at first very *astounded* at it." In the afternoon he laid the matter before the Queen and found "that Her Majesty was *not* disquieted by it, although the form is not that prescribed." As regards Palmerston's demand for the evacuation of Holstein, Bunsen said that this must either be complied with or a compromise chosen: the Danes to evacuate Als and the Germans to abandon their position on the Eider.

Bunsen expressed his great satisfaction with the "peculiar note:" "The great step has been taken *the very evening before (am Vorabend) the communication of the Russian note: that the division of Slesvig has been accepted as a basis*, and that the incorporation of the united Duchy of Slesvig-Holstein has been accepted." Bunsen and Palmerston were, however, disagreed as to the method of division, the former wishing a plebiscite, the latter being against it. Bunsen found that Åbenrå and Haderslev counties should go to Denmark, while Tønder County should remain German. Sense must be urged upon the Provisional Government. "More than this truly reasonable we cannot ask for, and we ought not really to claim!" From a military standpoint the acquisition of Als was important, "but on what *principle* can one claim and hold it?" The inhabitants were "fanatically" Danish, and the Germans had not either succeeded in occupying the island.

Bunsen wrote again to Arnim on the evening of the 23rd after another discussion with Palmerston about Russia's attitude. Palmerston did not believe that Russia would attack, but it was sensible not to irritate her. He was also of the opinion that Russia would allow Britain to have a free hand with her mediation if Prussia did not act too harshly towards Denmark.

In letters of the 25th and 30th Bunsen gave "proofs of the conciliatory spirit of the Prussian Government," particularly the evacuation of Jutland, and received Palmerston's appreciation of these proofs.¹ On receiving the news of the Danish attack on the 28th of May Bunsen wrote to Palmerston that Denmark seemed to have considered the evacuation of Jutland as a sign of German weakness, and that he [Palmerston] ought to instruct Wynn "to make the strongest remonstrances to the Danish Government in that sense."² Palmerston did this at once, as has been mentioned above.

At the beginning of June, when Bunsen sent Palmerston a translation of the protest made by the Provisional Government on the 17th of May to Prussia against the division of Slesvig as a peace basis, his intention presumably was to stress Prussia's placability against the background of the uncompromising attitude of the Provisional Government.³

Mention should be made in this connection of Bunsen's communication of the 30th of May to Reventlou-Pretz,⁴ in which he gave strong support to the justifiability of the idea of division: "The Provisional Government would lose its reputation for ever if it denied the principles of fairness and belief in its own rights, which the declaration of the 31st of March has given it." But he urges Reventlou to insist "*that the diplomats will not, and shall not divide, but that the people must and shall be heard.*" "It is a question of laying the foundations of permanent conditions on a mutually fair basis."

In a letter of the 26th of May from Reventlow to Knuth it was stated that Palmerston was waiting anxiously for a reply from the Danish Government on the subject of Bunsen's proposal.⁵ Knuth's

¹ F.O. 64/292.

² Ibid.: 2/6.

³ F.O. 64/292: 7/6. — EE. 11 contains Correspondenz mit Preussen über die Theilung Schlesiens. Mai 1848.

⁴ EE. 3.

⁵ Reventlow's letter of 26/5, enclosed dispatch of 26/5, No. 41.

dispatches of the 24th to Reventlow were, as was his talk with Wynn of the same day, to a certain extent favourably disposed towards Bunsen's proposal recommended by Palmerston.¹ In one of the letters to Reventlow Knuth said that in his talks with Sternberg and Wynn he had been "obliged to mention, that there might be a certain possibility that the Danish Government perhaps would allow the most southern part, where there was a purely German population, to be joined more closely to Holstein . . . but that it was quite unthinkable that this proposal could ever be mentioned as coming from Denmark . . .". "I have said that if such a proposal were made to us it could be considered, notwithstanding the enormous sacrifices it would involve," but there could never be a question of a plebiscite. ". . . our statements on the subject must, therefore, be made with the greatest caution."

In another of the dispatches of the 24th of May Knuth authorized Reventlow to make certain modifications in the armistice proposal of the 18th of May. The main modification was that the German Confederation could be granted the right of appointing the temporary administration in the most southerly part of Slesvig, south of a line Gelting – Nybøl – Husum. Knuth ended this letter: "An armistice is of great importance to us. Only if absolutely necessary we shall make any statements about the future."

When Reventlow informed Brunnow of Knuth's dispatches they agreed wisely that he should not, at the present, take the initiative with Palmerston, nor put forward the modifications mentioned, but await further instructions.² They found that the time was not yet ripe for a concession from the Danish side.

At the end of May and the beginning of June two skilful and experienced Danish diplomats visited Reventlow. One of them was Baron Pechlin, our former Minister to the Confederation at Frankfurt, who returned to Copenhagen by way of London at the request of Fox-Strangways and according to Count Knuth's wishes.³ The other, Reedtz, Knuth's right-hand man and Secretary of Dispatches (cf. p. 28), was sent from Copenhagen with dispatches to London.⁴ In one of these dispatches Knuth stated that as "the present moment would seem to be of incalculable

¹ Ges. ark. London. Orders 1848: 24/5, Nos. 38, 39 and 40.

² Reventlow's dispatch of 30/5, No. 42.

³ Ibid.: 26/5, No. 41. – U. Min. Gehejmregistratur: 13/5 to Pechlin.

⁴ Reventlow's dispatch of 4/6, No. 44.

importance for the turn our case seems to be taking," he will for some time appoint an assistant to Reventlow, Reedtz, "who has intimate knowledge of my views on the details of the matter."¹ He requested Reventlow "to make use of his [Reedtz's] advice and guidance in every respect." In the other communication Knuth enjoins on Reventlow to inform Palmerston that it is a mistake to interpret the King's reply on the 24th of March to the Slesvig-Holstein deputation as an expression of an intention to incorporate Slesvig in the Kingdom.² On the contrary the King intends to stabilize Slesvig's "independence" by separate administration and representation. Whatever one thinks of this interpretation of Knuth's, it is evident from it that "Slesvig's independence" could be considered as a peace basis (by Knuth-Reedtz?).

On the 4th of June Reventlow informed Knuth that he and Reedtz had discussed the situation that day with Brunnow. All three agreed that "we ought to continue to show that we are prepared for an armistice, but only to accept new proposals ad referendum." The day before Brunnow had been to see Palmerston, "but had agreed on everything beforehand with me" (Reventlow). They had discussed a possible division, and Brunnow had said that if the Danish Government agreed at all to this the Trene would be the absolute limit; alone the acquisition of the town of Slesvig, would, for the sake of the name, be far too great a satisfaction for Germany's arrogant demands; "sie können dann "Schleswig-Holstein merumschlungen" singen." To Palmerston's question as to whether Reventlow had authority to conduct negotiations on the question of division or whether Reedtz had brought such authority, Brunnow replied that Reventlow had power only to accept the armistice consisting of six points which he had agreed to with Palmerston. Reventlow wrote at the end of his dispatch that Brunnow was still personally in favour of the Eider as the frontier, but that he would give up this opinion if the Danish Government itself regarded a separation of the most southerly part as desirable. "It's all the same to Palmerston, he only wants to settle the matter and have done with it," remarked Reventlow. In a letter of the 14th of June from Reedtz to Knuth

¹ Ges. ark. London. Departementalia 1848: 28/5, No. XXXIV.

² Ges. ark. London. Orders 1848: 28/5, No. 41.

the discussions with Brunnow were reported as follows: "It seems to me as if he and Palmerston are of the personal opinion that Denmark cannot obtain the whole of Slesvig but that some of the southern part . . . will be lost."¹

On the 7th of June Reedtz and Reventlow called on Palmerston at his official residence in Carlton Gardens.² Palmerston was, excusably enough, extremely dissatisfied that Reedtz did not have power to negotiate on the basis of division which he had proposed. He said that Britain had now for more than a month been engaged in the mediation, "sans effet, que c'était compromettre sa dignité et qu'il fallait savoir où elle en était." Denmark ought not to count too much on help from Sweden and Russia, as this only applied to an attack on the Kingdom, he said, and he knew from Bloomfield that Nesselrode was in favour of division. If the present royal line died out both Duchies would be separated from Denmark on account of the law of male succession – Palmerston was again the spokesman for the incorrect Slesvig-Holstein claim! If Denmark remained "intraitable et ne voudrait pas se prêter à une telle négociation, l'Angleterre s'en laverait les mains et ne pourrait plus continuer une médiation que ne promettait aucun résultat." Shortly afterwards, however, he stated that it would perhaps be best if he drew up a protocol himself which he could then hand over to the parties to accept or reject.

The Danish negotiators, of course, disputed firmly the Slesvig-Holstein view of the succession. Reedtz said that if Britain and Russia insisted on a division and in this way supported our enemies, then Denmark, naturally, had no choice. But he stressed all the dangers and risks connected with this principle. Was it not more reasonable, he said, that the Great Powers declared: "dans vos prétentions exclusives vous avez été trop loin tous les deux; le Duché de Slesvig est et doit demeurer réuni à la Couronne Danoise, mais il n'est ni une province Danoise ni pays de la Confédération, il a le droit de demeurer avec ses institutions particulières comme un pays de transition, où les populations d'origine différent coexisteront en respectant mutuellement leur nationalité." Palmerston then asked Reedtz for two memoirs, the

¹ U. Min. Alm. Korr. Sager. Krigen 1848–50. Korr. Sager 25/3–30/6 1848.

² F.O. 22/166: 6/6. – Dispatch of 9/6, No. 45, from Reventlow and Reedtz.

one dealing with the succession in Slesvig, the other on the risks connected with a division.¹ After receiving these he would return to the question of a basis for a final arrangement.

In Reventlow's and Reedtz' dispatches mentioned here it was stated that Brunnow seemed to be especially interested in Reedtz's idea of Slesvig "comme un pays intermédiaire mais inséparablement uni à la Couronne Danoise."

The day after the discussion with Palmerston, Reventlow was surprised to receive from him a communication with an armistice proposal.² "Our Slesvig negotiation does not seem to make, or at present be likely to make, much Progress towards a final settlement," he wrote. In consideration of this he found that "at least an armistice should be concluded at once." He suggested that this should be "indefinite in its duration," but that each of the parties could terminate it at a fortnight's warning if, after two months, an agreement had not been reached on a "preliminary Basis of a final arrangement." During the armistice Slesvig and Als should be evacuated by both parties. All military and civil prisoners as well as captured vessels were to be released and the blockade was to cease. The armistice agreement should include nothing about a basis for a final settlement or "the manner in which Slesvig should be administered." It was a question of stopping the war and thus "prevent those fluctuations of opinions and pretensions on both sides which necessarily arise from the fluctuations of military events." If the war ceased for two months at least, feelings in both Frankfurt and Copenhagen could calm down, and the chances for a solution of the points at issue would be more favourable. Palmerston ended his letter by saying that Bunsen and Banks, to whom he had shown his proposal the same day, were prepared to accept it; if Reventlow were, too, "we could all meet at the Foreign Office tomorrow at three and we could draw up and sign a short Protocol," which could be sent to the respective Commanders-in-Chief.

As Bunsen wrote in a dispatch to Berlin on Saturday the 10th, he had daily during that week tried to persuade Palmerston to force Denmark to accept the mediation proposals of the 19th of

¹ Their contents are referred to in A. Thorsøe: Kong Frederik den syvendes regering. I (1884), p. 326 ff. Reedtz sent them to Palmerston noting that he had made them as short as possible. Reedtz's private records. G. II.

² F.O. 22/166: 8/6. — Reventlow's dispatch of 9/6, No. 46.

May. Thus on Thursday he had sent Palmerston a letter,¹ stating that The Ultra-Danish party consider "as sign of weakness a step taken by Prussia out of motives of conciliation and pacific policy." But "will [Denmark] not make peace, we must cease to combat the warlike party at Frankfurt, which presses us more and more every day." The arrival at Frankfurt of twenty-five to thirty Slesvig-Holstein refugees from Haderslev would, he believed, "excite a terrible storm in the Parliament."² He requested an interview with Palmerston the same or the following day.

The same day Palmerston asked Bunsen to call on him, and presumably Banks, too, took part in these negotiations.³ Palmerston stated that Reventlow and Reedtz would not agree to peace preliminaries and asked if Bunsen could agree only to an armistice. Bunsen answered that he could, that was to say, on the terms that Prussia had laid down and which he thought he and Palmerston had already agreed upon. Palmerston said that he would then suggest to Bunsen and Reventlow to call on him the next day and sign a protocol. Palmerston did this as mentioned above. In his letter to Reventlow, Palmerston said that Banks was prepared to accept the proposal, but it must be mentioned that Banks stated in his account that he refused to sign the protocol. During the negotiations he had only given expression of his private views. He had also taken care not to "mention the difficulty on which the whole proposal must strand; the continued administration of Slesvig by the Provisional Government."

Reventlow did not appear at the hour suggested by Palmerston. Instead he wrote to Palmerston, after conferring with Reedtz and Brunnow, that he abided by the proposal of the 18th of May which Palmerston had found reasonable.⁴ He had informed his Government of this on the 19th and had been given authority to sign it. If Bunsen was willing to accept it he, too, was prepared "dès demain" to sign it. But it was impossible for him to negotiate on different terms. If Palmerston now wished to put forward new proposals of his own, he could, of course, forward them to the Danish Government.

¹ F.O. 64/292: 8/6.

² Cf. Hjelholt. I, p. 127.

³ Bunsen's dispatch of 9/6, (pol. Ber.). - Banks' account 8/6, No. 15. Bundesarchiv Frankf. am M. BT. 1/409.

⁴ Reventlow to Palmerston 8/6. P.P.

In a letter to Knuth, Reedtz called Palmerston's communication of the 8th to Reventlow "a shameless attempt . . . to take Reventlow by surprise in order to get him to sign an armistice."¹ It is curious to note the character-sketch which Reedtz gives of Palmerston after his first meeting with him: "He has an excellent brain, great flexibility, is free from scruples and misgivings of any description, and is exceptionally rash and superficial."

Two days later (on the morning of the 10th) Bunsen wrote confidentially to Palmerston that he understood that Reventlow was unable to agree to Palmerston's proposal of the 19th of May.² The reason that Bunsen described his own proposals as Palmerston's, is that Palmerston had accepted them on the whole, and recommended them to the Danish Government. Britain's mediation, said Bunsen without much truth, was undoubtedly "counteracted by very powerful machinery which has nothing less in view than a general war against Germany." He conjured up Russia's menace, and that this could force Germany into an alliance with France. Before the "Whitsunday holidays" [it was Whitsun on the 11th], he wished a definite answer as to whether Denmark would accept one of the two proposals put forward on the 19th of May.

On the same day Bunsen had a new talk with Palmerston of which he gave an account in a note added to his dispatch in the evening. Palmerston went through with him the armistice proposal put forward by Reventlow (and Palmerston) on the 18th of May which Reventlow had referred to in his letter of the 8th.³ Bunsen found this letter "unfriendly and unsuitable". Meantime, however, to prevent the oppression of North Slesvig by the Provisional Government, he would agree to the appointment of a Danish and a German Commissioner, with a Britisher as arbitrator to supervise conditions in North Slesvig. Palmerston suggested a joint administrative authority, half to be instated by the Provisional Government or the Confederation, and half by the King, the chairman to be appointed by both, and all to be Slesvigers.

¹ Letter of 9/6. U. Min. Alm. Korr. Sager. Krigen 1848-50. Korr. Sager 25/3-30/6 1848.

² F.O. 64/292: 10/6. - Copy of letter with Bunsen's dispatch. 10/6 (pol. Ber.).

³ The Belgian Minister S. van de Weyer, whom both Bunsen and Reventlow knew socially, gave information about the standpoints of the two parties in a dispatch of the 10/6 to his colleague Hoffschmidt in Berlin. See the extract of the dispatch in Westmorland. I, p. 373.

Bunsen said that such a proposal was contrary to his instructions, but he promised to consider it under certain conditions.

As soon as he had ended his dispatch to Berlin, Bunsen sent Palmerston a new letter dated "Saturday 6 o'clock."¹ He enclosed his instructions which, as he noted, agreed on all the main points with Arnim's note of the 22nd of May to Westmorland. He rightly stated: "The real difficulty is and remains in Art. IV of the Danish project of 18/5, which they reproduce." He thought that those who possessed the country and the authority ought to continue provisionally to exercise their authority in the name of the Duke. But a joint commission with one member appointed by the King, one by the Confederation, and one by Britain could reside in Slesvig during the armistice "to watch over the *political agency* of the administration. This is the only reasonable, equitable and good plan." He was prepared to sign a protocol with such a plan. On the other hand, the plan mentioned by Palmerston: a Slesvig administration of Slesvigers, three appointed by the Prussian Government, three by the King, and a chairman chosen by both was "decidedly against my instructions." A protocol with such a clause he could only sign "with an *express reserve of ratification* and, of course, only if the Protocol is signed immediately, this *evening or Monday*." But he was afraid it was impracticable. The other proposal "*must satisfy Denmark, for it is equitable and saves the dignity of the Crown of Denmark*." He hoped, therefore, that Palmerston would suggest it. "I am waiting for your orders," he ended.

When Bunsen had left Palmerston on Saturday afternoon, Reventlow and Reedtz called at the Foreign Office at six o'clock in the evening for negotiations.² Before this meeting Reventlow had said to the Belgian Minister that even a demonstration by the British Navy would not make Denmark deviate from the armistice terms of the 18th.³ All the chances were in Denmark's favour. He mentioned the disorganised state of affairs in Germany and the support given to Denmark by Russia and Sweden, while

¹ F.O. 64/292. — The letter comes after a letter of the 15/6, but must be wrongly filed. It has no other date than that mentioned in the text.

² Reventlow's dispatch of 13/6, No. 47.

³ Van de Weyer's dispatch of 10/6, No. 330. See also his letter of the same day to the King, in which he wrote: "La Prusse s'est imprudemment jetée dans une lutte, dont elle croyait le succès certain."

Germany as her only resource had an alliance with Republican France.

The talk on the 10th was followed by new talks both on the 11th and the 12th, even although the 11th was Whitsunday. Bunsen was out of town on the 11th, but Palmerston summoned Banks that day to the negotiations.¹

The armistice proposal of the 18th was made the basis of the talks on the 10th, 11th, and 12th between Palmerston and the Danish negotiators. The crux of the matter in this proposal was articles four and five dealing with the separate administration of the two Duchies during the armistice. Reventlow stated in his dispatch to Knuth that Palmerston tried to substitute these two articles with one which, after a discussion between him and us, was drawn up as follows: "L'établissement d'une administration (mot que j'ai proposé pour éviter celui du Gouvernement) civile dans les deux duchés dans le but de maintenir l'ordre et la police durant l'armistice, jusqu'à la conclusion de l'arrangement qui statuera définitivement l'organisation intérieure de l'un et de l'autre des deux duchés. Cette administration se composera de 6 membres nommés à moitié par le Roi de Danemark et à moitié par la confédération germanique à l'exclusion toutefois des individus qui ont formé partie du Gouvernement provisoire ou qui se sont compromis gravement dans des ménées politiques." Only after receiving a promise from Palmerston of a written declaration that such a joint provisional administration should in no way be able to prejudice the final sanction of the King's Government with regard to the organisation of the two Duchies, did Reventlow consent to sign a protocol in which this provision was taken ad referendum for the Government's decision. As can be seen, the two Danish negotiators were moving over towards the Slesvig-Holstein standpoint of a joint administration during an armistice. During the negotiations on the 11th Palmerston had also expressed to Banks his no mean surprise that the Danes would agree to this, "as with half of the administration of the two Duchies appointed by the Confederation, they recognised a principle against which they had hitherto protested."

¹ Banks' account of 10/6, No. 17, cont. 12/6. Bundesarchiv Abt. Frankfurt a. M. BT. I/409.

On the 12th Bunsen had again lengthy talks with Palmerston, but, as he wrote in his detailed account the same day to Berlin, the result was negative and the negotiations must henceforward be considered as broken off.¹ Palmerston's suggestion of a new joint provisional government had, as Bunsen noted in his account, the advantage of preserving the *unity* of the administration. But were it accepted, the Provisional Government would be offended and just at a moment "when an Assembly of the Estates, as it were constituting, although legally quite unauthorized and illegitimate, and elected with the complete exclusion of the Danish population in North Slesvig, though acting so as to win great esteem, places itself beside the other." Palmerston regarded indeed this consideration as of no importance, and he found that Germany and the Duchies would have many more advantages of an armistice than Denmark.

Bunsen did not doubt, his account continued, that Palmerston had done everything to get the Danish negotiators to accept the proposals of the 19th of May, but his efforts were fruitless. Bunsen had learnt this before his talk with Palmerston on the 12th at eleven o'clock. He had, therefore, prepared an ultimatum which, he stated, he would send later in the day to Palmerston with a diplomatic note, in case the Danish negotiators, who were waiting in an adjoining room, did not *immediately* accept one of the proposals of the 19th of May.

When Palmerston finally asked what Bunsen wished him to do now, Bunsen replied that Britain ought to use strong language to Russia, Sweden and Denmark in order to avoid war. Bunsen ended his dispatch by stressing that it was of vital importance that Germany soon got rid of the prevailing anarchy and formed a Reich Government.

The gentlemen in the adjoining room did not, as we know, accept the proposals of the 19th of May, and therefore Bunsen sent to Palmerston on the 14th his note (dated the 12th) with comments on the proposal of the 18th.² He protested that the

¹ Bunsen's dispatches of 12/6 (pol. Ber., No. 4) and 12/6 (pol. Ber., No. 1) with an enclosure.

² F.O. 64/292. Printed in German in Actenstücke, p. 24 ff. Cf. Brevskaber, p. 55 f., and Westmorland, I, p. 391 (Weyer's dispatch of 13/6). Bunsen's dispatch of 14/6 (pol. Ber. No. 9).

proposal of the 18th was reproduced as the basis of further negotiations during Britain's mediation. It seemed to him that such a reproduction meant, in reality, that Denmark rejected Britain's mediation. Germany had accepted the proposals, Denmark had rejected them by putting forward "after three weeks' delay . . . the same proposals on which Britain, as mediating power, had given its opinion in so unequivocal a manner." Bunsen had, nevertheless, scrutinised the proposals of the 18th, and wanted to show that they were "inadmissible in themselves." Germany would never accept them. But Prussia was still prepared to conclude an armistice on the basis of the proposal of the 19th.

In his account of the 12th Banks mentioned the breakdown of the negotiations, and stated with deep regret that there were very poor prospects of settling the dispute in a peaceful manner, and also just as little chance of doing so with the sword. A few days later both Reedt and Pechlin left London, but there was really nothing more for them to do there.

In his dispatch of the 14th of June, in which he stated that he considered the negotiations under Britain's mediation to be broken off, Bunsen mentioned that he did not regret the breakdown of the negotiations concerning only an armistice. Denmark wanted to gain time but Germany ought now to continue the war. The only negotiations which could still be carried on were those dealing with peace preliminaries on the basis of the proposal of the 19th of May, provided that Britain took strong action against Denmark, Sweden and Russia. He suggested that the diplomatic documents concerned: his note of the 18th, Palmerston's reply, Arnim's note of the 22nd to Westmorland, and his own note of the 12th of June with enclosures be handed over to the Federal Diet and, if possible, made public.¹

It was not, as we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, in London but in Malmö, that, at long last, an agreement was reached on an armistice proposal. From the 7th to the 10th of June Frederick VII and his Foreign Minister were the guests there of King Oscar and his ministers. The British Minister, Wynn, was also present at the negotiations, while Ungern Sternberg remained in Copenhagen. As Sternberg wrote to his Government,

¹ They are printed in Actenstücke. — See also dispatch to Bunsen 22/6.

he considered this the most correct thing to do on account of the attitude Russia had adopted towards the dispute.¹ In his dispatch Sternberg recommended that “les Puissances amies” in London should settle the matter consistent with the best interests of the Scandinavian countries, and should dictate these terms to Denmark. He opposed a division in consideration of the fact that if once the historical frontier had been violated “il deviendrait impossible d'imposer une barrière aux prétensions de la nationalité germanique.”

Wynn described his visit to Malmö in two letters of the 12th to Palmerston.² He had first had a talk with King Oscar and the Swedish Foreign Minister Stierneld, and the King had told him that he had a long talk the previous evening with Frederick VII, who would rather abdicate than give up any part of Slesvig; the only solution, he did not seem absolutely opposed to, was the independence of Slesvig, “as already suggested by me to Your Lordship.” When Wynn later spoke to Frederick VII, he confirmed that he would interpose “a most decided veto of any division of Slesvig.” Wynn further stated that during negotiations between Stierneld, the King’s Private Secretary Manderström, Knuth and Oxholm, an agreement had been reached on contrapositions to the Prussian armistice proposal; he enclosed these with his dispatch. They are, he said, with certain modifications based on Arnim’s proposal. Oxholm was to take them yesterday, the 11th, to St. Petersburg with letters from the Swedish and Danish Kings to the Tsar.

I shall leave open the question whether it quite covered the matter to say that the new Danish proposal was based on Arnim’s with certain modifications. It was reproduced in a verbal note of the 10th of June and included ten points.³ The most important difference from the Danish proposal of the 15th of May was that Denmark was now willing – in Point 3 – to release the captured vessels if she was promised compensation for all the contributions levied by the German troops.

As Wynn mentioned, the question of a peace basis was, of course, discussed at the meeting between the two Kings. In a

¹ Russ. Akter X. 1848: 8/6, No. 107.

² F.O. 22/163: 12/6. No. 84 and 12/6 (private). – Cf. Bunsen’s dispatch of 21/6 (pol. Ber. No. 12).

³ Brevskaber, p. 56 ff.

dispatch of the 11th of June to our Minister in St. Petersburg two possibilities were mentioned: division or independence, "une indépendance spéciale et sur la plus large échelle possible sans toutefois compromettre son union perpétuelle avec la Couronne danoise."¹ It was added that no decision had yet been taken on the degree of Slesvig's independence. Wynn said of this that Knuth "acceded to the arrangement proposed for Slesvig, but declined putting anything on paper till he had consulted his Colleagues among whom there is so great a diversity of opinion." The debate in the Council of State on the 14th of June at which Knuth stated that Sweden wished to know what degree of independence Slesvig was to be granted, gave a vivid impression of this diversity.²

In his private communication to Palmerston on the 12th Wynn expressed his hope that "the terms for the armistice may be considered acceptable." He was less optimistic with regard to the final settlement for Slesvig, as Frankfurt was against it, "neither will Bunsen like to lose his *seat in Parliament*" [he was elected from Slesvig, see above]. Knuth was, wrote Wynn, "very reserved and out of humour, said *that they had never entirely put aside the possibility of a division*, and that I must not take the King's Declaration quite au pied de la lettre."

As Brunnow told Reventlow, Palmerston informed Bunsen at a talk [on the 17th?] of the Malmö proposal, and requested his comments on it by the 19th.³ On the 18th Reventlow had a long talk with Palmerston about the new armistice proposal and found him in an "excellent mood." Palmerston said that he would now draw up proposals for a peace basis which the two Ministers should only accept ad referendum, and which he would send by courier to Copenhagen and Berlin. I encouraged him to do this, Reventlow wrote to Knuth, in accordance with your letter of the 11th. In this letter Knuth had requested Reventlow to try to get the opposite side to put forward a proposal for division, "definite and on favourable conditions," although it was impossible for

¹ U. Min. Alm. Korr. Sager Lit. K. Väbenstilt. i Malmö, etc. Læg 7.

² Statsrådets Forhandl. 1848-1863. I, p. 318 ff.

³ Reventlow's dispatch of 23/6, No. 49, with Brunnow's letter to Reventlow (18/6). It should rightly be with the dispatch of 20/6, No. 48. Bunsen's dispatch of 21/6, No. 12. Bunsen refers to the conference taking place on Sunday, the 17th, but Sunday was the 18th, and the following day, Monday, the 19th, which Bunsen has correctly.

Knuth to "give you authority to agree to such a basis for a possible peace, even though the lines of demarcation were extremely favourable for us."¹ Knuth ended his letter by saying that the line Gelting – Husum "might still be considered as suitable if there ever were to be any question of division."

Bunsen's report on the Malmö proposal, which he handed over to Palmerston on the 19th, was, as Wynn had expected, very unfavourable.² "The insult to Germany contained in such proposals," it said, "is only equalled by the ridiculous presumption of supposing that Britain could be brought to recommend them instead of her own proposals rejected by Denmark." Not for one minute would Germany hear of such proposals; the only reply was "*utter contempt*." Bunsen was of the opinion that the Malmö Conference "appears to be a rather extraordinary answer to an advice to listen to the English project of mediation for a peace." The proposals showed that Denmark wished to gain time by an armistice "not in order to conclude peace but to continue the war with the greater chance of success." Palmerston's [!] proposal of the 19th of May was the only basis for future negotiations. On this basis Prussia took her stand, "relying upon the justice of the British Cabinet."

Palmerston had promised Bunsen that he would submit Britain's final mediation proposal at this conference, which lasted three hours, and Bunsen had therefore brought Banks with him – which Palmerston had also wished him to do. First of all the Malmö proposal was discussed, but Bunsen rejected this absolutely, as mentioned above. Palmerston, however, definitely maintained that Denmark must be given compensation for Wrangel's impositions in Jutland. On the other hand, according to Banks' account, he would not deny that the contents of the last four points in reality were: "The German Confederation gives up all the claims for which it hitherto has fought and therefore obtains an armistice; if peace is to be concluded even greater sacrifices must be made, or war waged only in Holstein."

Then, after Palmerston had read the two memoirs sent him by Reedtz, he went on to discuss the four possibilities of ending

¹ Cf. Olsen, p. 248 ff.

² F.O. 64/292: 19/6. – Bunsen's dispatch of 21/6, No. 12, with enclosure. – Banks' account of 20/6, No. 18. Bundesarchiv. Frankf. a. M. BT. I/409.

the dispute. The two first: Slesvig completely German or completely Danish were out of the question, he thought. There was great opposition to the third possibility, that of division. But what of the fourth one, the status quo before 1846? Were there conclusive arguments against this?

This proposal, the status quo before 1846, was explained by Palmerston, according to Banks, as joint civil administration and a "*joint Assembly of the Estates*," but Banks wrote rightly in his dispatch that the decisive question for Germany was the more detailed formulation of the proposal. At the conference Bunsen stressed the impossibility of returning to the status quo of 1845, and asserted the indivisibility of the Duchies and their common succession. Palmerston was said then to have remarked that the King of Denmark would, in fact, have to acknowledge "*the political connection and unity of the two Duchies*" by giving "*a political constitution and assembly for both*." This involved the same succession and inseparability. Bunsen then declared that such a proposal was something quite different from the status quo in 1845, and he was much in favour of it if the plan for division had to be dropped. Palmerston thought that he would be able to have his new proposal ready by the 23rd to be sent to Berlin and Copenhagen. He promised that he would inform Bunsen of the proposal before "it was finally drawn up."¹ Bunsen stated that on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd he asked Palmerston whether the plan was now drawn up so that he could comment on it before it was sent off.² Bunsen, however, had no opportunity of doing this as Palmerston was so busy. On the 21st Palmerston replied that he had not yet had a moment to draw up the proposal, "which is certainly not to be wondered at considering this extraordinary man's many heavy official duties, obligations and interruptions," commented Bunsen.

The day following the lengthy conference with Bunsen and Banks, Palmerston had a talk with Reventlow. He informed him that as a peace basis he would suggest either division or status quo ante.³ He would submit such a proposal as soon as possible to the Queen and his colleagues for approval, and on the 23rd send

¹ Banks also said this in his account of 24/6, No. 22. Bundesarchiv. Frankf. a. M. BT. I/409.

² Bunsen's dispatches of 21/6 and 23/6, Nos. 12 and 14.

³ Reventlow's dispatch of 20/6, No. 48.

it by courier to Copenhagen and Berlin. Reventlow read to Palmerston part of Knuth's dispatch in code of the 14th,¹ and stressed in this connection that the Danish Government "préférerait l'indépendance du Slesvig à un partage;" he received the impression that Palmerston was not biased either way. According to Reventlow's account to Knuth, Palmerston was very pleased with the progress being made, and Reventlow himself evidently thought that the peace preliminaries would soon be signed.

When Brunnow and Reventlow met Palmerston on the 22nd at the Queen's reception, he had still not had time to draw up his proposal.² But he said that he would go home at once and do it – and home he went. On Friday the 23rd Reventlow sat and waited for Palmerston's proposal; twelve o'clock went past, then four o'clock, then six o'clock, but he had still heard nothing from Palmerston. The British Cabinet had been meeting since two o'clock; so off Reventlow went with his dispatch, which among other things contained this information, to Downing Street, where he wanted to hand over the dispatch. There he discovered that Palmerston really had finished his work, and that it would be ready for him in a few minutes. Bunsen and Banks were there, too, "just as expectant and empty-handed as I was," wrote Reventlow in his letter dated from "Foreign Office Downing Street."³ "Here is the document!," he ended and forwarded the British proposal with Palmerston's own signature.

The proposal began by giving an account of the happenings up to that date.⁴ Britain's first proposal concerned an armistice and then negotiations, but Prussia had demanded at all events that the general principles for the final understanding be laid down at the same time. Britain then made an attempt to do this, but was unsuccessful. Then Britain again put forward a proposal for an armistice and later made a new attempt to make a final arrangement at the same time. Britain requested both Governments to put forward their views; they had now done this, and on the basis of these views Britain put forward the following proposals for both an armistice and a final settlement.

¹ Ges. Ark. London. Orders. 1848.

² Reventlow's dispatch of 23/6, No. 49.

³ Cf. Bunsen's dispatch of 24/6, No. 16.

⁴ The proposal is printed in Brevskaber, p. 59 ff. and Actenstücke (Abdruck), p. 41 ff. – Cf. Haralds, p. 150 ff.

The first three points dealt with the cessation of hostilities, the liberation of prisoners, and mutual compensation for the losses incurred by the opposite side (the seizure of vessels, the contributions in Jutland). Point 4 laid down that Slesvig (also Als) was to be evacuated by both German and Danish troops. No mention was made this time of the evacuation of Holstein by the German troops. According to Point 5, during the period until a final settlement had been reached, both Duchies were to be administered by a Commission of Seven, three appointed by "the King-Duke," three by the Confederation, and the seventh, the Chairman, "in a manner to be hereafter agreed upon." These seven should not have taken any active part in the recent events. This last sentence was, for that matter, the only one that the Queen criticized when she was shown the note.¹ Not without reason she asked: "Can such men be found?" Palmerston had to give a lengthy explanation of his reasons for this point, which was included "to meet an invincible objection of the Danish Government to consent to leave the Government of the two Duchies in the hands of the present Provisional Government whom it considers as Rebels," and, on the other hand, Palmerston was unwilling to name them.

The last point in the note included two proposals for a final arrangement, and it was left to "the King-Duke" to choose one of these. The first was the proposal for division, whereby South Slesvig and North Slesvig each became a Duchy. The former should be included in the German Confederation with the same succession as Holstein. On the other hand North Slesvig should "be attached by its law of succession to the Crown of Denmark."

If this proposal was not found to be expedient Slesvig could remain as it now was and with joint administration for it and Holstein. Furthermore, there should be a joint Provincial Assembly of the Estates for the two Duchies. The King would as hitherto be a member of the German Confederation for Holstein, not for Slesvig. "No change would in this case be made in the law of succession of Slesvig." Finally the note appealed to "the spirit of conciliation" and "the love of peace," and asked the parties to remember "that the convictions of its adversary may be as strong and as sincere as its own, and that though the commencement of War is simple and ready, the issue of War is concealed

¹ R.A.W. I 5/62 and 63.

in the doubtful Darkness of the Future and is hid from the foresight of Man.”

As mentioned above, apart from a single critical remark, the Queen had approved of the note, and she had expressed her hope that “this fair proposal may be accepted by the two contending parties.” Prince Albert expressed the same hope in a letter of the 1st of July to the King of Saxony.¹ “Die Anforderungen von beiden Seiten sind natürlich,” he wrote, “durch die Erhitzung des Kampfes überspannt und das Geschäft des Vermittlers, zu jeder Zeit ein sehr undankbares, schwierig geworden.” Although Prince Albert shared the unhistorical Slesvig-Holstein view of the origin of the strife, he admitted that this had been “falsified” by “the attempted incorporation of Slesvig in Germany,” through which it had become possible for Denmark “to give the impression to Russia, Sweden and the British public that Germany is in the wrong.”

Brunnow, as well as Reventlow and Bunsen, was informed by Palmerston of the proposal. In his letter of thanks Brunnow called it – rather surprisingly it seems – “Votre excellent travail sur l’affaire du Slesvig” and declared that it was “conçu dans un véritable esprit de conciliation et d’équité.”² He stated furthermore that he had strongly advised Reventlow to recommend his Government to accept the proposal, and that he had done this in writing so that it could have the desired effect in Copenhagen. Brunnow must here refer to the advice which Reventlow mentioned in his dispatch of the 23rd – before he had knowledge of Palmerston’s note of the same day – viz. “not to reject altogether Lord Palmerston’s first proposition [division] for a peaceful settlement, when it includes a fairly acceptable basis . . .”. (See also p. 236).

Reventlow had hardly had time to read the document in its entirety before forwarding it. The most important of the critical comments he made a little later on the contents are as follows.³ In the proposal for division no line was indicated – the very thing that the Danish Government wished the opposing party or the mediating power to do. Reventlow described the clause dealing with the joint Provincial Assembly of the Estates in the second

¹ R.A.W. I 6/1.

² F.O. 65/357: “Dimanche matin.”

³ Reventlow’s dispatch of 27/6, Nos. 51 and 52, and 3/7, No. 54.

alternative as the most unfavourable part of the proposal. When Reventlow drew Palmerston's attention to the fact that this did not agree with the status quo ante, Palmerston answered that it was the only concession Germany would get if Denmark chose this alternative. According to Reventlow one favourable feature of the proposal was that it was put forward by Palmerston, and another that the Danish Government had good time to consider it in detail as an answer had not to be given by any definite date to the mediating power.

On the 24th of June Bunsen sent his Government Palmerston's note and stated that he was not quite sure whether certain of its points were entirely in agreement with his interpretation of them at the conference on the 19th. He had, therefore, the same day compared these points, and written to Palmerston requesting further information on their interpretation.¹ He thought for example, he wrote, that at the conference he had understood that, if a final settlement were approved, Palmerston would not suggest any new Provisional Government; he did not believe in the suggested provisional administration. As regards the plan for division Germany would have to demand a plebiscite in North Slesvig. As far as the alternative was concerned, Bunsen had understood Palmerston's proposal to mean that the Duchies should not only have a joint administration but "one and the same joint political assembly," and that Slesvig no more than Holstein should have any constitutional connection with Denmark. But what, he asked, did the sentence on succession mean? — a subject on which Denmark and Germany had quite different opinions. And how was "Provincial Assembly of the Estates" to be interpreted? As his previous instructions were concerned only with the acceptance of the proposal of the 19th of May, he would have, moreover, to request new orders, but he asserted, Germany had "a sincere wish for the establishment of peace on equitable terms, honourable for both parties."

On the 28th of June Palmerston replied to Bunsen.² As the latter had again emphasised that Prussia had accepted "Palmerston's proposal" of the 19th of May, but that Denmark had

¹ F.O. 64/292. — Bunsen's dispatch of 24/6, No. 16, with enclosure. — Actenstücke (Abdruck), p. 45 ff.

² F.O. 64/292.

rejected it, he remarked that Britain was not an arbitrator but a mediator. Then he dealt with Bunsen's various questions and said that he would be pleased to hear his views on the choice of a chairman for the suggested administration.¹ He did not think that the King of Denmark could be expected, after all that had happened, to enter into official relations with the Provisional Government. He further rightly emphasized that the first proposal (division) was a concession to Germany, who had no right "to any portion of that Duchy." It appeared to Britain, "that as these arrangements concern the King-Duke more nearly and more directly and more importantly than they concern the Confederation it would be but just to leave it to the King-Duke to choose between these two equivalent Arrangements." Britain was aware that there were various opinions on the question of the succession. It would be best to leave this "at some future, and it may be hoped very distant time."

The next day when Bunsen sent Palmerston's reply to Berlin he remarked that in the new proposals Palmerston not only acknowledged an administrative, but a political connection between the Duchies.² That meant that Denmark would have to give up her letters patent of 1846, in fact all her "dishonest" policy since 1815. But was Denmark willing to do this? Bunsen wrote that Reventlow had said "in his somewhat bombastic manner," that the last Dane would die rather than retract the letters patent. However, Reventlow was said to have remarked at the same time that Palmerston's new proposal could be accepted "with some minor modifications."

It was clear that Bunsen had not trusted Palmerston to give his new proposal the scope which he [Bunsen] wished, for he stated in his dispatch that he would request an interview to expostulate with Palmerston that he must point out the consequences of the proposal to both Wynn and the Danish Government. At this interview on the 1st of July Palmerston was said to have confirmed that it was the definite view of the British Government that Slesvig should be separated from Denmark in the same way as Holstein.³ The difference between the two Duchies lay in

¹ He put the same question to Reventlow at the same time. F.O. 22/166: 28/6.

² Bunsen's dispatch of 29/6, No. 20.

³ Bunsen's dispatch of 1/7, No. 22. — Banks' report of 4/7, No. 26 (Bundesarchiv Frankf. a. M. BT. I/409) probably alludes to this conference.

their position as regards Germany, not Denmark. Palmerston was said to have promised Bunsen to oppose every attempt from the Danish side to evade or invalidate this point. Bunsen also took the opportunity to give John Russell a detailed account of the matter, and expressed his regrets to him that Palmerston had used the expression "Provincial Assembly of the Estates:" "There is no use at all in drawing a veil over the matter."¹ Furthermore he inserted an article in the *Times* contradicting an account which had appeared there.

In his reports to Frankfurt Banks also commended Palmerston's new proposal.² It was not content with re-establishing the position before 1846, he wrote on the 26th of June, "but it goes much (sehr viel) further, it gives the Duchies the right to a joint Assembly of the Estates and settles the question of the succession by contradicting the "letters patent." I cannot interpret the proposal in any other way than that it virtually establishes the three points, the same succession, indivisibility, and independence."

Although it has no direct connection with the mediation negotiations, I shall just mention that, about the middle of June, at Reventlow's request, Britain published a ban on the export of weapons to those countries who were at war with Denmark, in accordance with the treaty of 1670. Bunsen protested, of course, to Palmerston but without success.³ He was informed from another quarter that the ban would not be strictly enforced. Bunsen's assertion that Denmark was the aggressor was dismissed by Palmerston: "the advance of the troops of the confederation beyond the limits of the Territory which belongs to the confederation must surely be considered as an act of aggression."

There was, as seen from a Danish standpoint, nothing very promising in Palmerston's proposals except the fact that no time limit was set for an answer, which Reventlow emphasized as a favourable point. When Wynn, who did not receive the proposals until the 28th, spoke to Knuth about them he found him very irritated.⁴ The Danish Foreign Minister described the proposals

¹ Bunsen's dispatch of 6/7, No. 23.

² Banks' reports of 24/6, No. 22; 26/6, No. 23, and 29/6, No. 24. Bundesarchiv Frankf. a. M. BT. I/409.

³ Bunsen's dispatches of 17/6, No. 11 with enclosure and 30/6, No. 21 with enclosure. - F.O. 64/292: 15/6 and 23/6.

⁴ F.O. 22/163: 1/7, No. 92. - Westmorland. I, p. 439.

as "totally inadmissible, inasmuch as the great object they had fought for and would still fight for, the independence of Slesvig was abandoned. I in vain told him, that some sacrifice was *absolutely* necessary," and that Palmerston's proposal was conceivably what Prussia would agree to. Knuth said, however, that the proposal would make Slesvig, "as much a German province as if she was actually incorporated." However, when Wynn spoke to Knuth again on the 1st of July he found him "much more temperate" and received the promise that Palmerston's proposal would receive serious consideration.

A letter sent on the 29th by Wynn to his colleague in Berlin testifies even more strongly to Knuth's irritation.¹ He wrote that the proposals "were rejected by Knuth with a degree of indignation and irritation which may subside with time and which I must at all events soften down to Lord P. for fear of his giving up the whole concern. He would hardly listen to me when I told him that the terms were perfectly honorable to them and that in fact no *concession* had been made to Germany, as the state of Slesvig would remain nearly[!] as it was before."

Wynn continued by saying that he believed he put Knuth "in somewhat better humour by reading to him and giving him an Extract of that part of your letter in which you express Schleinitz's regret that *his proposal* for the temporary Government of *Slesvig* by *one* German, *one* Dane and *one* English commissary was not accepted by this Govt. He said that they had never received any such proposition and that if made they would accede to it."

Westmorland's letter quoted here by Wynn was dated the 22nd of June.² Almost the same information was found in Westmorland's dispatch of the same date to Palmerston:³ Schleinitz "very much regrets that Your Lordship's proposition to make over the Government of Slesvig to a *German*, a *Danish* and an *English* Commissioner has not been accepted by Denmark." He himself approved of it wholly, "and he still hopes Your Lordship may find some means of modifying it so as to obtain the sanction of the Danish Government."

¹ Westmorland. I, p. 439 ff.

² Westmorland. I, p. 423.

³ F.O. 64/288. — Bloomfield's dispatch of 30/6, No. 193 states: Nesselrode approved of Palmerston's "proposal[!] that a mixed commission of Germans and Danes, with an English arbitrator should be appointed for the managements of the affairs of the Duchy of Slesvig." F.O. 65/349.

It was obvious that Westmorland's information was due to a misunderstanding. Strangely enough the Foreign Office accepted it, but in its orders of the 30th to Westmorland described the proposal as Schleinitz's.¹ It was, the orders said, flattering for Britain, who "nevertheless would not wish to take upon themselves the responsibility which would result from such an arrangement." On the 6th of July when Westmorland let Bülow read this dispatch, Bülow remarked "that he should have regretted this decision if the appointment had been required which under the circumstances of the Armistice about to be agreed, he did not think was likely."² He said that he had understood that the proposal came from London. Westmorland then mentioned in his dispatch that a dispatch from the Belgian Minister, Van de Weyer, of the 13th of June also gave this impression, but this covered only the proposal mentioned above on p. 152.

Westmorland's letter to Wynn on the 29th showed that he had realised that there had been a misunderstanding.³ He said in this letter that Schleinitz "can hardly venture to supersede the Prov^l Govt now existing but agrees to either the Com. of three or seven as proposed by Ld P. to control the Prov^l Govt." This statement was not completely correct either, but it was based on the proposals mentioned on p. 150 ff.

On the 1st of July Palmerston wrote to Wynn and Westmorland to make earnest recommendations to the Danish and Prussian Governments, respectively, to accept his proposal.⁴ However, it did not become necessary for the two countries to come to a final decision on the proposals on account of the armistice negotiations proceeding in Malmö since the beginning of June with Swedish participation.

8. Negotiations in Malmö about an Armistice.

The Convention of the 2nd of July.

Britain had made serious efforts to prevent the outbreak of the Danish-German war. Even her commercial interests were a decisive motive for this. Palmerston had given warnings and

¹ F.O. 64/283: 30/6, No. 145.

² F.O. 64/288: 6/7, No. 259.

³ Westmorland. I, p. 451.

⁴ F.O. 22/160 and 64/283.

made appeals, but no action had followed. He carried out the mediation he had taken on without seeming to feel any obligation towards Britain's Treaty of Guarantee of 1720. In his efforts at mediation he followed the line of least resistance. He therefore tried to force the Danish Government to make more and more concessions, so that Prussia at last would accept his proposal. This had resulted in the proposal of the 23rd of June, the provisions of which Count Knuth would hardly allow Wynn to state in detail.

Reventlow had remarked rather bitterly on Palmerston's attitude that the most important thing, as far as he was concerned, was to settle the matter. The question must be left open how much Palmerston really studied the "case", in spite of his famous statement about the three people who really understood it. On the question of the succession he no doubt from the beginning accepted, as a matter of course, the incorrect Slesvig-Holstein view for which Bunsen was the spokesman. Neither Reventlow nor Lehmann seemingly could alter this view. On the other hand, the memoir on the succession which Reedtz prepared for him during his stay in London, and which he received (see p. 148), must at least have made him realize that the Danish view could not be rejected as a matter of course. When on the 21st of June Wynn forwarded the pamphlet "Der Aufstand in den Herzogthümern Schleswig und Holstein,"¹ Palmerston made the note on the report; "Is there any argument or Fact in this Pamphlet that is of any importance."²

Whatever love the national-liberal minded Danish Government had for Britain it had to admit, realistically, that it was not from there but from reactionary Russia that help could be expected. During the above-mentioned meeting in Malmö between the two Kings, an agreement was made (p. 154 f.) to send Oxholm to the Tsar. According to Bloomfield's dispatches Oxholm and his proposal were received rather coldly both by Nesselrode and the Tsar, who considered the Danish attitude too uncompromising.³ Oxholm is leaving today, wrote Bloomfield on the 22nd, but he

¹ The anonymous pamphlet "Der Aufstand in den Herzogthümern Schleswig und Holstein und Preussens Verfahren gegen Dänemark" was written by Johs. Höpfner.

² F.O. 22/163: 21/6, No. 87.

³ F.O. 65/349: 17/6, No. 179; 20/6, No. 182; 21/6, No. 183; 22/6, No. 184.

is not at all satisfied with the result of his mission, and Denmark cannot expect armed help from Russia. The Tsar had said to Oxholm that under the present conditions in Europe it would be unwise of the Danish King to try to obtain his full rights, "that He must therefore advise His Danish Majesty to accept the best arrangement which He could obtain through the mediation of Britain." However, Meyendorff in Berlin received instructions to recommend the new Danish proposal, and the Prussian Minister in St. Petersburg was also, wrote Bloomfield, "greatly disappointed" at Russia's friendly attitude towards Denmark.

Sweden had not only assisted with the new Danish proposal mentioned above, but about the 20th through her Minister d'Ohsson in Berlin, she took the initiative in transferring the negotiations about an armistice, but not about a peace basis, from London to Malmö.¹ When Sweden sounded Berlin on this change she was favourably received there, where at same time after new mob riots – the arsenal was stormed on the 14th – a change of Government took place. Rud. v. Auerswald became Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, although Schleinitz attended to foreign affairs during the last half of June. Prussia's politics became a little more Legitimist. As early as the 12th of June Westmorland was able to inform Wynn that Frederick William IV was considering sending his adjutant, General Neumann, to Copenhagen to express to Frederick VII his "anxious desire for the termination of hostility between the troops of the two countries and to seek the means by which this may be effected."² The Ministers' views on this, however, had not yet been heard, added Westmorland, and as they advised Frederick William not to do so, the general did not go to Copenhagen.³ On the other hand, Count Pourtalès who was Prussian Minister-Designate in Constantinople on the 24th was sent to Malmö to negotiate about an armistice. About the same time Frederick William sent Count Pful to St. Petersburg for the purpose of bettering the relations between the two courts.⁴

Not until the 26th of June did Wynn inform Palmerston that Lagerheim had asked if Britain would consider it "an improper

¹ Haralds, p. 173 ff.

² Westmorland. I, p. 395.

³ Westmorland. I, p. 407. – F.O. 64/288: 15/6, No. 236. – Cf. Haralds, p. 177.

⁴ F.O. 65/349: 28/6, No. 190, and 30/6, No. 193.

interference" in her mediation, if Sweden, at Prussia's request, tried "to bring about a cessation of hostilities."¹ Wynn wrote that he had replied that Palmerston would certainly approve of "any step towards a cessation of hostilities," but that he was not so sure that the cessation would be hastened by negotiations in three different places. Wynn's view of Palmerston's attitude was confirmed. On the 4th of July Palmerston told him that the British Government would "be delighted to hear of the conclusion of an armistice between the Contending Parties by whomsoever that Armistice may have been negotiated."²

On the 3rd of July Wynn was able to send Palmerston the armistice proposal agreed on in Malmö on the 2nd.³ On the same day he sent Westmorland a copy of his dispatch which "will tell you all I know of the Transactions at Malmoe as it seems from the first to have been determined that it should be entirely a *Scandinavian* Affair. My Russian Colleague is rather *sore* that neither he nor I were consulted. *Je ne leur tiens pas rancune*, and I am sure Lord P. will not and on the contrary will be very glad if it should give him an opportunity of getting out of the mediation; and I am almost inclined to think that the Parties should be more likely to come together alone than if Bunsen should act for the Confederation."⁴ On receiving Wynn's dispatch Palmerston requested him to express to the Danish Government Britain's genuine pleasure in learning of the Convention, and her hope that the conciliatory spirit would also bring about a final settlement.⁵

Bunsen was also able to report to Berlin that Palmerston was extremely satisfied with the result of Pourtalès' mission, and that there was exceptional pleasure in the City.⁶ Bunsen himself, who had not received full information from his Government, was certainly dissatisfied at having had no part in the armistice negotiations and was critical of the result.⁷

The Danish "placability" had shown itself especially in the fact that Denmark had agreed to a joint administration for both

¹ F.O. 22/163: 26/6, No. 89. – Cf. Haralds, p. 177.

² F.O. 22/160: 4/7.

³ F.O. 22/163: 3/7, No. 93. – Westmorland. I, p. 459.

⁴ Westmorland. I, p. 459.

⁵ F. O. 22/160: 11/7.

⁶ Bunsen's dispatch of 7/7, No. 24.

⁷ Bunsen's dispatch of 24/7, No. 30. – Berlin's dispatches of 22/6 and 8/7.

Duchies during the armistice – an idea which she hitherto had definitely opposed. This was expressed in Article 7 of the Convention which consisted of twelve articles.¹ It stated that the method of administration existing before the events of March was to be re-established during the armistice. The joint Government for the Duchies was to consist of five members, chosen from notables who commanded universal respect and confidence. It was not to have any legislative power, and was to administer according to the existing laws and ordinances in the name of the King of Denmark in his capacity as Duke of Slesvig and Holstein. Two members were to be chosen by the Danish King for Slesvig, and two by Prussia, in the name of the German Confederation, for Holstein. These four were to choose a fifth as Chairman, and if they could not agree on this, Britain as the mediating power would be asked to appoint him; he was to be chosen from the inhabitants of the Duchies. All those who had been members of the administration before the 17th of March, and all those who had since formed a Government – that was to say the Provisional Government – were excluded from being members of the new Government.

The first four articles of the Convention dealt with the length of the armistice: three months with one month's notice of termination, the positions which the armies might occupy at the notice of termination, the discontinuance of the Danish blockade and the liberation of prisoners-of-war and political prisoners. Article 5 stipulated the return of captured vessels, etc., and compensation for the requisitions in Jutland. In the following article the evacuation of the Duchies with their islands [Als!] by the Danish troops and the Confederate troops was stipulated. A few Danish troops would be allowed to remain on Als to guard hospitals, depots, etc., and a corresponding number of Confederate troops in Altona and other places where there were hospitals and military establishments.

Article 8 was very important and dealt with the troops allowed in the Duchies during the armistice at the disposal of the new Government: in Holstein the Confederate contingent reduced to a peace-time footing, and in Slesvig the cadres of the troops raised there, though not exceeding the usual peace-time number, and

¹ Brevskaber, p. 70 ff. – Actenstücke, p. 38 f.

these troops to have their cantonments as near their homes as possible. The remainder of the Slesvig and Holstein troops and the Free Corps formed by natives of the Duchies were to be discharged.

Article 9 stated that Denmark and Prussia were both to appoint a Commissioner to see that the provisions of the Convention were complied with, as well as to see that the law was enforced impartially for both Danish and German inhabitants. The following article stated that conditions in Lauenburg were to be the same as before the entry of the Confederate troops. Article 11 was to the effect that Denmark and Prussia would request Britain's guarantee for the Convention, and finally in the last article the two parties maintained the demands and rights which each of them had claimed; the Convention was not to prejudice the terms of the final peace settlement.

On the 3rd of July Westmorland had informed Wynn, who probably realised it beforehand, that Prussia definitely opposed Denmark's wish to separate the Governments of the two Duchies.¹ On the other hand, wrote Westmorland, Prussia would suggest "that the present Provisional Government should abdicate and the King-Duke should appoint Prince Ferdinand or any other of the Royal House as the Lieutenant Governor of the two Duchies and that a Commission to assist him should be named by the King-Duke excluding *Olshausen*, *Beseler*, and *Augustenburg*, on the other side *Schele* [*Scheel*] and his followers."

When Westmorland heard of the Armistice Convention he stated in a letter to Wynn² that "both countries have conceded nearly all the war was begun about – the cost in blood as in money, the derangement of commerce might all have been saved to Germany and nearly the same results obtained if the exertion to stop its armies on the Eider had met with success." He found, furthermore, as Wynn would have seen from his last letter, "that even more than has been gained by Denmark by the Armistice would have been agreed to here," especially the appointment of Prince Ferdinand.

Wynn obviously did not consider the appointment as a gain.³ In his reply of the 10th he wrote: "I sincerely hope that he [Schlein-

¹ Westmorland. I, p. 463.

² *Ibid.*, p. 483 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 495 ff.

itz] will throw over the *Provisional* Government and confirm what was agreed upon at Malmoe. His proposition for a Lieutenant Governor might be acceptable, but if there would be *difficulty* in finding seven Persons for a Government there would be an *impossibility* of finding a Member of the Royal Family *capable* of being Vice Roy or *Stadthalter*. The Royal Family consists unfortunately of one Person Prince Ferdinand and Schleinitz must know as well as I do that he is more distinguished at a *Faro-Board* than at one of Administration.”¹

When King Oscar’s Private Secretary, Manderström, who had gone with Pourtalès from Malmö to Berlin, had returned with the information that the Convention had met with approval there apart from a few minor changes, Wynn found the moment appropriate, the 11th, to congratulate Palmerston on the conclusion of an armistice.² The Danish public, however, he wrote, was not very pleased with it; the general opinion was that it ought to have been “as favorable to their wishes as if they had an overpowering army and every pecuniary resource.” He said that Knuth, even if he had originally belonged more or less to the Ultra-Danish Party, “has since seen the necessity of concession, and is now acting as he has from the beginning, an honest, conscientious part.”

In spite of his congratulations to Palmerston, Wynn realized, as appeared from his letters to Westmorland at the same time, that the difficulties were not over, and that the Provisional Government would not give way as a matter of course. “Other difficulties and impediments” would also arise if Bunsen were to continue to be a representative at the peace negotiations.

Westmorland had sent his congratulations to Palmerston earlier than Wynn. As early as the 6th of July he informed Palmerston that Pourtalès had returned the day before from Malmö with a draft for an armistice, “which will be agreed to by the Prussian Government and for the signature of which the orders will tomorrow be transmitted to General Wrangel.”³ He ended his dispatch by congratulating Palmerston warmly “on

¹ In his dispatch of 7(8)/7, No. 260, Westmorland wrote that Manderström did not consider the choice of Prince Ferdinand as President as a good one, but that he recommended Adolf Blome. F.O. 64/288.

² F.O. 22/163: 11/7, No. 98. – Cf. Westmorland. I, p. 499.

³ F.O. 64/288: 6/7, No. 258.

having so mainly contributed to bring about this most desirable object." He did not omit to emphasise "that no effort of mine has been wanting to give effect to Your able and unremitting exertions." Moreover he said in the dispatch that the only remark he had made on the draft to Bülow concerned Article 11. He had said that Palmerston could possibly "object to a direct guarantee on a question in which the interests of Britain were not immediately concerned."

The next day Westmorland had to report that the Provisional Government's envoy in Berlin, Schleiden, had launched a protest against the armistice (the various provisions of which, however, had not been communicated to him), and that Schleinitz expected opposition from Frankfurt, but that, nevertheless, he would "tomorrow transmit by Pourtalès the orders to Wrangel to sign it."¹ Pourtalès was sent on the 8th together with Count Münster, but Auerswald asked Schleiden to go with him to Rendsburg to introduce him there to the Provisional Government.² The Provisional Government did everything in their power to prevent the armistice being signed. A mission was sent to Wrangel and managed to get him to send a protest to Berlin, and then Reventlou-Preetz and Schleiden themselves went to Berlin, where late at night on the 12th they had a talk with Auerswald and Bülow. The result was that Auerswald approved, on the whole, the demand of the Provisional Government for important changes in the Convention, and gave Wrangel new orders.³ Reventlou-Preetz and Schleiden returned after their successful mission to Wrangel's headquarters, and there an estimation was made of the modifications to the Convention demanded by the Slesvig-Holsteiners. They concerned the important Articles 7 and 8, while it was desired to omit articles 9 and 10.

There was also one more demand and it was connected with developments in Frankfurt. As mentioned above, Archduke Johann of Austria had been appointed Regent there at the end of

¹ F.O. 64/288: 7/7, No. 260.

² Cf. Haralds, p. 194 ff.

³ Auerswald said in his dispatch of 13/7 to Bunsen that he had sent instructions that day by the returning courier to Wrangel to obtain the desired modifications directly from the Danish Cabinet, Pourtalès acting as intermediary. However, if their efforts were unsuccessful it was not to be considered sufficient reason for refusing to sign the armistice; but this was only to be concluded subject to the Regent's ratification.

June, and had taken up his duties on the 12th of July. The old Federal Diet had been dissolved. The authority which Prussia had from the Federal Diet to act on behalf of Germany in the Slesvig-Holstein question – an authority which it had certainly never waited to receive before acting – could then possibly be said to have expired. The Provisional Government, which was closely connected with the German revolution and the Frankfurt Assembly, then informed Auerswald that only when the new Central Power had approved of the proposals would it accept these.¹ Auerswald agreed to this, and Wrangel was ordered only to conclude an armistice subject to the Regent's ratification. In a letter of the 13th of July to Wynn, Westmorland remarked that the Prussian Government was alarmed at the discussion on the 10th in the Frankfurt Assembly about Slesvig-Holstein.² He added "when a Government like Prussia gives up the power of deciding upon points where its own interests are concerned it is very difficult to count upon the direction it may be driven into."

Schleinitz was spared taking part in this volte-face in Prussian politics. On the 8th of July he gave up his post as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and again took over his post as Minister in Hanover. Auerswald, the Prime Minister, who was also Foreign Minister, then had Bülow, who was Under-Secretary of State, to help him. During talks with Westmorland, Bülow stated that he made "his utmost endeavours" to have the Convention carried through, and that the important modifications which were demanded were trifles.³ Westmorland dutifully reported these views to Palmerston; presumably he had had no detailed information about the extent of the modifications, either.

After Wrangel had thus received from Berlin, if not full support, at least not a refusal of his own demands and those of the Provisional Government, there were poor prospects of a successful result of the forthcoming negotiations between Reedtze and Pourtalès, and Münster as well as representatives from the Commanders-in-Chief Hedemann and Wrangel. These negotiations

¹ EE. 16: draft for letter of 11/7 to Auerswald.

² Westmorland. I, p. 507. Frankfurt had received unofficial copies of the Convention, and at the meeting on the 10th impassioned attacks were made on Prussia. A. Stern, *op. cit.* I, p. 177.

³ F.O. 64/288: 13/7, No. 264; 15/7, No. 167; 17/7, No. 269; 20/7, No. 273; 24/7, No. 276.

took place on the 14th and 15th at Bellevue south of Kolding, when the German demands for modifications (Slesvig-Holstein's and Wrangel's) were put forward – modifications which the Danish Government were unable to agree to.¹ The negotiations were not broken off altogether as Reedtz, before returning to Copenhagen, arranged to meet Pourtalès again on the 19th.² Pourtalès, who was responsible for the Malmö Convention, undoubtedly endeavoured to reach a result at the negotiations. In his dispatch of the 17th concerning Wrangel's refusal to sign the Convention, Wynn mentioned that Reedtz remarked that while he found Count Münster "very arrogant and overbearing", Pourtalès was "as conciliating as he had been at Malmoe."³

On the 17th at the meeting of the Danish Council of State it was agreed to write to Hedemann to request Wrangel to sign the Convention as agreed by the two Governments.⁴ Reedtz was not to go to Kolding again.

Shortly after this meeting, however, Count Knuth was urgently requested by the Swedish Foreign Minister to re-open the negotiations and, if necessary, allow "less important" modifications.⁵ A message from the Swedish Minister in Berlin stating that the Prussian King had sent General Neumann to Wrangel with orders, prompted this request. Knuth went with the Prime Minister and the Minister for War to see the King at Frederiksborg – some of the other Ministers were also present – and it was decided to send Reedtz and General Oxholm to negotiate again with Wrangel. Lagerheim, who had been given full authority to negotiate by his Government, was also to go, and likewise Wynn, who "had offered to go." Wynn said that Knuth had expressed a wish for him to do so.⁶ The modifications that could be agreed to in an emergency were also decided upon.

During the new negotiations on the 19th at Bellevue, at which Lagerheim and Wynn then were present, the treaty draft was

¹ Krigen 1848–50. I, p. 1125 ff. – The dates given by Haralds, p. 192 ff. are both inaccurate and confused.

² According to Westmorland's dispatch of 17/7, No. 269. F.O. 64/288.

³ F.O. 22/163: 17/7, No. 99.

⁴ Statsrådets Forhandl. I, p. 383 f.

⁵ Statsrådets Forhandl. I, p. 387 ff. Haralds, p. 198, writes, "One last effort . . . was made by Denmark, whereby she tried to bring pressure to bear upon the mediating powers, Britain and Sweden," but this is none too correct and does not either agree with his own account on p. 199.

⁶ F.O. 22/163: 17/7, No. 101.

gone through, to see, as Wynn said in his report of the meeting to Palmerston, "what concessions could be made by each party."¹ The Prussians, however, were definitely opposed to the reduction and separation of the Slesvig-Holstein troops stipulated in Article 8. Wynn tried to mediate by putting forward a suggestion "such as the usual furlough after annual exercise," but Pourtalès would not agree to this, much less to the separation according to nationality (Slesvigiers and Holsteiners). Such was impossible, he said, "as they had been amalgamated with the object (tho' not avowed by him) of preventing the desertion of the Slesvigiers." Immediately after the discussion the Prussian negotiators wished to sign, "which the other Party totally objected to, as some of the Articles were in decided opposition to their Instructions, and tho' they took them *ad referendum* they could not advise their acceptance." The suspension of hostilities was prolonged until the 24th so that a final answer could be received from Copenhagen.

In his letter of the 23rd to Westmorland² about the fruitless negotiations, Wynn said that none of his suggestions concerning Article 8 were found acceptable "by the *vainqueurs* as Oriolla styled his Party tho' I could not help telling him that the Captains and Owners of Ships detained here would perhaps use another Epithet." He continued, "I could not help feeling sorry for Pourtalès, as it was evident how much the whole concern *lui répugnait* and how completely his hands were tied up by Wrangel."

It appeared from Reedtz's letter of the 19th to Count Knuth that he was more satisfied with the help given by Wynn than by Lagerheim at the negotiations.³ Lagerheim, he wrote, spoke "much about the unreasonableness of Wrangel's demands, though without using any threats at all." Wynn spoke less but expressed himself very definitely about the indignation Palmerston would feel at Prussia's behaviour.

Oxholm took with him to Copenhagen the proposal which the Prussian negotiators had declared themselves willing to sign.

¹ F.O. 22/163: 21/7, No. 102. – Westmorland. II, p. 5 ff.

² Westmorland. II, p. 17 ff. – Wynn mentions in the letter that by his mediation suggestions he had anticipated Westmorland's "suggestions" in the latter's letter of the 13th on how to get round the question of the Slesvig-Holstein troops.

³ Copy of letter in file U. Min. I.A. Dossiersager, alm. Krigen 1848–50. Diverse taken from other subject-groups 1958–59.

They insisted in the proposal that it was subject to the Archduke's ratification.¹ That meant that while Denmark would have committed herself, Germany had still a free hand. Besides, Denmark had not recognised the new German Central Power. In Article 2 dealing with the positions which the armies could occupy at the notice of termination of the armistice, a demand was made to change the date from the 27th of June to the 30th, as Wrangel could then occupy the country as far as the frontier with Jutland. The important changes concerned Articles 7 and 8. In Article 7 the introduction was omitted which stated that the method of administration should be as it was before the events in March. The statement that the new administrative authority should act according to "the existing laws and ordinances," in connection with the above introduction had, however, probably had to be interpreted in such a way that the laws, etc., promulgated by the Provisional Government were invalid during the armistice. When the introduction was deleted, the interpretation in any case was more a matter of dispute.² The composition of the new Government remained as before, but instead of stating as previously that the King appointed two members for Slesvig it now stated that he appointed two members in his capacity as Duke of Slesvig and Holstein!

Article 8 which dealt with the troops who could remain in the Duchies was completely changed, the newly formed Slesvig-Holstein army thus remaining intact. It had, however, to remain in Holstein (with Rendsburg), while Slesvig was to be occupied by three thousand Confederate troops. As a kind of compensation Denmark was allowed to have three thousand men on Als.

The modifications demanded were unacceptable to the Danish Government. On the 23rd of July Wynn reported to Palmerston that he had twice spoken to Knuth, the second time together with Lagerheim, but without being able to change "the strong opinion he expressed that nothing was to be done at Berlin or at Headquarters as long as a subsequent reference to the Assembly at Frankfort was required."³ Knuth asserted,

¹ Printed in *Brevskaber*, p. 78 ff. and *Actenstücker*, p. 40 ff. — Cf. *Haralds*, p. 200 ff.

² In a dispatch of 21/8, No. 310 Westmorland stated how Auerswald thought one could get round this intricate question. F.O. 64/289.

³ F.O. 22/163: 23/7, No. 103.

likewise, that the present organisation of rebel troops was dishonourable to the King.

War broke out again formally between Denmark and Germany on the 24th of July. However, there were no prospects of new armed clashes.¹ If the Prussians had again moved into Jutland Sweden, and probably Russia, would have been involved. If Denmark had taken military action she could have expected strong disapproval from the friendly powers.

There was one party, the Provisional Government, which was extremely satisfied with the rejection of the armistice. On the 26th of July it expressed its sincere thanks to Wrangel, as he had "determinedly" rejected the Danish terms (i.e. the Convention concluded between Denmark and Prussia!).² It expected that the German flag would soon be waving victoriously again in the enemy's country: "Denmark will then regret that she rejected reasonable offers, and Germany will, in all her might, enjoy the fruits of victory." The same day the Provisional Government expressed to Auerswald its heartfelt gratitude towards "Wrangel and the Royal Prussian Government" because Denmark's arrogant claims "were rejected, whereby the danger to Germany's honour as well as to her unity" was averted: "Not negotiations, but only an energetic continuation of the war can quickly and surely bring about the desired peace."

This was certainly not Berlin's view. On the 29th of July Schleiden wrote from there that Count Bülow was convinced that a war with Sweden would be followed by a war with Russia.³ He thought, continued Schleiden, that "Prussia has so disgraced herself at the recent negotiations that, in future, no one else will consider negotiating with her." "Had he been King he would have recalled Wrangel, because he takes it upon himself to send a report to the Regent, and in his letter to Stettin has expressed himself as if war and peace were dependent on him." In this letter sent to a firm in Stettin Wrangel had, it is true, expressed his regrets that the war had had regrettable consequences for trade, but, at the same time, he had said that "the honest Pomeranians, faithful to their beloved King," would surely not

¹ Cf. F.O. 22/163: 26/7, No. 106, and 31/7, No. 110.

² EE. 16.

³ EE. 5.

demand that he, Wrangel, should sign "a dishonourable armistice."¹

Schleiden also mentioned that Auerswald had said that the admission to the Frankfurt Assembly of deputies from Slesvig was considered by all European countries as an infringement of international law, and that he, Auerswald, cannot either deny that the Slesvig-Holstein cause and Germany's war has thereby become *unjust* (underlined by Schleiden).

Westmorland gave expression to his views on Wrangel's behaviour in one way in a letter to Wynn on the 27th of July.² He wrote, "It is very extraordinary particularly as he is a valuable officer and one who may do the King good service, but his military ambition has carried him too far. You have seen his letter to the Inhabitants of Stettin and to Frankfort and this explains to what length he will go. He characterizes the armistice settled by his Government and approved by the King as dishonourable." In his letter Westmorland mentioned that he had said to Bülow that the Prussian Government's decision about the Archduke's ratification was "the first step towards mediatizing Prussia." He stated furthermore that Bülow had requested him, through Wynn, to inform the Danish Government "that the Prussian Ministers are desirous they should not consider the negotiation as closed."

9. The Convention of the 26th of August.

The triumphal fanfares which the Provisional Government had sounded after the rejection of the Convention of the 2nd of July, re-echoed at the centre of the German revolution in Frankfurt. There, on the 31st, the Central Government informed the National Assembly that the armistice negotiations had been broken off, and that the necessary steps had been taken the previous day to reinforce Wrangel's army with troops from South Germany, and that the war would recommence. The Assembly expressed its whole-hearted approval.

¹ The letter of 16/7 is reproduced, among other places, in *Altonaer Mercur* 21/7, No. 269, and in *Berlingske Tidende* 26/7. Copy of it with Westmorland's dispatch of 24/7, No. 276. F.O. 64/288.

² Westmorland. II, p. 37. — Cf. Westmorland's dispatch of 24/7, No. 276. F.O. 64/288.

While Rendsburg revelled in dreams of victory and of again planting the German flag on Danish territory, the Prussian Government was occupied in giving assurances of its peaceful intentions, expressing its wish to reopen the negotiations, and explaining and justifying its action in not having carried into effect the convention which it had concluded.

The person who felt himself most offended was the King of Sweden, under whose active participation the Convention had been entered into. In a letter of the 23rd of July to d'Ohsson, intended to be submitted to the Prussian Foreign Minister, Stierneld expressed Sweden's surprise at Wrangel's "prétentions excessivement onéreuses pour le Danemarck," and at the demand for the Regent's ratification.¹ Sweden wished, the letter said, that Prussia for her part complied with the Convention which she had accepted, and that she withdrew from the war on Denmark's fulfilling her obligations towards her. If Prussia was unable to do this, Sweden threatened to tell the world about her behaviour!

Britain's reaction was strong enough – in words. On the 11th of July Palmerston had enjoined Westmorland to express to the Prussian Foreign Minister "the lively satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the spirit of conciliation manifested in this matter on this occasion by the Prussian Government."² However, on receiving word of Wrangel's refusal to sign the convention and of the fruitless negotiations at Kolding, there was no question of "satisfaction", let alone "lively satisfaction." On the 24th Bunsen informed Berlin³ that, the evening before last, Palmerston had said to him – and repeated it to Banks – that if the war broke out again "*England*" would dissolve her connections "*gänzlich und für immer von dem Vermittlungsgeschäft und das Weitere Russland überlassen wird.*" "We wash our hands of it." Bunsen, of course, gave his assurance that the war was unlikely to break out again, and asked Britain to continue as the mediating power. The next day Bunsen wrote that both Palmerston and John Russell had

¹ Actenstücke zur Schleswig-Holsteinischen Frage. Waffenstillstand von Malmö vom 26 Aug. 1848 (Ein Abdruck der amtlichen Ausgabe). Bremen 1848, p. 61 ff. – Stierneld's dispatch of 23/7 to d'Ohsson. Besk. i Berlin Arkiv, Riksarkivet. Stockholm. – Haralds' mention (p. 217) of the dispatch as of 24/7 can be due either to a printer's error, or to the fact that the dispatch had a letter enclosed, dated 23/7, but with a postscript of 24/7.

² F.O. 64/283: 11/7, No. 154.

³ Dispatch of 24/7, No. 30.

promised that Britain would do so as soon as the Convention was ratified.¹ The same evening in Parliament Palmerston replied to a question of Disraeli's by stating that he did not doubt that the armistice would be concluded.²

On the 25th Palmerston wrote to Westmorland, asking him to notify the Prussian Government of Britain's view,³ that Prussia "by having sent Count Pourtalès to Malmö for the purpose of negotiating an Armistice with the Plenipotentiaries of Sweden and Denmark, by having made alterations in that Armistice when it was submitted to them for approval, and by having then sent it to General Wrangel for signature have morally bound themselves to cause its stipulations to be fully carried into effect."

The same day a new dispatch was sent to Westmorland in consequence of his communication of the 17th stating that the negotiations had broken down, but that there was a chance of their being reopened on the 19th.⁴ Palmerston expressed the hope that the Prussian Government "will find itself able to settle this matter promptly and satisfactorily, and in a manner consistent with the arrangement which the Prussian Government had already agreed to." Otherwise Britain would have to withdraw from the negotiations "in which so many difficulties are constantly started on one side while so much conciliation has, of late at least, been evinced by the other." If both sides did not show "an equal desire . . . to come to a fair and satisfactory arrangement," it was not becoming for Britain to continue the mediation. On reading this appeal of Palmerston's one regrets that modern means of communication did not exist at that time, for the message did not reach Berlin until about a week after the meeting for which it was intended. The contents, however, nevertheless were not without importance.

As Westmorland had given a detailed report of Wrangel's behaviour in his dispatch of the 24th, Palmerston remarked that the Prussian Government "might prove its sincerity in this matter by recalling General Wrangel, and by appointing a more obedient and reasonable General in his Room."⁵ In consequence of West-

¹ 25/7, No. 32.

² Bunsen's dispatch of 26/7, No. 33.

³ F.O. 64/283: 25/7, No. 158.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 25/7, No. 159.

⁵ *Ibid.*: 31/7, No. 162.

morland's dispatch of the 26th reporting the breakdown of the negotiations and the many "explanations" given by Bülow and Pourtalès, Palmerston came straight to the point on the 4th of August¹ as follows; "I have to say to you that it is by Prussia and not by Denmark that the negotiation for the armistice . . . has been broken off, because it was the Prussian Government which after having agreed to and ratified certain Articles, broke away from its engagement and insisted as a *sine qua non* that Denmark should consent to other alterations which would have made the terms of the Armistice different in some material respect from the terms to which the Prussian Government had deliberately and formally assented." When the Prussian Government cast the blame on Wrangel, Palmerston remarked that "when a Government is acting with sincerity and good faith [and Pourtalès had maintained this] it recalls a General who refuses to obey a positive order to give effect to the Engagements which his Government has entered into." If the armistice was not signed quickly Prussia would of course have to "expect a renewal of the Blockade of its Ports and the Capture of its Vessels; and it must also lay its account with the sale of the Vessels which may have been and which may hereafter be captured."

Also John Russell was said in a conversation with the Prussian chargé d'affaires, Prince Löwenstein, to have expressed strong disapproval of Wrangel's behaviour.² Prussia would have to be careful, he said, not to force Britain to take the side of Denmark after asking her to mediate.

The Prussian Government had no intention of dismissing Wrangel. However, Bülow admitted later, it is true, to Westmorland that to make a possible arrangement easier "the most influential persons forming the Staff of General Wrangel have been changed[!]."³

The Prussian Government stated, as mentioned above, that the chief reason for repudiating the ratified Convention was the

¹ F.O. 64/283: 4/8, No. 166. – The Queen was dissatisfied with the firm language in the dispatch which Palmerston justified by stating "that it is highly important with a view to prevent extensive Embarrassments that the Prussian Government should be strongly pressed to adhere to the armistice to which it had itself consented." R.A.W. I 7/7.

² Van de Weyer's dispatch of 29/7, No. 411.

³ F.O. 64/289: 9/8, No. 298.

new situation in Frankfurt.¹ At the same time it tried, as also mentioned above, to minimize the modifications to the Convention demanded by Prussia at the negotiations at Bellevue. They were characterized, as can be seen in Westmorland's dispatches, as "minor points," "trifling differences," or "some trifling alterations."² Both Auerswald and Bülow expressed their hopes to the British Minister that Palmerston "would not consider them as responsible for the failure of the negotiation." Who then was responsible? Frankfurt?

On the 25th of July Palmerston had sent dispatches to Orme, Britain's chargé d'affaires in Frankfurt, similar to those sent to Westmorland.³ Orme approached A. v. Schmerling, who at that time was head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the new Central Government, but with no result.⁴ Schmerling said that the Central Government was not bound to approve the treaty concluded by Prussia, but "adopted the principal amendments proposed by General Wrangel as indispensable for the basis of any future Armistice." He referred furthermore to the mood of the German press and the National Assembly. Orme informed Palmerston that he considered it useless at present to approach again "a Ministry imperfectly formed like the present."

At the end of July Palmerston, as mentioned above (p. 30 f.), sent Cowley as Britain's envoy to Frankfurt. He was – like the Court – favourably disposed towards the German movements for unity and liberty. He was characterized by Bunsen as "the noblest British diplomat and the best Wellesley [he was a nephew of the Duke of Wellington]. He is as German as I am."⁵ His instructions were favourably disposed towards the efforts being made at Frankfurt, apart from the statements on the Slesvig-Holstein question. He was, as regards this question, enjoined to make earnest recommendations to Frankfurt to sanction the armistice between Prussia and Denmark without "further delay" – if such sanction were necessary. "It is obvious," the instructions continued, "that a prolongation of hostilities in the Duchies

¹ F.O. 64/292: 3/8 from Löwenstein.

² F.O. 64/288: 26/7, No. 278; 27/7, No. 279, and 31/7, No. 286.

³ F.O. 30/103: 25/7, No. 13.

⁴ F.O. 30/104: 1/8, No. 55.

⁵ Bunsen. II, p. 440. – See also Bunsen's dispatch of 24/7, No. 31.

cannot fail to lead to serious and extensive Embarrassment." Cowley arrived at Frankfurt on the evening of the 2nd of August.¹

While Palmerston used strong language in Berlin and Frankfurt, he urged Denmark to maintain her conciliatory attitude and not to allow her troops "to advance beyond the frontier of Jutland while the Negotiations are pending."² All the Danish appeals for more action in favour of our cause were lost on him; he stated that there was still a possibility of a result through negotiations.³ Rud. Bielke, our Secretary at the Legation in London, wrote to Count Knuth: "Prussia's recent behaviour has, of course, increased sympathy for us, but whether it will lead to action depends on the Government's view of what serves Britain's interests best, and it must be admitted that "to keep out of the broil" is the general wish which will be followed as long as possible."⁴

Palmerston's expectations of a result through negotiations were based, as regards realpolitik, on his knowledge of Prussia's fear of Russia's action on behalf of Denmark. According to Reventlow he said to Bunsen that if Germany continued in this manner he would hand over the whole of his task to Russia, whereupon Bunsen made profuse promises on Prussia's behalf (Cf. above).⁵ Bloomfield's dispatches from St. Petersburg gave Palmerston a strong impression that Russia would not be – as he was – content with words.⁶ Bloomfield reported on the 30th of July that the Tsar would "never consent to Denmark's being forced to sign an ignominious peace," however painful it would be for him to be involved in a war with Prussia. When Bloomfield heard of Palmerston's orders of the 25th of July to Berlin, Copenhagen and Frankfurt, stating that he might possibly give up the mediation, he wrote to Palmerston – to warn him I believe: the Russian Government "will not fail to avail themselves of so favorable an opportunity for endeavouring to increase their influence with the other Powers of the Baltic, which is already only too well established, by taking the lead in the conduct of a negotiation for the settlement of a question which so peculiarly

¹ F.O. 30/109: 3/8, No. 1.

² F.O. 22/160: 25/7.

³ Reventlow's dispatches of 25/7, No. 60; 28/7, No. 61; 1/8, No. 62; 4/8, No. 63.

⁴ Letter of 1/8, enclosed with dispatch of 1/8, No. 62.

⁵ Reventlow's dispatch of 4/8, No. 63.

⁶ F.O. 65/350: 26/7, No. 218; 30/7, No. 223, and 8/8, No. 234.

effects the interests and national prejudices not only of Sweden and Denmark but of Russia Herself." That liberal Britain and conservative Russia had completely different opinions about Frankfurt was due not only to ideology but *realpolitik*. Nesselrode preferred, wrote Bloomfield, a divided Germany to "one great and powerful Empire," and he "considers the project of German unity to be a mad and impracticable scheme."¹

Bunsen had, as mentioned above, suggested to Palmerston that there was a possibility that Revolutionary Germany could seek refuge in the arms of Revolutionary France if Conservative Russia began to take liberties. As regards the Slesvig-Holstein question this possibility was cut off in the course of the summer. In June Denmark entered into official diplomatic relations with the French Republic, and in the last half of July France was approached for help on the plea of the Treaty of Guarantee for Slesvig of 1720. The French Government replied that it fully abided by this Treaty.²

As has been seen, Prussia laid most of the blame for the failure of the armistice on Frankfurt. A dispatch of the 28th of July, of which Palmerston received a copy, stated that Prussia had not anticipated any difficulties with the Central Power, but these had nevertheless arisen.³ However, yesterday (the 27th), Major General Below had been sent to Vienna, where the Regent was in residence, to obtain the necessary authority. It was hoped to obtain this within a few days. If it was not received, Prussia would have to act on her own judgment. Auerswald expected that Britain would understand Prussia's position and her peaceful intentions.

Prussia's hope of obtaining full authority from Archduke Johann by going to see him in Vienna, where he was not under the influence of Frankfurt, was not realised.⁴ Westmorland had rightly predicted that the Regent would consult the responsible Ministers at Frankfurt.⁵ Only after Johann's return to Frankfurt was the authority granted on the 7th.⁶ The Prussian Government

¹ F.O. 65/350: 1/8, No. 228.

² Thorsøe, p. 359 ff. — Cf. Haralds, p. 222 f.

³ F.O. 64/292: Löwenstein to Palmerston 3/8. — Dispatch of 28/7 to Bunsen.

⁴ Cf. Haralds, p. 209 ff.

⁵ F.O. 64/288: 27/7, No. 279, and 31/7, No. 286.

⁶ Actenstücke, p. 53 f. — Brevskaber, p. 88 f.

had given Below a detailed statement of reasons for its request.¹ I can mention from this statement that it wished to proceed with the new negotiations not on the basis of the Malmö Convention, but on the basis of the Bellevue draft and to maintain the latter's essential features. The Regent's authority naturally adopted this basis and added three more terms: 1. that the members of the new administration be chosen before the conclusion of the armistice; 2. that by the laws and ordinances mentioned in Article 7 was to be understood all those promulgated before the armistice; 3. that all the troops who were to remain in the Duchies should be under the command of the German Commander-in-Chief. The intention of the first term was, of course, that the new administration should consist of Slesvig-Holsteiners, and of the second that all the measures of the Insurrectionary Government should remain valid.

Two days later the Reichsministerium made out orders for Max v. Gagern, the Under-Secretary of State.² He was to go first to Berlin to negotiate there about members for the new Government, then to the Duchies to negotiate about the same matter with the Provisional Government and Prussia's negotiator. Furthermore he was given the task of concluding peace preliminaries with Denmark if a suitable occasion arose, and of notifying the Danish Government of the Regent's accession. None of these questions arose.

As mentioned above, Lord Cowley arrived at Frankfurt on the 2nd of August. He was, then, present pending the negotiations about Prussia's new authority, but he scarcely influenced these negotiations, and he had also first to acquire some knowledge of the leading men in Frankfurt. His opinion of these people is obvious from statements in letters to Westmorland, e. g. he says of the Government "if Ministers they can be called" and "I never met with such a set of impracticable men as these are here. They will listen to nothing but their own wild theories."³ On the 4th of August Cowley had a talk with Schmerling as he had been directed to recommend the Central Government to sanction the armistice.⁴ By refusing to do this, he said, it had placed itself

¹ Actenstücke, p. 46 ff.

² Ibid., p. 54.

³ Westmorland. II, p. 117 ff. and p. 121 ff.

⁴ F.O. 30/109: 4/8, No. 6.

“in a very false position, for it could not be forgotten in Europe, that the King of Prussia had been authorized by the Diet to carry on the negotiations for the settlement of the question and that therefore whatever His Majesty had agreed to, was morally binding on the Central Government.” Cowley did not receive any promise from Schmerling that the armistice would be signed, but was assured that the Central Government wished a peaceful solution – although a few days earlier in the National Assembly Schmerling had announced “the resumption of hostilities.”

During the next few days Cowley spoke to various influential people, among others Baron Stockmar, and recommended that the Central Government should sanction Prussia’s consent to the armistice and not propose new modifications.¹ I did it, Cowley wrote to Palmerston, not in the hope that my views would be accepted, but with the intention of making “the propositions to be made, as little objectionable as possible.”

Cowley received a copy of the authority with the terms late in the evening of the 7th, and the next day he sent a translation of it to both Palmerston and Westmorland.² To both he expressed his doubts that Denmark would accept the third term. He remarked besides to Westmorland that he did not know what had happened at Bellevue on the 19th of July: “It is too bad of the Foreign Office not sending one such papers as those.”

On the 9th he received from Max v. Gagern a copy of his instructions.³ They showed, he wrote, “the intention to circumscribe as much as possible the free action of Prussia.” He spoke to Gagern before he left and recommended moderation, but he received the usual answer: “The honor of Germany . . . It is in vain, My Lord, to tell them that Denmark has her feelings of honor also, but that when once a third Power is called in to mediate, the honor of the two first merges in the last, and that there is no dishonor in accepting what the third proposes.”

In his dispatch of the 12th Cowley mentioned a talk with Camphausen about “the modifications,” which Camphausen asserted he had done everything he could to oppose.⁴ Camphausen believed that Britain could force Denmark to accept these.

¹ F.O. 30/109: 7/8.

² *Ibid.*: 8/8, No. 21. – Westmorland. II, p. 121 ff.

³ F.O. 30/109: 9/8, No. 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 12/8, No. 28.

Cowley answered this by saying that although Palmerston "would lament the fresh conditions sent to Berlin, you would yet do all in your power by council and advice to induce the Danish Government to listen to them," but would be unlikely to use threats or support suggestions to solve the problem entirely in Germany's "own way."

On receiving Cowley's communication of the 3rd, telling him about the Central Government's orders for sending reinforcements to Wrangel, Palmerston wrote: You must make it clear to the Central Government and to members of the Assembly "that if a General War in Europe is their object they are setting to work the right way to arrive at their End."¹ This sarcastic remark was, however, scarcely sufficient to frighten the Republicans, a party which, according to Cowley, "would embroil Germany, nay, all Europe in a war for their own purposes."²

Cowley's above-mentioned assurance to Camphausen that Palmerston would no doubt strongly advise the Danish Government to consider "the modifications," was not confirmed by the dispatch sent to him by Palmerston on the 14th on receiving the copy of the authority.³ The dispatch stated that the British Government is "not able to say how far the Danish Government may or may not be willing to consent to the further Modifications No. 1 and No. 2." No. 1 would, however, mean an unnecessary postponement of the conclusion of the armistice, and No. 3 is directly at variance with the fundamental principle on which the British armistice proposal was based. This was to the effect "that the Duchies should be evacuated by the troops of the Contending Parties, that the Insurrectionary Government should cease to exist, that a new Provisional Government should be established, the Members of which should be named in equal numbers by each of the two Parties, and that this Provisional Government, being charged with the Administration of the Provinces during the Armistice should appoint and maintain under its own command such a Force of Police as might be necessary to preserve order within the Duchies." The Frankfurt proposal was quite incompatible with the principle in the proposal which Britain

¹ F.O. 30/107: 8/8, No. 9.

² F.O. 30/109: 7/8.

³ F.O. 30/107: 14/8, No. 19. — See also Löwenstein's dispatch 12/8, No. 47.

considered "fair and just between the Parties;" it was impossible for the British Government "to take any steps in order to advise the Danish Government to submit to such Terms."

Furthermore, the dispatch directed Cowley in consequence of his report about the feelings on this matter at Frankfurt to stress earnestly in his talks with leading men "that a perseverance in their Views for the Annexation of Slesvig to the Confederation against the Will of the Sovereign of that Duchy will probably lead Germany into a serious War." He was also to draw Frankfurt's attention to Britain's Guarantee of 1720. The dispatch ended by saying that if Britain were to continue the mediation the negotiations were to take place only in London; Denmark would almost certainly not negotiate either at Frankfurt, where "a spirit prevails so hostile to Denmark."

As a result of this dispatch and of information from Wynn of the impossibility of getting Denmark to accept the modifications Cowley again approached the Reichsministerium.¹ His efforts were unsuccessful, and Cowley had possibly considered them useless beforehand. The Ministers here, he wrote, are so afraid of public feeling "that they are prepared to run all the chances of war rather than accept the conditions of Malmœ." But as Britain's chief aim was peace, Cowley thought that it was evidently better to bring some pressure to bear on Denmark. Threats would have no effect at Frankfurt and France's menacing attitude was only irritating.

When Heckscher declared to Cowley that the Central Government had no intention of considering Slesvig as a part of the German Confederation, Cowley asked him why deputies from Slesvig had seats in the Frankfurt Parliament. He received no reply to this question. The election of these deputies had been a grotesque farce, at least in Mid and North Slesvig.²

A formal state of war had again commenced on the 24th of July. There was not, however, any prospect of fresh hostile encounters. On the 26th of July Wynn informed Palmerston that he had with pleasure been informed by Oxholm "that there is no danger of a repetition of what occurred at Sundevit."³ On the

¹ F.O. 30/109: 21/8, No. 49, and 28/8, No. 58.

² Hjelholt. I, p. 119 ff.

³ F.O. 22/163: 26/7, No. 106.

31st of July he wrote that Knuth had assured him that there would be no attack by the army in Jutland or on German ports "as long as there was a possibility of Prussia taking a decided and separate line, or of there being any other prospect of a pacific arrangement."¹ On the other hand it was intended to proceed to a blockade of the Elbe and the Weser, but not until the 15th of August.²

As to Prussia, Bülow on the 27th of July assured Westmorland that Wrangel would receive orders "not to engage in any hostilities, which he might be able to prevent, and in no case, even if he should receive orders to that effect from Frankfort to allow a single Prussian Soldier to pass into Jutland."³ After Below had returned from his mission to the Archduke at Vienna, he stated that the latter had sent orders to Wrangel "not to cross the frontier of Jutland nor to recommence hostilities."⁴ A crossing of the Jutland frontier would have given rise to a general war.

Whereas Wynn officially complained of and warned against the Danish declaration of blockade⁵ – he found it "ill-timed and calculated to produce irritation" – he wrote in a private letter to Westmorland: "It will be a great blow to our Commerce but we cannot feel or express any surprise at their using the arms they have in their Power."⁶ Wynn's master did not express any aversion to the Danish declaration of blockade. On the contrary, he stated that the Danish Government's decision was "not unnatural and that however such a measure might be regretted as productive of general inconvenience to the commerce of Europe no blame could justly fall on the Danish Government for having recourse to it."⁷

From London Reventlow wrote on the 4th of August that Disraeli's advice was to declare a blockade "and not to study any more the interests of the English merchants, as you have done hitherto; it was good policy then, but now it would do more effect

¹ F.O. 22/163: 31/7, No. 110.

² The communication about a possible extension of the blockade was given by an Order of the Ministry for Naval Affairs of the 7th of August. *Krigen 1848–50*. I, p. 1216.

³ F.O. 64/288: 27/7, No. 279.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 31/7, No. 286.

⁵ F.O. 22/163: 2/8, No. 112, and 4/8, No. 113.

⁶ Westmorland. II, p. 65 ff.

⁷ F.O. 22/161: 8/8.

to enforce the blockade." Disraeli was presumably thinking especially on the effect the blockade would have on Palmerston as a prompting to obtain a result of the mediation. It was in fact of great importance because the Prussian ports on the Baltic, which suffered greatly by it, appealed to their Government to have peace restored. This point was strongly emphasized in Auerswald's application to the Archduke for new credentials.

After the Malmö Convention had failed owing to the resistance of the Provisional Government, the Federal Diet, and Wrangel, the Prussian Government had to contemplate what attitude to adopt. It was understandable that it recalled Bunsen from London in order to consult with him. Furthermore, he had obviously been considered as future Foreign Minister of the German Confederacy at Frankfurt. It appears from several statements by Bunsen himself that he already in his mind's eye saw himself as such, placed before the greatest task of his life, establishing the foreign policy of the new powerful Germany. Before Cowley towards the end of July left London in order to go to Frankfurt, he had thus, as he informed Palmerston,¹ a conversation with Bunsen, who in detail mentioned the future conditions of Germany "and told me that it was very probable that I should meet him at Frankfurt as Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Confederation."

How close the relationship between the Prussian Minister and the Queen's Consort was, appears from the letter of the 26th of July in which Bunsen informed Prince Albert that he has been summoned to Berlin, and in which he – it may be said – assumed that Albert during his (Bunsen's) absence would look after German interests.²

My foreign policy, he wrote, will aim at a close relationship with England, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland. As to the Danish affairs, he hoped – but wrongly – that the ratification of the Malmö Agreement had taken place: There was no choice, but it was a *great mistake* to take the affair out of our hands! (uns die Sache aus den Händen zu nehmen!). "Ich hatte ja, nicht allein die (sehr günstige) Basis des *Friedens*, sondern auch die Zusage Dänemarks, sie *anzunehmen*, und nun muss man vor

¹ Cowley to Palmerston 28/7. P.P.

² R.A.W. I 6/53.

Deutschland treten, ohne alle Garantie für die Zukunft!" Therefore Bunsen had, indeed, he wrote, made Russell and Palmerston definitely promise that the mediation of England would remain in force if the ratification took place now, and Denmark thus was forced to choose one or the other solution [in the British proposal].

Palmerston, indeed, Bunsen continued, had mentioned that the present endeavours of Denmark aimed at having as basis the independence of the Duchies, with special assemblies. Bunsen characterized these endeavours as absurd. "Only a united Parliament offers the guarantee demanded by the Duchies and Germany." Palmerston's proposal was "ingenious and good, if interpreted as I (and he, too) interprets it. But he must stick to it. Therefore, I set my hopes on Your Royal Highness; for otherwise the difference might after a fortnight or so seem insignificant to him."

Bunsen arrived at Berlin on the 31st of July.¹ He was requested by Auerswald the next day to draw up partly a report on the attitude of Britain towards the Danish (Slesvig-Holstein) question, partly a report on her attitude towards the diplomatic relation to the Regent.² His reply to the former question was that England from Prussia demanded unconditional ratification of the Armistice Proposal. England wanted to have peace restored, partly for the sake of her commercial interests, partly for fear of a general war. This view of the Government was still more harboured by the "decidedly pro-Danish Tories." The press and public opinion in general laid the blame on Germany for the fact that the Convention was not ratified.

In the morning of the 3rd of August Bunsen had a conversation for several hours with Schleiden, the Envoy of the Provisional Government.³ The result of this was to Schleiden the rather dismal one that a division of Slesvig must be accepted or a civil war in Germany could be risked. Naturally Bunsen declared Count Pourtalès's mission to Malmö a great blunder, "which had essentially contributed to aggravating our cause as England for this reason had felt violated." Bunsen judged the negotiations at Malmö very strictly. At the latest conference he had had with

¹ EE. 5: letter from Schleiden 1/8. – Bunsen. II, p. 427 ff.

² Bunsen. II, p. 453 ff. – Bunsen's memorandum 3/8.

³ EE. 5: letter of 3/8 from Schleiden.

Palmerston, the latter had stated that if the armistice did not come off now, England would send a fleet into the Baltic in order to support Russia's efforts for making peace. France was also convinced of Germany being wrong. If the Regent refused to give authority to Prussia, this country would withdraw her troops from the Duchies and make peace herself. — Bunsen's statements about the intentions of the Prussian Government were based on conversations with the members of the Cabinet and with Frederick William IV, with whom he was personally closely associated. With or without Frankfurt he wanted to make an end of the war against Denmark, the King said to him in a conversation the following day.¹

In a later conversation, on the 6th of August, with Schleiden, Bunsen stated that Palmerston to him regarding the second alternative of his peace proposal had maintained orally and in writing that this was aimed at community of the constitution of the Duchies and the complete independence of Denmark of the Slesvig-Holstein Parliament.² Schleiden for that matter in another letter mentioned that Schleinitz, who had been summoned from Hanover in order to make a statement about the affair, said about Bunsen that he painted in strong colours and on the whole was not quite reliable (*überall nicht ganz zuverlässig*).³

The credentials which Below brought home to Berlin with him from Frankfurt, were, indeed, far from being according to the wishes of the Prussian Government. Bülow had said to Westmorland that if the authority was not unlimited, he considered it best to return it to Frankfurt.⁴ When it appeared that it contained conditions, he was at first alarmed at it.⁵ To Westmorland he later expressed a hope that "they might not upon mature reflection be objected to by the Danish Government and at any rate he felt that they might be modified by the Prussian negotiator so as not to prevent the successful termination of the negotiation." He tried to explain the comparatively innocent character of the conditions and hoped that they "may not have the embarrassing effect he at first apprehended." Perhaps, he said, they would deviate from them.

¹ Bunsen. II, p. 458.

² EE. 5: letter of 6/8 from Schleiden.

³ EE. 5: 5/8.

⁴ F.O. 64/289: 9/8, No. 298.

⁵ Ibid.: 10/8, No. 301.

Orally as well as in writing, in letter of the 9th, Bülow requested Westmorland through Wynn to suggest to the Danish Government to send a negotiator to Malmö. On her part Prussia would do so, as she had now from the Regent received the authority with the desired modifications of the Bellevue proposal of the 19th of July. The Prussian Government, it said in Bülow's letter, in this way gives "une nouvelle preuve de ses intentions pacifiques[!]."

The next day Westmorland received a letter from Bunsen,¹ who at Sanssouci had been with Auerswald, who had asked him to inform Westmorland of "the decision we[!] have come to as to the Danish Armistice." However, he saw that Bülow had already done so, for which reason he would only add "that I rely entirely upon your and Sir H. Wynn's good offices at Copenhagen, in order to bring the matter to a final issue." Contrary to fact he continued, "The *only real* difficulty (as the Swedish plenipotentiaries also declare most positively) was the reserve of the ratification. This *is* removed. What we have to propose is, upon my sincere conviction, founded in equity, and imposed upon us by the impossibility of otherwise carrying into effect the agreement."

In accordance with Bülow's request Westmorland immediately wrote to Wynn that the negotiations now could be – and ought to be – resumed.² As to the "modifications" he expressed a hope that "they may not seriously embarrass the negotiation." He reported in detail what Bülow had said about the three conditions, also that Bülow was "ready to enter into discussion with regard to them, and (confidentially he has stated) into some modification of them." Westmorland hoped that Wynn "might modify any unpleasant feeling which might be raised against them, because I am persuaded that this Government is now most anxious to conclude the Armistice, and if the present opportunity is lost, I do not see a chance of another." The Prussian Government was, ended Westmorland, determined "to maintain what their Plenipotentiaries will sign. I therefore hope, with your exertions, this negotiation may now be carried to a successful issue."

Bülow had at first intended to send the Prussian Minister at the Holy See, Guido v. Usedom, to Malmö.³ As he refused,

¹ Westmorland. II, p. 139 ff.

² Ibid. II, p. 153 ff.

³ F.O. 64/289: 10/8, No. 301. – Westmorland. II, p. 157 f.

Bülow wanted to send Dönhoff, who, however, also wanted to be excused from the task. So it was Below who together with Wildenbruch went to Malmö, where they arrived on the 14th of August. Before Below left, Bülow's "last verbal instruction" to him was "that he ought not to hesitate to take responsibility upon himself, and unless what he considered an insuperable obstacle was opposed to him that he must conclude the armistice."¹ When the Berlin Government asked its Minister in London to inform England of Below's mission, it was pointed out that the negotiations at Malmö were due to the wish for obtaining a more speedy armistice, but that Prussia counted on England's mediation for the conclusion of the final peace.²

Under the presidency of King Oscar and Baron Stierneld the negotiations about an armistice were opened again at Malmö.³ The Danish participant was our competent Minister at Stockholm, Chr. Hoyer Bille, who arrived at Malmö on the 16th and who during the whole of the following day negotiated with Below, Stierneld acting as leader or "person present." During these negotiations Below's first proposal, mainly the Bellevue draft, was modified somewhat, and with this second proposal of Below's Bille on the 18th went to Copenhagen. There he was on the 19th instructed only to negotiate on the basis of the Convention of the 2nd of July, which Prussia had already once approved of, and which from Danish quarters had only most reluctantly been accepted. Indeed, it involved joint administration of Slesvig and Holstein! On the 20th Bille returned to Malmö.

The same day Sir Henry Wynn went to Malmö, as Stierneld on the 19th had requested him to assist at the Conference in order to bring the parties closer together.⁴

In one of his dispatches Cowley reported a Slesvig-Holstein statement that as long as Great Britain was represented "at Copenhagen and at Berlin by two such violent partisans as Sir Henry Wynn and Mr. Howard, there was no chance of any terms being accepted by the Danes."⁵ As is well-known, Mr. Howard was not

¹ F.O. 64/289: 14/8, No. 305.

² Dispatch of 15/8 to Bunsen.

³ Cf. Haralds, p. 221 ff., and Krigen 1848-50. I, p. 1228 ff. - Brevskaber, p. 90 ff.

⁴ F.O. 22/163: 20/8, No. 120. - Westmorland. II, p. 177 ff.

⁵ F.O. 30/109: 28/8, No. 59. - In a dispatch of the 4/9, F.O. 30/107, Palmerston sharply repudiated this statement and furthermore remarked that if any

Great Britain's Minister at Berlin, but her chargé d'affaires. Wynn in his dispatches gave an account of the Danish points of view, and so did Westmorland and Cowley as regards the views of Berlin and Frankfurt, respectively. But to how high a degree did Wynn advocate them, and was he ever in doing his duties in any way opposed to his chief, Palmerston, or omitted following the lines laid down by him?

In a dispatch of the 9th of August Wynn reported a conversation with Knuth in which the latter informed him of the steps taken by the Danish Government as regards France (cf. p. 185) in order to obtain her support in the conflict with Germany.¹ My Russian colleague, wrote Wynn, seems "jealous of any intervention on the part of France, and has, without having received any instructions on the subject, represented to Count Knuth, that any approximation to that Government would rather impede than facilitate a desired arrangement." I have, remarked Wynn, ventured to say that you would not see things from this point of view, especially as Bastide (Jules Bastide, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs) had stated that his Government's wish was to act in complete agreement with Great Britain.

Wynn expressed his satisfaction with Bastide's conduct in a letter of the next day to Westmorland.² "I was much pleased with Bastide's language," he wrote, "if the other great Powers would hold the same, matters would soon be settled and I am sure that my friends here would not object *to be dictated to* as to the Terms and by the necessity of submission defend themselves *and their places* against the extravagant ideas which a little success or support occasions in the public."

On the 14th of August Wynn sent another dispatch to Palmerston, and at the same time he wrote a rather long letter to Westmorland.³ The day before he had from Cowley heard that at Frankfurt they demanded modifications which Cowley did not mention in detail, but characterized as "not of importance." So they had to be, he wrote to Westmorland, "in every sense of the word to render them acceptable here." Somewhat in contrast

persons precluded a friendly arrangement, this would amongst others apply to Max Gagern!

¹ F.O. 22/163: 9/8, No. 114.

² Westmorland. II, p. 147 ff.

³ F.O. 22/163: 14/8, No. 118. — Westmorland. II, p. 161 ff.

to what he had written some days before about the conduct of France, he now in both letters expressed anxiety that France should make the Danish Government less willing to negotiate. But, he wrote in the dispatch to Palmerston, Oxholm had promised him to try to influence the King as well as the Ministers to agree to "any moderate concessions." Wynn furthermore mentioned as Oxholm's view that as Sweden had now taken over the mediation[!], Britain, Russia, and France might "assume a more decided character, and with a view of avoiding the danger of a general war dictate such terms as they consider ought to be accepted by both Parties." Wynn thought that this would be most pleasant to most Danish Ministers, who in this way would be able to defend a possible compliance "against the extravagant ideas of the Public."

About the Danish Government's distrust of Prussia's actual intentions regarding the resumption of negotiations, it was said in the dispatch: "I am sorry that notwithstanding all my Collegues and myself can say to the contrary, there still exists in His Danish Majesty's Council great mistrust of the real intentions of Prussia, and a belief that General Wrangel acted more in compliance with, than in opposition to, his Sovereign's orders in refusing to sign the convention."

Having obtained knowledge of Below's proposal (the Bellevue draft plus modifications) Wynn on the 16th of August wrote to Palmerston that Denmark might have expected more favorable conditions than those of Bellevue, but on the contrary had been faced with more onerous ones.¹ Wynn highly criticized these and mentioned that Knuth pinned his faith on a joint action of the four powers, only. To Westmorland he wrote that the negotiators would have an "*utterly hopeless Task* . . . unless those from Prussia are empowered to make concessions on what was demanded at Colding, and *might then have been signed*.[?]² It would be useless for me to attempt to persuade an adoption of them and this impossibility is equally felt in Sweden."

From his dispatch of the 14th of August to Cowley we have already seen (p. 188) that Palmerston did not either find Prussia's proposal acceptable to Denmark. The following day he sent a

¹ F.O. 22/163: 16/8, No. 119.

² Westmorland. II, p. 165 ff.

copy of this dispatch to Wynn, who received it in the morning of the 19th of August.¹ At the same time Knuth must have received Reventlow's dispatch of the 15th of somewhat similar contents. Reventlow wrote that Palmerston about the three conditions had said that Denmark must be able to accept the first. He did not understand the second, and he found the third to be inadmissible. When Reventlow explained the meaning of the second term, Palmerston declared that he also considered this term "inadmissible." This was his view before he had seen the criticism in Wynn's dispatch of the 16th of August. He communicated this to Bunsen, who on the 19th had returned to London. Bunsen's remarks will be quoted below, although they had no influence on the negotiations at Malmö.²

Before Wynn on the 20th of August went to Malmö, he could inform Palmerston of the new proposals made by Below in connexion with Articles 6 and 7.³ Palmerston, he remarked, would see that the proposal referring to Article 6 contained much concerning the Holstein troops "which is perfectly inadmissible." The reference was to the fact that the proposal aimed at a maintenance of the Insurgent Army, even though it was removed to Holstein.

There are two reports from Wynn⁴ concerning his participation in the negotiations at Malmö. One is a letter to Westmorland, written on the 21st of August from Malmö, the other a dispatch to Palmerston of the 23rd, written after he on the 22nd had returned to Copenhagen.

In the letter Wynn wrote that he had come to Malmö yesterday on King Oskar's invitation and had been "till late last night in almost constant Conference either with the King or with Stierneld and General Below." Below was "a most conciliatory negotiator," but unfortunately instructed both from Frankfurt and Berlin. It was also unfortunate that "my friends the Danes" had been encouraged by Palmerston's oral declaration to Reventlow, "confirmed in his Dispatch to Lord Cowley,"⁵ and by the

¹ F.O. 22/161. – Lagerheim's dispatch of 19/8, No. 130 b, to Stierneld. Riksarkivet, Stockholm. – Haralds, p. 227.

² F.O. 64/292: [22/8].

³ F.O. 22/163: 20/8, No. 120.

⁴ Westmorland. II, p. 177 ff. – F.O. 22/163: 23/8, No. 125.

⁵ According to dispatch of 26/8 to Bunsen from Berlin, Denmark's "obstinacy" was due to Palmerston's dispatch to Wynn, i. e. the one in which the copy of the dispatch to Cowley was included.

declarations of France. Wynn doubted "whether our last night's *redaction* which ought to satisfy both Parties will satisfy *either*." He then offered some remarks on the negotiations concerning the specially disputed Articles 6, 7, and 9 (the last one about Lauenburg). They show his eagerness to draw up the articles in such a way that they would be acceptable to both parties.

On the 23rd of August he wrote to Palmerston: He had during the two days been in constant connexion with Stierneld and the Danish and Prussian negotiators, "the latter of whom were so tied down by their Instructions from their respective Governments that it was no easy matter to bring them to any understanding." Only late during the negotiations on the second day did we [Stierneld and Wynn] succeed in having such changes made in Articles 6 and 7 as make them, if not satisfactory, at least acceptable to the Danish Government.

The convention on which agreement was largely achieved during Wynn's negotiations at Malmö, was dated at the 26th of August; it was not signed until the following day.¹

The duration of the armistice which was concluded, was fixed at seven months (three months in the Convention of the 2nd of July), subject to a month's notice. The first articles of the Convention on the whole correspond to those in the Convention of the 2nd of July. The most important changes from this first convention were found in Articles 6, 7, and 9, in which the Danish negotiators had to make various concessions to the new German demands.

According to Article 6, which was drawn up from Articles 6 and 8 of the former convention, up to 2000 Danish troops and the same number of Confederate troops might remain on Als and in the Duchies, respectively, for the guarding of hospitals and military depots. As to the Slesvig and Holstein troops it was said that those born in Slesvig should be organized in special corps to be stationed in Slesvig. They should be commanded by the New Government which was to be set up, and this could demobilize those whose service was not considered necessary. The military in Holstein was to consist of the present number of the regular troops of Holstein belonging to the Federal Army. These troops

¹ F.O. 22/163: 27/8, No. 127, and 28/8, No. 128. — In the Council of State the Convention was not adopted until the 28th of August. Statsrådets Forhandling, I, p. 427.

should also be at the disposal of the New Government, and their number must not be reduced except by arrangement with this Government and the Commander-in-chief of the Federal Army.

Article 7 contained rules for the formation of the new "administration collective," the United Government. It was to consist of five members chosen from among the Notables of the Duchies. Two should be appointed by the Danish King for Slesvig, two by Prussia in the name of the German Confederation for Holstein. The fifth member, the President, should be chosen by Denmark and Prussia together. No member of the Slesvig-Holstein Government before the 17th of March and none who had been in a Government afterwards, could become a member of the New Government. The administration should be carried on in the name of the King of Denmark in his capacity of Duke; it should have no legislative power. All acts, notices, etc., issued for the Duchies after the 17th of March should cease being valid at the accession of the United Government to power. But the Government should be authorized to put into force those of them which seemed inevitable or beneficial for the regular course of the current affairs. They must not contain anything which was at variance with Article 11 of the Convention. In this it was stated that the Convention did not prejudice the peace, and that both parties reserved their rights.

Article 8 entitled the Danish and the Prussian King, the latter in the name of the German Confederacy, each to appoint a commissioner to stay in the Duchies during the armistice in order to watch the observance of the Convention and the application of the acts existing in favour of the Danish or the German population, while in Article 10, which now became Article 9, it said about Lauenburg in so many words that this country should be brought back into the same position as it held before the advance of the Federal troops. A commission of three members should be appointed according to the new, long version. Denmark was to choose one, Prussia the second, and as to the third, the two parties were to come to an agreement.

In connexion with the final form adduced here which the much disputed and discussed Articles 6 (+8) and 7 were given in the Convention, I shall mention the criticism directed by Bunsen against Wynn's comments in his dispatch of the 16th of August

(cf. p. 198). As mentioned above, Palmerston had communicated it to Bunsen, and when Bunsen returned it, he wrote that he had "most *important* and *urgent* observations upon the principal point to lay before you."¹ These observations were sent as an enclosure in the letter, and the principal point was the conception of "the existing laws" in the Convention of the 2nd of July. Bunsen maintained as Prussia's point of view that the existing laws included the laws promulgated by the Provisional Government after the outbreak of the rebellion, and that the Danish negotiators had approved of this view. Nor did Palmerston ever, wrote Bunsen, propose the cancellation of the provisions of the Provisional Government after the 24th of March, a remark which was irrelevant in this connexion. The Orders, etc., of the Provisional Government, continued Bunsen, were "the "existing laws" in the Duchies, altho' not *legitimately* existing in the Danish point of view." He found it unreasonable to repeal these during an armistice, mentioned Wynn's objections to the laws violating the King's dignity, and concluded: "If the Danes will restore them during the armistice they must first re-conquer the Duchies and keep an army in the country."

In the letter itself Bunsen admits that the Prussian Government had agreed *bona fide* "to the Project proposed[!] by Manderström, with a few modifications: but we found *afterwards*, on conferring with General Wrangel, that the Art. VIII, *as it stood*, was *inexecutable*, because there exist *no* Schleswig battallions, but every company is a *mixed* one." These and other objections were raised by us at Kolding besides the question of the ratification by the Regent. "This last point, considered by Swedes and Danes as the principal one, *has been settled*. As to the rest, the most reasonable arrangements are proposed. Now they come with objections to a clause, *which was perfectly explained to them*, and acquiesced in by them."

As Bunsen had not participated in the Bellevue negotiations, his report on these can hardly have any particular value as source ascribed to it.² The correctness of the report is definitely denied

¹ F.O. 64/292: [22/8]. — Bunsen's dispatch of 22/8, No. 49, and dispatch of 26/8 to Bunsen.

² In his dispatch of 22/8, No. 49, in which he sent his "Observations" to Berlin, he, for that matter, regretted not having received the documents concerning the negotiations during Pourtalès's first mission.

by the two "neutral" participants in the negotiations, Wynn and Lagerheim. Bunsen's assertions as to the meeting at Kolding, Wynn wrote to Palmerston¹ on the 30th of August, were quite wrong: "So far from there being any *mutual understanding* they [the Danish negotiators] repeatedly stated their total inability to agree to the proposed terms;" the Conference would have ended if he and Lagerheim had not asked them to continue. Wynn furthermore remarked in his dispatch that it was incomprehensible to him that Prussia or the Central Power could consider the issuing of insurrectional decrees "as the *foundation of the negotiations.*" Palmerston would, he thought, be the first to recognize that by nature they were against the honour of the Sovereign and "*prejudicial to the rights of Denmark.*" Finally Wynn called Palmerston's attention to the fact that the articles about the division of the Slesvig troops which Bunsen had characterized as *inexecutable* "formed part of the new convention!"

A few days later Wynn informed Palmerston that he had shown Bunsen's "observations" to Lagerheim, who had been just as interested as Wynn himself in correcting the mistakes.² Wynn was glad that the Swedish Minister in London had been instructed to give Palmerston the Swedish Government's refutation of the "observations," and thought that it was useful by showing "the unconciliatory spirit, which has animated . . . Bunsen during the whole negotiation, and which will probably still shew itself in that which is now to be commenced."³

Wynn's final words presumably refer to the coming negotiations about a final arrangement. In these Bunsen, as Wynn wrote to Westmorland, no doubt would be "intractable."⁴ As to the Swedish refutation of Bunsen's assertions, Wynn, in a slightly later letter to Westmorland, was of opinion that it would "open the eyes of all those who may be *en rapport* with him."⁵

The Federal Government at Frankfurt as the first term of its credentials had demanded that the members of the New Government should be appointed before the conclusion of the Convention. This demand was complied with, as the first supplementary

¹ F.O. 22/163: 30/8, No. 129.

² *Ibid.*: 4/9, No. 131.

³ Copy of the refutation of 31/8 in Westmorland. II, p. 181 ff.

⁴ Westmorland. II, p. 221 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 257 ff.

article of the Convention contained the names of the possible members of the United Government. As President it was agreed to appoint the Holstein Count Carl Moltke, a loyal adherent to the United Monarchy and former Head of the Slesvig-Holstein-Lauenburg Chancellery, a decided opponent of the Slesvig-Holstein Rebellion. His Deputy was the Conservative Count Adolph Blome. Among the four Members and their Deputies there was presumably only a single one (the titular Councillor of State Th. Prehn), with whom the Danes had any reason to be satisfied.¹ The others were more or less Slesvig-Holstein-minded. Wynn said in his dispatch² written after the Slesvig-Holsteiners had put up a violent resistance to the appointment of Carl Moltke as President, that he had for this post proposed Prince Ferdinand, the Heir Presumptive, who had been mentioned as acceptable from Rendsburg and Frankfurt as well as Berlin. He would not, wrote Wynn, have brought any talents, but he "might have been well directed, and his name and rank would have conciliated many who are now most violent in their opposition." It was after my (Wynn's) departure from Malmö that the names were agreed on. Below consented to Carl Moltke's being chosen, and the Danish negotiators approved of the other four, "who, tho' in other respects unobjectionable, were known to entertain opinions more or less inclined to Slesvig Holstein."

On the 31st of August Westmorland informed Wynn that Frederick William IV. the day before had ratified the Convention. He congratulated Wynn on it.³ A few days before, when the information had come from Malmö, he had written to Cowley: "I congratulate you as I do myself, upon the termination of this most troublesome affair."⁴ Wynn also received the Danish King's thanks for his participation in the negotiations.⁵ It appears from Frederick William's letter of the 30th of August to Meyendorff,⁶ the Russian Minister, that it was a load off his Legitimist mind when he on the same day at half past two ratified the Convention. He asked him to inform the Emperor of the rati-

¹ See further H.T. 11. r. VI, p. 9 ff.

² F.O. 22/163: 8/9, No. 135. — Cf. Westmorland. II, p. 209 ff.

³ Westmorland. II, p. 225 f.

⁴ *Ibid.*: p. 217 ff.

⁵ F.O. 22/163: 7/9, No. 134.

⁶ F.O. 64/289: 31/8, No. 319, enclosure.

fication: "I write this with a heart full of gratitude to God and with thanks to the Emperor and you, my dear Meyendorff." He wanted Meyendorff also to inform Westmorland. It is a matter of course that Palmerston's congratulations did not fail to appear.¹

After the conclusion of the Convention of the 2nd of July Westmorland, as mentioned above (p. 172 f.), had sent Palmerston a hearty congratulation, the premature character of which he later recognized. After the conclusion of the new convention he wrote on the 29th of August to Palmerston: "I hope now I may safely venture to congratulate Your Lordship upon the termination of this most complicated negotiation."² Should his congratulation this time prove premature, too?

10. The Joint Government of the 22nd of October. The Question of a Four-Power Declaration.

On the 29th of August Westmorland had congratulated Palmerston on the conclusion of the negotiations, but only four days later, on the 2nd of September he wrote to Wynn: "Now we have got the Armistice we must get it executed which may still be not so easy."³ He was proved right.

In Holstein the Provisional Government refused to comply with the Convention, and on the 5th of September in the National Assembly in Frankfurt a resolution was passed to stop the execution of the armistice.⁴ The man behind this resolution was Dahlmann, who attacked the Convention at the meetings on the 4th and 5th on the plea of Germany's honour. Cowley stated in his report:⁵ "The debate itself turned much more on German honor, than on the expediency of the Armistice. Every fanciful definition that could be given to, every romantic notion that could be entertained of the meaning of this word honor, was canvassed – commented upon – sifted."

¹ F.O. 64/289: 26/9, No. 352.

² F.O. 64/289, No. 317.

³ Westmorland. II, p. 245 ff.

⁴ This and the following are dealt with in my paper "Om tilblivelsen af fællesregeringen for hertugdømmerne af 22. okt. 1848." H.T. 11. r. VI, pp. 1–80.

⁵ F.O. 30/110: 8/9, No. 76.

The resolution of the National Assembly caused the resignation of the Government. Dahlmann, however, did not succeed in forming a new Ministry. He also approached Stockmar,¹ who had a talk with Cowley during the crisis; this talk was mentioned by Cowley in his report, and resulted in an exposé from Cowley to Stockmar stating the former's views on the solution of the Danish-German question: by Britain's arbitration whereby "a safe, practicable and honorable issue is opened to both parties."² If the Central Government accepted this proposal Cowley would send couriers to London and Copenhagen where he hoped to obtain consent to his plan. Cowley heard no more about his proposal, but it showed that he did not hesitate to take independent diplomatic action.

As it proved impossible for the majority who was responsible for the decision of the 5th to form a new Government, the Assembly passed a resolution on the evening of the 16th not to prevent the execution of the armistice, "as far as it is still able to be carried out under the present conditions (nach der gegenwärtigen Sachlage)," a somewhat perfidious recognition. The Central Government was to negotiate directly with Denmark about further "modifications" in it and about a final peace.³ President Gagern emphasised in a letter to Cowley that the resolution was passed only "with a view of preserving the peace of Europe, and of giving the Powers of Europe a proof of the moderation of Germany."⁴ Cowley did not seem to appreciate this statement very much as he wrote at the time to Palmerston:⁵ "From first to last, this Schleswig Holstein transaction has shewn a laxity of political morality among the Germans, which, if repeated, must destroy all confidence in them as a Nation. Whether we look to its origin, to the different phases through which it has passed, or to its end, we are met at every turn by a looseness of principle which ill accords with the flourishing phrases concerning German honor, in which the Press, the Parliament and the public have so largely indulged . . . They [The Central Government] have acted throughout this business as if their

¹ Cf. Stockmar, p. 537.

² F.O. 30/110: Cowley's exposé 6/9 with his dispatch of 8/9, No. 76.

³ Cf. Cowley's dispatch of 16/9, No. 98. F.O. 30/110.

⁴ F.O. 30/110: 17/9, No. 100.

⁵ Ibid.: 17/9, No. 101.

dictum was law, and that Denmark had no voice, and no right to be heard in the matter." There was not, Cowley thought, to judge from the debates which had taken place, one statesman in the Assembly: "And such is the stamp of the men on whom the future success of the Central Power depends!"

The result of the Cabinet crisis was that after the vote on the 16th, the Archduke was able to ask the old Government to continue. Some changes, however, took place. Among others Karl v. Leiningen went out, and A. v. Schmerling, who was Austrian, took over the leadership. The reorganised Ministry was finally constituted on the 24th.

At the beginning of September Carl Moltke, who had been nominated President of the Joint Government, had gone to Holstein to meet the other members and to constitute the Government. But they refused to serve under him, and the Slesvig-Holstein mob compelled him to leave Holstein. He then went to Sønderborg, where he was under the protection of the Danish Army. Wrangel did, it is true, in spite of the Provisional Government's protest, give his troops orders to evacuate the Duchies, with the exception of the two thousand men mentioned in the Convention; but he did nothing to make the Insurrectionary Government comply with the convention, but, on the contrary, put forward to Reedt, the Danish Commissioner, suggestions for "modifications" in the provisions of the Convention.

The Holsteiners made the most of their time. While Reedt carried on useless negotiations with the Prussians, the constituting "Slesvig-Holstein" National Assembly met on the 4th of September and passed in two days[!] a Slesvig-Holstein Constitution for the new state, the aim of the revolution. It was still maintained that there was no intention of severing the so-called Personal Union with Denmark as long as the male line existed.

In spite of the ratification of the Convention the Prussian Government's efforts were immediately aimed at changing the provisions in order to meet the wishes of the angry Germans and Slesvig-Holsteiners. On the 31st of August Westmorland reported that Bülow, afraid of the opposition that the appointment of Carl Moltke would arouse in the Duchies, had ordered Below, at the meeting the next day in Lübeck where the ratifications were

to be exchanged, "to use every exertion to get Count Adolph Blome appointed in his room."¹ The same day he wrote to Wynn² about Bülow's wish for another President: "he hopes you will second his wishes. I said I would mention the subject but could do no more." Both to Palmerston and Westmorland, Wynn disclaimed any part in the nomination of Carl Moltke.³ "I strongly advised another arrangement" [Prince Ferdinand, the Heir Presumptive] he wrote to Westmorland. At a conference which Count Knuth had on the 9th of September at Wynn's house with him and the Ministers of the other friendly Powers, the Ministers all agreed that they disapproved of the appointment of Carl Moltke.⁴

Palmerston received his best and promptest information about the Slesvig-Holstein reaction to the armistice from Hodges in Hamburg, who on the 5th of September reported the angry Slesvig-Holstein feelings, especially at Kiel and Altona, and described the choice of Moltke as infelicitous.⁵ He wrote that Reedtz, with whom he had spoken, did not either seem to disagree entirely with him on this point. He left it open whether the Prussian Government had "the power and will to carry into effect the spirit of the convention that they have now entered into with Denmark." The next day he expressed his conviction that it was impossible for Carl Moltke to retain his post as President, and that it was desirable to nominate "some more popular person . . . in his place."⁶ Both in this dispatch and in a later one of the 12th he mentioned the fear in the more conservative circles in the Duchies, that the Radical elements would get the upper hand, and that anarchy and a republic would be the result.⁷ A large part of the population, he believed, "would gladly see the political state of those countries restored to what it was before the commencement of hostilities." One of the sources on which these opinions were based, was no doubt, Altona's Prefect, Reventlow-Criminil, who had recognized the Provisional Government on its formation.

¹ F.O. 64/289: 31/8, No. 319.

² Westmorland. II, p. 225 f.

³ Ibid.: p. 277 ff. – F.O. 22/163: 8/9, No. 135.

⁴ F.O. 22/163: 10/9, No. 136.

⁵ F.O. 33/114: 5/9, No. 90.

⁶ Ibid.: 6/9, No. 91.

⁷ Ibid.: 12/9, No. 97.

When Hodges had mentioned that the British Vice-Consul in Kiel, M.T. Schmidt, a member of the Provisional Government, was the leader of the Radical circle, Palmerston wrote on the dispatch that "some other Person should be appointed [as British Vice-Consul] who would attend to his commercial Duties and not meddle with Politics, and Mr. Schmidt should be informed of the Reason why the change is made."¹

Hodges' reports about the ill-feeling towards Carl Moltke has doubtless contributed towards – or occasioned – Palmerston's decision of the 15th to direct Wynn to suggest to the Danish Government that Moltke be replaced by his substitute Adolph Blome, "who was Minister in England" [Danish Minister 1832–41].² When this suggestion reached Copenhagen, Blome had already declared that he would not take on the job as President,³ and he does not seem, for that matter, to have received any official Danish request to do so.

In consequence of Wynn's above-mentioned dispatch of the 9th of September in which he stressed Knuth's disinclination to give up Moltke as President, Palmerston in his answer gave vent to his anger at the Danish Government's "imprudence."⁴ It was surprising, he wrote, that the Government in spite of their experience of the difficulties "in which for many months past they have involved themselves by the notion that they can carry by force their own notions of what is best in regard to the Duchies should have run the risk of defeating the friendly exertions of their Allies by proposing and persisting in an appointment which they must have known to be in the highest degree disagreeable to the population which it is so much their interest to conciliate, and this sample of the policy of the Danish Government is far from encouraging with reference to the prospect of effecting a final settlement of the questions still at issue." As can be seen, Palmerston considered "the population" here as Slesvig-Holstein-minded.

The advice, given by the Ministers of the Four Powers at the Conference on the 9th with Count Knuth, was not followed. On

¹ Cf. Aktenstücke zur n. S.-H. Geschichte, p. 585, note on Schmidt's dismissal as British Vice-Consul.

² F.O. 22/161: 15/9. – F.O. 64/284: 15/9, No. 193. – Bunsen's dispatch of 15/9, No. 61.

³ F.O. 33/114: 15/9, No. 100.

⁴ F.O. 22/161: 22/9.

the 18th of September Wynn¹ reported that Knuth still considered it quite possible to install in Slesvig a separate Government consisting of two Danish members with Moltke as President: "We have, I fear in vain, represented the risk incurred by insisting on the appointment of a person justly or unjustly so unpopular." At the same time in a letter to Westmorland he complained that a week had passed in apparent inactivity in Copenhagen, while "measures of energy ought to be resorted to."² He was, however, happy to report that Knuth was now going to comply with his suggestion and send Reedtzt to Berlin for direct negotiations. Wynn had advised Knuth to authorize Reedtzt to give up Moltke as President. He did not believe that there would be opposition in Denmark to Count Reventlow-Jersbeck, whom Westmorland had mentioned as Berlin's candidate.³

The separate Government in Slesvig which Wynn mentioned in his dispatch, was that which Carl Moltke installed in Sønderborg on the 18th of September under the name of "the Royal "Immediate" Commission for the joint administration of the Duchies of Slesvig and Holstein." When the members nominated at Malmö had declined the task, the King had appointed as members for Slesvig the Prefect of the County of Haderslev, F. Johannsen, and the Bishop of Als, Jørgen Hansen, two Conservative adherents of the United Monarchy. It was pointed out that Prussia could then appoint her two members for Holstein, and it had been agreed at Malmö that Carl Moltke was to be President. However, Prussia and her Commander-in-Chief in the Duchies, Bonin, refused to recognize this Commission.⁴ Its activity, then, was more or less confined to Als where Danish troops were stationed; but the risk was not taken of using them on the mainland to support the Commission.

Moltke's "Immediate Commission" was sharply criticized by Bunsen in an aide-memoire of the 26th of September which he sent to Palmerston.⁵ His remarks about Johannsen and Hansen were incorrect, as was his remark that they were nominated by Moltke, — they were appointed by the King — but it was correct

¹ F.O. 22/163: 18/9, Nos. 141 and 142.

² Westmorland. II, p. 309 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 289 ff.

⁴ Dispatch to Bunsen 26/9. — Aktenstücke zur n. S.-H. Geschichte, p. 525 ff.

⁵ F.O. 64/292: 26/9. — Bunsen's dispatch of 29/9, No. 63. — Cf. Hjelholt I, p. 148.

that they were not on the original list of names suggested by Prussia and Denmark. In a letter written at the same time Bunsen stressed that "the times are too critical to try such experiments after all what has passed." He asked Palmerston to warn Denmark as he had always found him willing "to lend the powerful influence of Your advice and council to the work of pacification, being sure that you will always find the Prussian Government second to none in furthering the same good cause." There were good reasons for setting a question-mark after the last phrase.

In a letter the next day to Palmerston¹ Bunsen said that the Danish Government was acting on the basis of two assertions: that the King's dignity demanded the humiliation of the Duchies instead of their reconciliation, and that it was Prussia's duty to execute the Convention against the will of the people. On hearing that the members nominated had declined he remarked: "How can anybody *force* people to *act* as Members, if they *will* not?"

Palmerston did not reply until the 9th of October when he stated that Britain had strongly advised the Danish Government to appoint another in Moltke's place.²

Palmerston had already given this advice in his dispatch of the 22nd to Wynn. On the 26th he wrote again to Wynn³ that if the Danish Government retained Carl Moltke, "it will be considered as tantamount to a declaration that they are determined that there shall be no peaceful settlement of these questions; and a settlement by force of arms may not be in their favour." On the 6th of October he sent Wynn a copy of Bunsen's above-mentioned aide-memoire, requesting him to make serious remonstrances to the Danish Government about "the hopelessness of any satisfactory conclusion of these affairs unless they pursue a different course."⁴

Knuth had begun to pursue such a course about the 20th of September by sending Reedtz, who was always willing to negotiate, to Berlin. He arrived there during a new Cabinet crisis, but on the 21st Auerswald's Government was replaced by v. Pfuël's, and Dönhoff became Foreign Minister. On the 27th a protocol was signed in the presence of Westmorland by Reedtz and Dönhoff

¹ F.O. 64/292: 27/9.

² F.O. 64/292. — Bunsen's dispatch of 11/10, No. 74.

³ F.O. 22/161.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 6/10. No. 113; cf. No. 116.

whereby the latter was to appoint the new Government of five members for the Duchies from the nine names still on the list.¹ Both Carl Moltke and the other two members of the "Immediate Commission" were thus given up by Denmark. Westmorland had strongly recommended Reedtz to agree to this.

Dönhoff then discussed the matter with the Provisional Government to see which of the persons on the list were the most suitable considered from a Slesvig-Holstein point of view. Five were chosen who were willing, but they declared that they would only take over the administration provided that it was carried out on the basis of the newly-passed Slesvig-Holstein Constitution. An attempt was made to conceal this provision from Reedtz, and in a protocol dated the 12th of October he accepted the new Government with Reventlow-Jersbeck as President, on behalf of Denmark. The protocol stated that the Danish and Prussian Governments would see to it that the new administration be installed as soon as possible. This took place on the 22nd of October, and on the same day the new administration passed an ordinance making valid all the laws and ordinances of the Insurrectionary Government! Both the "modifications" in the armistice, which the Central Government according to the – incorrect – information from Prussia had reason to expect that Denmark would agree to, were thus effected: a continuation of the Slesvig-Holstein administration and the maintenance of the legislation passed by the Insurrectionary Government. Cowley proved then, more or less, to be right when he wrote in a dispatch of the 23rd of September that he trusted the Danish Government to still manifest "the moderate and conciliatory conduct, which has so eminently distinguished it during this transaction."²

Palmerston had contributed to this "conciliatory conduct" with his strongly-worded notes. On the 28th of October Bunsen was able to give him the Joint Government's warmest thanks for "the protection granted to the country by prevailing upon the Danish Government to withdraw Count Moltke.³ They are fully aware, that nothing but "the decided language of Lord Palmerston" could have produced that effect, "and *thus prevented a new civil war*!"

¹ Dispatch of 27/9 to Bunsen.

² F.O. 30/110: 23/9, No. 120.

³ F.O. 64/292: 28/10. – Cf. Bunsen's letter of 31/10. EE. 3.

Denmark's compliant attitude, of which Reedtz and Knuth were the most important representatives – both under pressure from the Ministers of the “friendly” Powers – met with strong opposition from other members of the Government and from men like Carl Moltke and the King himself. This opposition will not be dealt with in more detail here, except to mention a few remarks about it in private letters from Wynn to Palmerston.¹ In these letters, as opposed to the official dispatches, he did not need to moderate his expressions.

On the 2nd of October he complained about the Danish Government's “want of decision and excess of obstinacy. – There is no one to take a leading part in the cabinet and the King who ought at least to have the appearance of doing so remains in the Country *procul negotiis*.” A week later he spoke about the Government's difficult position “surrounded by a violent Danish Party and headed by an obstinate inept King running after a little Popularity. – They have had and I believe still have difficulty in withholding orders for the occupation of North Slesvig by a Danish Force.” The King talked of issuing such orders if everything was not in order by the 23rd (the date of the meeting of the Constituent National Assembly).

After the Joint Government had clearly shown its attitude to the Slesvig-Holstein problem, by its proclamation of the 22nd, Wynn made assurances in a letter of the 29th that he would exert all his strength “to keep them quiet here, but it is no easy matter, and it is not to be done by attempting to deny that they have *sufficient Provocation* to occupy Slesvig with the 40,000 men who are ready and able to drive their opponents even out of Holstein if such be the King's orders.”

The indignation of the Danish Government at the flagrant breaches of the terms of the armistice which Slesvig-Holstein and Frankfurt had carried into effect, was not likely to be lessened by the fact that Denmark had agreed to these terms extremely reluctantly and only when urged on by Sweden and Britain. As a kind of repayment for Denmark's obliging attitude at Malmö, King Oscar had held out prospects of Sweden's readiness to sign a collective declaration together with Russia, Britain and France on the indissoluble connection between Slesvig and the Kingdom

¹ P.P.

of Denmark.¹ In his above-mentioned dispatch of the 23rd of August (see p. 199) Wynn wrote that, during his talks with King Oscar, the King had asked him to urge upon Palmerston the necessity of a protocol or declaration from the Four Powers on Denmark's right to Slesvig "as a federal independent State and subject to the same law of succession."² Sweden would sign such a declaration, and France doubtless, too. In a private letter to Palmerston four days later Wynn again mentioned the Swedish King's suggestion of a Four-Power declaration, and wrote that he had been urged "to do my utmost" to see that Palmerston's decision, on which everything depended, was a favourable one.³

Wynn stated in the same letter that he had seen "the rough Draft" of an identical note to his colleagues and himself; he "suggested some alterations in it." On the 30th Knuth sent Reventlow a copy of the note about which, as he wrote, he had come to an agreement with the Swedish Minister. It was not until the next day that it was sent, dated the 31st, to the Ministers of the Four Powers in Copenhagen. On the 4th of September Wynn forwarded it to Palmerston.⁴

Palmerston had reacted unsympathetically to Wynn's first communication. On the 29th of August he wrote to Wynn, "that to affirm by a Protocol what the law of Succession in Slesvig is, would be in some degree to decide arbitrarily a part of the questions which have for so many years been the subject matter of controversy."⁵ The British Government "would scarcely be prepared at present to take such a step." On receiving Knuth's note he directed Wynn on the 12th of September to express to the Danish Government Britain's good-will with regard to the consolidation of the Danish Monarchy, but rejected the idea that Britain, after accepting the rôle of mediator, could sign such a declaration.⁶ In a letter to Westmorland, Wynn noted with regret Palmerston's unsympathetic attitude and added: "He occasionally fires off an angry Despatch to you and Lord Cowley expressing the same opinions as those entertained by the other Powers, but which lose their effect when coming singly."⁷

¹ Löfgren, p. 42 f. and 69 ff.

² F.O. 22/163: 23/8, No. 125.

³ 27/8. P.P.

⁴ F.O. 22/163: 4/9, No. 132.

⁵ F.O. 22/161: 29/8.

⁶ Ibid.: 12/9.

⁷ Westmorland. II, p. 257 ff.

The same day that Palmerston in his dispatch to Wynn refused to participate in the suggested Four-Power declaration, Knuth directed Reventlow to do everything in his power to persuade Britain, as soon as possible, to give the solemn declaration we wanted on Slesvig's inseparability from Denmark.¹ In a confidential letter the next day Knuth emphasised that, if Reventlow found it opportune, he ought not to delay for one moment in taking the necessary steps to obtain a declaration from Britain in the same spirit as that Russia was willing to give.²

Before Reventlow carried out his instructions he conferred, as was his custom in important matters, with Brunnow. It was holiday time and Brunnow was at Brighton. Reventlow went to see him there on the 18th,³ and was informed by him that two days earlier, according to his Government's orders, he had written to Palmerston asking him if Britain were prepared, together with the three other Powers, to sign a declaration about Slesvig's inseparability from the Danish Monarchy. Brunnow did not know what Palmerston's answer would be, but he remarked: "if it were old Aberdeen, he would refuse to do so, as the first guarantee should be sufficient."

It was not a very forcible request that Russia and her Minister made to Palmerston about the signing of a Four-Power declaration to ensure "à la Couronne de Danemark la possession inviolable du Duché de Slesvic, ainsi que le portent les actes de garanties antérieurs."⁴ Brunnow was, he wrote, authorized to sign such a declaration if Palmerston approved of the idea. If he did not, Brunnow would do nothing, "car il est entendu que je devrai attendre Votre décision, *pour ou contre*." In his request he also mentioned the formal hindrance for a Four-Power declaration – the fact that France was not formally recognised by Russia – but he thought that this difficulty could be overcome in some way or another.

After his visit to Brighton, Reventlow went on the 20th to visit Palmerston at his estate, Broadlands, and did not return to London until the next afternoon.⁵ At Broadlands he gave Palm-

¹ Ges. Ark. London. Orders: 12/9, No. 78.

² *Ibid.*: 13/9.

³ Reventlow's dispatch of 19/9, No. 79.

⁴ Brunnow to Palmerston 16/9. P.P.

⁵ Reventlow's dispatch of 22/9, No. 80.

erston a letter written by Knuth thanking him profusely for Britain's support up to that time, and urging him to take part in the declaration which the three other Powers were willing to sign. He stressed that Sweden's hope of such a declaration was the reason why the Danish Government had overcome its misgivings about an armistice which gave the Duchies a Provisional and Joint Administration. But Palmerston was not convinced. He considered the declaration ill-timed, and said that Britain could not just suddenly give up her rôle as mediator, and participate in a declaration which settled the question-at-issue in opposition to Germany's opinions and claims. The Queen's Council of State would not either agree to such a declaration, he remarked.

During Reventlow's visit to Broadlands the stage which the dispute had reached was, of course, discussed, and I shall return later to various statements made by Palmerston on the subject. In his report to Count Knuth, Reventlow declared that now we (Denmark) know "where we stand, and that Palmerston will not yet renounce his temporizing rôle as mediator nor take energetic action."

The Swedish Minister in London, Rehausen, did not wish to approach Palmerston until Reventlow had done so. He received the same answer – that Britain, as mediator, could not participate in any new "declaration or Engagement."¹

Not until the 16th of October did Palmerson give Brunnow detailed reasons for Britain's being unable to participate in the suggested declaration.² He ended with the not very illuminating statement, that if guarantees made in the 18th century were still in force they did not need to be renewed, and if they did not exist any longer "par le laps du temps," he did not believe that Britain was disposed to revive them.

Palmerston went into more detail in a note, of the 14th of October, on a dispatch from Westmorland of the 9th.³ Westmorland had reported how pleased Dönhoff was that the Four-Power declaration suggested in Copenhagen "had not met with Your Lordship's sanction." So that probably not too much should be

¹ Reventlow's dispatches of 25/9, No. 81, and 29/9, No. 82. – Löfgren, p. 73.

² P.P.

³ F.O. 64/290: 9/10, No. 363.

read into this non-sanction Palmerston noted: "The objection to this proposed declaration is that if the former Guaranties which it enumerates are still in force, it is unnecessary, and indeed lends to invalidate those Guaranties by implying that they require a Renewal in order to make them to be *now* in force." But if they were not still in force, the declaration meant in reality, a new engagement, and the British Government were unwilling to undertake this. Palmerston's note showed that he agreed with the attitude which "old Aberdeen" would have adopted, according to Brunnow. It can hardly be assumed that these statements suggest that Palmerston considered the Treaty of Guarantee of 1720 as non-existent "par le laps du temps."

About the 1st of October the Prussian Government had learnt about the suggested declaration and was rather alarmed about it. On the 2nd it directed Bunsen to get hold of all the information that existed, described the plan as a provocation of Germany, and could not believe that Britain would approve of the declaration which went further than the Guarantee of 1720. Berlin seems to have been dissatisfied that information about the plan – and, for that matter, Palmerston's rejection of it – reached the Government from other quarters before it learned of it from its Minister in London.¹ The information which Bunsen procured after repeated requests was not quite correct,² but on the 7th of October, however, he was able to report that Palmerston had given what he called – rather incorrectly – "die allerbestimmteste abweisende Antwort" to Reventlow's request of the 20th of September. When Bunsen was later able to report Palmerston's reply to Brunnow, he remarked that it was evident that the three Powers – Sweden, Russia and France – especially the two last-named, wished to prevent Slesvig's separation from Denmark. Britain was the the only non-German Great Power which was not anti-German. After the failure of the Four-Power declaration on account of Britain's attitude, a plan was ventilated about a declaration from the three other Powers, but this did not lead to any result.³

¹ Dispatches of 7/10 and 10/10 to Bunsen.

² Bunsen's dispatches of 13/10, No. 77; 21/10, No. 84; 18/11, No. 103; 22/11, No. 104.

³ Cf. Löfgren, p. 74 ff.

11. Denmark Wishes Britain's Mediation to Cease. Changes in the Danish Cabinet in November. Palmerston Gives up the Idea of Division.

In Reventlow's dispatch of the 19th of September he had stated that the two chief aims of his Government were to win Britain's support for the above-mentioned plan for a Four-Power declaration, and to get her to cease her single-handed mediation. In several orders to Reventlow, Knuth had stressed that it was a question of "Britain's agreeing to consider her mediation, which has been so painful for us, as ended;" with the armistice the matter had entered a "new phase."¹

The Danish Government had always wanted Russia to take part in the mediation. Both Russia and Sweden had actively supported Denmark during the dispute. Furthermore in August Denmark received a clear declaration from France that she considered herself bound by her Treaty of Guarantee of 1720.² When France's Minister in Copenhagen, with reference to this Guarantee, asked Count Knuth at the end of August to promise to obtain France's advice before there was any question of giving up any part of Slesvig, Knuth gave his promise readily. What was more natural than Denmark's wish that these three Powers should participate in the negotiations about a final settlement! In this way we could also hope to avoid making up our minds on the two disagreeable alternatives which Palmerston had given us in his dispatch of the 23rd of June, and to which the Government had not yet given any answer.

At the beginning of September Wynn informed Palmerston of a talk he had had with Knuth and Oxholm, who, he wrote, "is always sent when I am to be sounded on any subject."³ Wynn understood from these two gentlemen that the Danish Government was desirous that Britain's mediation "should be considered as ceasing with the Armistice. Tho' grateful as they ought to be for what has been done, so many difficulties have occurred that they do not think that *single handed* mediation will avail them

¹ Ges. Ark. London. Orders: 4/9, No. 74; 8/9, No. 75; 6(?)9, No. 76; 12/9, No. 79.

² Löfgren, p. 72.

³ F.O. 22/163: 6/9 (private).

against the 600 Frankfort Demagogues for a final arrangement." Denmark took for granted that Britain would lead "the efforts of the other Powers who have individually given them active or moral support, and who they do not now wish to see excluded from a direct part in the negotiation." Finally Wynn mentioned that the Danish Government would prefer the negotiations to be carried on by a German "Confederate Minister," "or any arrangement, which would exclude Bunsen."

Wynn doubtless shared the Danish view that Palmerston had not given us any specially active support during the dispute, and his formulation of Denmark's wish that Britain's single-handed mediation should cease was, although expressed in cautious terms, favourably disposed towards the idea. Palmerston, however, reacted strongly to this wish.

On the 19th of September he sent Wynn from Broadlands, where he was on holiday, one of his fulminatory letters.¹ Britain had, he wrote, worked hard to obtain the first result, the armistice, and it had been achieved "with as little disturbance of the Peace of Europe." If Denmark thought it best to place her case in other hands "we have only to make our bow, and wish her well through it." But then it was clear that Denmark would not accept either of the proposals which had been put forward, and "does not like the Impartiality of Mediator." Denmark was encouraged by Russia's and Sweden's support and wanted a European war, during which she could obtain more than she could through Britain's proposals. It was the same policy which the last King of the Netherlands attempted [after the Belgian Revolution 1830], and it would, presumably, cause the same disappointment. Palmerston did not believe that the Great Powers would go to war over Slesvig, or that the Danish King could obtain more than by the British proposals: "But upon this he must of course decide for himself. As for Britain however he must not expect that she will enter the lists of one of the Combatants." Britain was willing to mediate but not to go to war, "and if the questions in dispute are to be settled by Force or by Threats, we shall withdraw from the Matter altogether" and remain onlookers during the fight.

¹ F.O. 22/161: 19/9.

Wynn read this letter to Knuth and afterwards thought that he could assure Palmerston that he would not hear again "from hence of any wish for a change in the mediation."¹

It is to be supposed that Palmerston found an outlet for his emotions in his letter of the 19th to Wynn. At least his statements in his talks with Reventlow during the next two days at Broadlands seem to have been more moderate. I take it for granted that Reventlow reproduced, more or less, the tone of the talks in his report.²

Palmerston's refusal to let Britain participate in a Four-Power declaration has been mentioned above. He drew Reventlow's attention to the fact that Denmark had not yet answered the proposals of the 23rd of June, but stated that Denmark was free to reject both alternatives, and also to put forward a third proposal "with a view e.g. to the introduction of a separate Assembly of the Estates for Slesvig." Britain would submit any new proposal to Germany. If nothing came of this, Britain would refuse to commit herself in advance. Palmerston continued by saying that Wynn had reported that Knuth had given him to understand that Denmark considered Britain's mediation as ceasing with the armistice, and found that she could place her "interests in better hands." Denmark had the right to do this, but must first give an answer to Britain's proposals. Palmerston warned Reventlow not to rely too much on support from the other Powers, and was of the opinion that no one would go to war over the question whether Slesvig should send deputies to Denmark or to Holstein.

Reventlow mentioned in his dispatch that Palmerston brought up "his pet idea," division, and scoffed at Russia who at first had supported the idea but had now abandoned it. As a result of his visit to Broadlands Reventlow believed that he could state beyond dispute that Palmerston now realized that Denmark did not find that a peace was acceptable on the terms of his proposals, and that she would prefer to appeal to "new junctures."

Unlike Denmark Germany, of course, did not wish the three more active Powers to participate in the mediation. The armistice concluded by Prussia had been, as we have seen, "approved"

¹ 2/10. P.P.

² Reventlow's dispatch of 22/9, No. 80.

on the 16th of September by the Frankfurt Assembly, but in reality on condition that the "modifications" previously demanded be effected. That was also what happened. The Provisional Government's administration continued, though under a slightly different form. Under these conditions the Danish Government refused to let the island of Als be administered by the new Government. Cowley wrote privately to Hodges at the beginning of November that in Frankfurt the opinion was held that Germany tolerated this arrangement as "a sort of counterbalance" to the maintenance of the State constitution under the Joint Government.¹ Cowley considered it a sensible compromise.

In a dispatch of the 20th of September Cowley brought up the question of the continuance of the mediation in order to bring about a final settlement.² He wrote that Max v. Gagern, the Under-Secretary of State, had informed him that the Central Government would negotiate with Denmark on her own; Gagern did not think that Prussia would object to this. Frankfurt would send Banks to Copenhagen to give notification of the Archduke's accession as Regent. When Gagern asked if Britain were willing to continue the mediation, Cowley had said that Palmerston would doubtless wait for a reply to his proposals and give "such advice as you thought likely to conduce to a peace, fair and honorable for both parties." Cowley emphasised that arbitration was better than mediation (cf. p. 205) but Gagern did not believe that the Central Power dared accept arbitration just then. Gagern had, he said, originally preferred the second of the two proposals in the dispatch of the 23rd of June, but now after his visit to Rendsburg he preferred division.

After the matter had been discussed at a Cabinet meeting in Frankfurt, Gagern was able to inform Cowley that the Central Power requested Britain to continue the mediation in London, and was desirous that Palmerston should see that Banks had a friendly reception in Copenhagen. Cowley would also write directly to Wynn on this matter.³ In his dispatch of the 20th of September Cowley mentioned furthermore that apart from

¹ F.O. 30/113: copy of Cowley's letter of 2/11 to Hodges with the dispatch of 1/11, No. 232.

² F.O. 30/110: 20/9, No. 110.

³ Cf. Cowley's dispatch of 23/9, No. 120, with enclosure. F.O. 30/110.

mediation direct negotiations between Copenhagen and Frankfurt would be "the surest way of bringing this wearisome and dangerous question to a termination." The Central Government would not like Russia and France or Sweden to take part in the negotiations. Denmark's wishes in this regard "alarm me," Cowley wrote to Wynn.¹ But, continued Cowley's dispatch, when the Danish Government sees that the Central Power is genuinely desirous of peace, one can hope "it will entertain the proposition now fairly made, and trust alone to Your Lordship's valuable and impartial advice to effect a permanent and honorable arrangement."

The same day that Cowley sent off his dispatch he wrote privately to Palmerston.² It was, he said, "very essential to keep both France and Russia out of this negotiation." These Powers had, he believed, an interest in annoying the Central Power, and at least a wish to do so, and therefore there was a fear that they would urge Denmark "to ask for more than either of your propositions give." At the moment the Central Power was "very much inclined to look to us for support," and Cowley would be happy if it appeared "that it can reckon upon us when reasonable." He had strongly recommended Stockmar as the Central Government's negotiator in London, as it would create a bad impression in Denmark if Bunsen were chosen. In another private letter to Palmerston a few days later, Cowley wrote of Stockmar: "You cannot have a better man than Stockmar. He is conciliatory and is one of the few Germans, to whom common sense has not entirely deserted."³ Stockmar, however, declined the official task of negotiator.⁴ Several months passed, however, before the negotiations opened in London, and then Bunsen was again the representative of Denmark's opposing party.

On the 6th of October, Banks, the Central Government's envoy, had arrived in Copenhagen; Denmark had stated that she was willing to receive him and to recognize the Central Power.⁵ His orders from the Central Government were to communicate the Archduke's accession, and to propose peace negotiations in

¹ See Note 3, p. 226.

² 20/9. P.P.

³ 25/9. P.P.

⁴ Stockmar, p. 546.

⁵ Statsrådets Forhandl. I, p. 460 ff. and 496 ff. – F.O. 22/164: 9/10, No. 154.

London under British mediation.¹ No other place could be accepted, and no other Power was to participate in the mediation. It was to be noted that Denmark had not given any answer to Britain's proposals of the 23rd of June, and that on the 30th of May the Federal Diet had declared that the separation of certain parts of Slesvig was permissible if it took place with the free consent of the inhabitants. At that time the proposal for a "change" in the North Slesvig succession had not been made, it was asserted. Banks was specially directed to see that the "modifications" in the armistice were effected, as still demanded by Frankfurt. As mentioned above, the result was that the Slesvig-Holsteiners and Frankfurt, by forming the Joint Government of the 22nd of October, altered the Malmö Convention to suit their own wishes.

Although it had been decided that the negotiations about the final settlement were to take place in London under Palmerston's leadership, Wynn naturally discussed the matter with Banks in Copenhagen. In a dispatch of the 9th of October Wynn reported the result of a long conversation he had had the previous evening with Banks.² Wynn stressed that there was a misunderstanding if Palmerston assumed that the Central Government would approve of his propositions of the 23rd of June. As regards the first proposal, Banks rejected the suggested line of demarcation and wanted it regulated by a plebiscite. In the second proposal he found that there was "the difficulty of establishing an independence of the German Confederation, and yet a Community of Administration." It may be noted here that this difficulty became insurmountable by the motion for a National constitution put forward in Frankfurt on the 19th of October which determined that there must not exist any other tie than a personal union between a German and a non-German country.³

Wynn and Banks also discussed a third plan – the "independence" of Slesvig. – Wynn said that Banks "did not appear disinclined" to Knuth's third plan: "the Integrity and federal Independence of Slesvig, nor did he reject as unfeasible the suggestion I threw out, that the required tie to the Confederation

¹ The English translation of the instructions is to be found with Cowley's dispatch of 23/9, No. 120. F.O. 30/110.

² F.O. 22/164: 9/10, No. 156.

³ Löfgren, p. 81.

might be found in a guarantee of their Independence, and in a Community of Customs."

Banks' "confidential memoir" of the 14th of October, an enclosure with his report of the same date to the Reichsministerium, gave detailed information about his attitude towards "the third plan," Slesvig's "independence."¹ He said that this plan, that without doubt was supported by Sweden, Russia and France, was to the effect that Slesvig not only obtained the special administration promised by the King's proclamation of the 27th of March as well as the protection of its language and nationality, but also its own Ministry in Copenhagen, its own Assembly of the Estates, whose approbation was necessary for every change in the legislation, and which had the right to use the surplus when the joint expenses, calculated according to the population, were paid to the Civil List, the State Debt, the Diplomatic Corps, the Army and the Navy. It was correct, as Wynn said, that Banks "did not appear disinclined" to this plan but he would certainly have it greatly altered, so that the administrative connection between Slesvig and Holstein was retained. Banks wrote that Wynn believed that if Frankfurt declared unconditionally that it would give its consent to Palmerston's proposals, then he (Wynn) would be able to persuade the Danish Government to do the same. "As far as I can judge," declared Banks, "Wynn is deceiving himself, and neither does he interpret the propositions in the same way as we do."

In a dispatch of the 5th of October² to the Danish Minister in Paris Knuth had requested France to support the proposal for independence, but wished at the same time to hear France's opinion on the proposal for division – a basis which the Danish Government would not, however, suggest itself. Similar dispatches were sent on the 23rd and 29th of October to the Danish Ministers in St. Petersburg and Stockholm, respectively.³

¹ Draft in Dienstakten Banks'. Id. Bundesarchiv Frankf. a. M. – Account in Schleiden, p. 254 f.

² U. Min. Gehejmeregistraturen. – Thorsøe. p. 445 ff.

³ Ibid. – Löfgren writes p. 79 with Schleiden, p. 252 as his source that at the end of September the Danish Government sent the Four Friendly Powers a confidential memoir about the plan for independence but adds: "The copy of this memoir intended for the Swedish Cabinet has, to all appearances, gone astray." Schleiden's account is, however, based on misunderstandings. The memoir mentioned by him is the one from June which Löfgren mentions p. 64 ff. With his dispatch

During Reventlow's visit to Broadlands mentioned above, Palmerston was informed of the resolution of the Frankfurt Assembly concerning the armistice. On the 21st he wrote to Wynn that as the armistice was now concluded and as Frankfurt would hardly interfere with it, the Danish Government ought to consider Britain's proposal for a final settlement.¹ He wished to hear Denmark's opinion as soon as possible. He repeated his request, but without sharpening his tone, in his dispatch of the 2nd of October.² In this dispatch he stressed the advantageousness of Plan No. 2 in that it freed Slesvig from becoming a part of Germany. The dispatch went on to say that before the Danish male line died out a solution of the question of the succession would probably be found which assured the continued unity of the Danish Monarchy.

Probably on the 1st of October Wynn informed Knuth of Palmerston's dispatch of the 21st of September.³ Knuth stated that the Government was prepared to make the greatest sacrifices "if they *really* and *truly* led to the desirable object of peace." He realized the risk he was running by accepting one of the alternatives "so grating to the Sovereign and the People, but, said he, if I am to be impeached, let it be for giving peace to the Country, I will not gratuitously risk my head for no purpose." He was prepared to accept Slesvig's independence, "but that it must be *literally* and *exactly* on the terms proposed by Your Lordship." If the Central Government demanded modifications to this plan, then Knuth would prefer division according to the line suggested by Palmerston, from Flensburg, "including that town and port," to the North Sea.

In his private letter to Palmerston on the 2nd of October Wynn expressed his satisfaction in having persuaded Knuth "as far as he is concerned, to an acceptance of either of your proposals."⁴

of 5/12 1848 Bunsen sent his Government a copy of it which he had obtained confidentially, and wrote that it was from September: Exposé sur l'état actuel des négociations. However, even the introduction shows that it is from June. Cf. an account in File U. Min. Sager on Slesvig. 1. 1848-ca. 1850, which states that the above exposé was immediately communicated confidentially to St. Petersburg and London and to the Swedish King, and later confidentially to France. The exposé also came to the knowledge of Prussia against Denmark's wishes.

¹ F.O. 22/161: 21/9, No. 97.

² Ibid.: 2/10, No. 110.

³ F.O. 22/164: 2/10, No. 151.

⁴ P.P.

His pleasure was short-lived, for in his dispatch of the 7th he had to tell Palmerston, to his great surprise and dissatisfaction, that Knuth had informed him that the acceptance of the two proposals, as far as division was concerned, "must be subject to the approbation of the French Government," who was a guarantor of the treaty of 1720.¹ Knuth had now shown him the above-mentioned exchange of notes with the French Minister (the notes of 31/8 and 2/9). When Wynn reproached him with "this concealment and want of Confidence," he tried to justify his action by saying that, in an earlier talk during which he mentioned the expected opposition from the King and the People, he had added "a *probably* similar feeling on the part of the Russian and French Government." Wynn told Knuth that he had put him in an unpleasant situation, and if Britain's proposal had to be approved by France Palmerston would perhaps not continue the mediation.

The report which Wynn gave of Knuth's statements in his dispatch of the 2nd of October could be said to justify the request which Palmerston made to Wynn on the 16th.² He was directed to ask Knuth if Palmerston were right in thinking that the Danish Government preferred the second plan, and if this plan could not be effected, then division with a line drawn south of Flensburg. If Palmerston had understood Knuth correctly he would suggest Plan No. 2 to the Central Government. On the 26th of October Wynn stated that he intended to inform Knuth in a note of the text of this dispatch of Palmerston's.³ It would give Knuth, he wrote, the opportunity "of which I know he will be anxious to avail himself, of putting forward the third arrangement for the Independence of Slesvig as a Federative State."

On the 5th of October Knuth requested Reventlow to come to Copenhagen for talks on the situation. "You must be sure to try to procure full particulars from Lord Palmerston as to which peace he thinks he can obtain for us," wrote Knuth. "What does Lord Palmerston think he can obtain by his first alternative, that is to say, which line of demarcation? It is hard and unfair, but we can submit to much for the sake of real peace. The second alternative is vague and confused, and our opponent will only be

¹ F.O. 22/164: 7/10, No. 153.

² F.O. 22/161: 16/10, No. 120.

³ F.O. 22/164: 26/10, No. 166.

able to accept it with the intention of violating it at the first opportunity. The third solution, an honest and fair one, was the complete independence of Slesvig under the Danish Crown, incorporated with no other country, and with its own Assembly and administration. If we could obtain that, then he deserves our warmest thanks, but if he can obtain something for us whereby the future and our honour are assured, then we must still thank him, even if the arrangement is not in agreement with our wishes." Reventlow was to tell Palmerston that he was going to Copenhagen so that, on his return, he would be able, if possible, to settle the matter.

Reventlow did not leave London until the 19th; the British Government put a steamer at his disposal.¹ Before he left he had another talk with Palmerston. On the 9th of November Lord Eddisbury assured Bielke that Palmerston did not intend to come to any decision on the matter before Reventlow's return; but he expected to see him back soon, authorized to make a final settlement.²

On the 23rd of October Wynn had informed Palmerston that Knuth intended to go to London himself "to settle the Basis of the Negotiation with Your Lordship."³ On the 29th Knuth told Wynn in a confidential letter that he would leave on the 15th of November.⁴ When Knuth told the Council of State of his intention, at the meeting on the 1st of November, he was met with general opposition on the ground that his action would commit the Government.⁵ Knuth stood by his decision and said that otherwise he would resign.

At several meetings of the Council of State at the beginning of November discussions were held about the contents of the orders which Reventlow was to take with him on his return to London.⁶ It was agreed that Slesvig's "independence" should be the first suggestion, and failing that, division. On the 8th Knuth had, however, to inform the meeting that the King wished "independence to be put forward as the only alternative; other-

¹ U. Min. Engl. II Dispatches: 20/10, No. 87 (from Bielke). – Wynn to Palmerston 29/10. P.P. – Reventlow to Palmerston 17/10. P.P.

² U. Min. Engl. II. Dispatches: 10/11, No. 91.

³ F.O. 22/164: 23/10, No. 163.

⁴ Ibid.: 30/10, No. 170.

⁵ Statsrådets Forhandl. I, p. 528 ff.

⁶ Ibid.: p. 531 ff.

wise we must go to war; he would not agree to division under any circumstances." Reventlow was summoned to the meeting the next day and gave a report of his negotiations with Palmerston, especially his talk on the 12th of October when he showed Palmerston Knuth's letter of the 5th. Reventlow advocated that the orders did not need to contain other proposals than the one of "independence". After Reventlow had left the meeting, Knuth said that it was "impossible for him to remain in the Government an hour longer," when the King was determined not to agree to division as a second alternative. Reventlow's views, Knuth said, were influenced by the opinions he was constantly encountering in his circle [in Copenhagen].

Although on the 10th the Prime Minister was successful in persuading the King to adopt a slightly more moderate attitude the result was that the Cabinet resigned the next day.¹ On the 10th Wynn could communicate the draft of Reventlow's orders to Palmerston.² It recommended, he wrote, the third plan, the independence of Slesvig instead of an administrative connection with Holstein; this latter type of connection had been prevented by the German Parliament itself by its motion to the constitution "which only allows a *personal* Connexion between a German Sovereign and a Territory not belonging to the Confederation." If Reventlow could not get the third plan accepted, he was authorized to consider division. Wynn remarked that this addition to the instructions had been rejected by the King, who would prefer to abdicate rather than cede any part of Slesvig. Knuth, however, found that as a man of honour he must stand by his statement to you [to go to London on the 15th to settle the peace basis with Palmerston?], Wynn continued, and I have in vain assured him that you would be prepared to release him from this promise,³ and have emphasized the unfavourable consequences his resignation will have. Wynn then added some words in praise of Knuth, but believed that he "will not be sorry to retire" as he no longer had the assistance of Reedtz, and had not been able to replace him – Reedtz had left the Foreign Service at the end of October on account of a difference of opinions.

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. I, p. 553 f. – Wynn to Palmerston 11/11. P.P.

² F.O. 22/164: 10/11, No. 176.

³ In his dispatch of 21/11, No. 135, Palmerston agreed with Wynn's statement. F.O. 22/161.

In a private letter to Palmerston the next day Wynn stated that Knuth was conferring "with his *retiring* Collegues, but it is not likely any change should take place in their determination."¹ He mentioned the change in the King's attitude to the orders brought about by Moltke, and thought that as the alternative dealing with division would probably not be discussed, "Knuth and his collegues might well have remained if they had been so disposed." He hoped that Palmerston would approve of "the precaution I took that they should not ascribe their retirement to any Engagement with England."

The new Cabinet which took up its duties on the 16th of November was a reorganisation of the old one on Conservative lines. A. W. Moltke remained Prime Minister and took over the post of Foreign Minister as well from Knuth. Lehmann, Monrad, and Tscherning retired as well as Knuth. C. F. Hansen, an able officer and a strong Conservative, became Minister for War in place of Tscherning. However, a few of the National Liberal leaders were included in the Government. When Wynn told Palmerston the same day that the Cabinet crisis was over he wrote that "the clause respecting the separation will be omitted in Count Reventlow's Instructions as no administration could have allowed it to remain."² He emphasised that Nesselrode's dispatch of the 8th of November to the Russian chargé d'affaires, Budberg, in Frankfurt, strongly supported the abandonment of the idea of division; the dispatch will be referred to later. "This is," Wynn wrote, – hardly correctly – "the first time that Russia has held out so positive an intention of taking a separate line with regard to Slesvig." If she acted along these lines it would have a decisive effect on the question. Wynn wrote to Westmorland on the 24th that the reorganisation of the Government was entirely due to the King, who found that Knuth "and his Casino collegues had engaged him farther than he intended as to the possibility of his ever consenting to any division of Slesvig."³

At the meeting of the Council of State on the 9th of November Reventlow had, as mentioned above, given a report of his talk on the 12th of October with Palmerston, and had asserted that the

¹ P.P.

² F.O. 22/164: 16/11, No. 179.

³ Westmorland. II, p. 447.

instructions only needed to contain the proposal of independence. "Lord Palmerston is undoubtedly in favour of independence," stated Reventlow, "he is at present completely in favour of the independence of Slesvig; this is what he wants to promote." In his dispatch of the 13th of October on the conversation Reventlow also wrote: "I have not in any of my previous conversations with Palmerston found him to be more in favour of our good cause; he has never before to the same extent agreed to my views stated in the name of my Government, as this time."

Had Palmerston stabled his "old hobby-horse," the division, which he still produced during the conversations with Reventlow on the 20th and 21st of September?

Having received Hodges's dispatch of the 12th of September (see p. 207) in which it said that a large part of the population of the Duchies would with pleasure see the old state before the war re-established, Palmerston on the 17th of September took the following note: Hodges is to be requested to find out "and report to me as far as he can get information on the subject without appearing to seek it for any official Purpose what is supposed generally to be the Feeling of the People in Holstein and in Slesvig" as regards the alternatives proposed in the note of the 23rd of June.¹ "I should like to know which of the two, the People of Slesvig are thought to be likely to prefer." – A dispatch which was identical apart from the necessary formal alterations was sent to Hodges on the 21st.²

Hodges performed the task set to him and answered in a detailed dispatch of the 10th of October.³ Before I mention this, I shall adduce a dispatch from Hodges of the 5th of October, written after he had returned from a short trip in the Duchies.⁴ The impressions he had received on the journey were as follows: "All classes there are anxiously desirous of Peace, and a strong Danish feeling has manifested itself throughout both Duchies, especially amongst the lower orders and the native Troops. These latter have lately declared their reluctance to oppose the Danes should they again march a force into Slesvig."

¹ F.O. 33/114: 12/9, No. 97.

² F.O. 33/112: 21/9, No. 33.

³ F.O. 33/114: 10/10, No. 108.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 5/10, No. 106.

In the dispatch of the 10th of October, received in London on the 13th, Hodges communicated the result of the information he had obtained, "collected from persons of different ranks and political opinions in the Duchies." About the scheme for a division he said that although most German politicians preferred it, "yet the people of the Duchies think otherwise," the people of Slesvig would consider "every division of their Country as the greatest disaster that could befall them." As a proof that in Slesvig they did not wish an incorporation into Germany, Hodges mentioned the parodic elections there for the Assembly in Frankfurt (cf. p. 189). In his opinion they showed that the population "generally are willing to return to the Status quo ante under proper guarantees."

So he thinks that the second alternative will be preferred by the population. Although this, too, offers great difficulties, "Your Lordship may not deem them insurmountable." The Holsteiners, he believed, would at last be satisfied, if only Slesvig was "essentially united to Holstein, and to a certain degree independent of Denmark."

Hodges's dispatch was apt to justify Palmerston's abandonment of the project of division. However, it arrived in London the day after Palmerston in his conversation on the 12th with Reventlow had made the statement quoted above. Therefore it must most likely be assumed that it was partly the attitude of the Danish Government which Reventlow had voiced in the conversations on the 20th and 21st of September, partly – and perhaps especially – Russia's (and in part France's) standpoint which led Palmerston into "the third plan," independence.

On the 2nd of October Palmerston sent Cowley a copy of his dispatch of the same day to Wynn about the desirable of the Danish Government deliberating the proposals of the 23rd of June.¹ The remarkable feature of the dispatch to Cowley was that Palmerston at the same time requested Cowley unofficially to investigate the question whether the Central Government might be supposed to agree to "the third Plan which the Danish Government wishes to propose though it has not yet specifically done so, and by which Slesvig would have a separate Constitution and Administration distinct from Denmark on the one hand and

¹ F.O. 30/10: 2/108, No. 95.

from Holstein on the other. Such an arrangement would not indeed be what Germany has been contending to obtain, but neither would it be that which Germany has taken up Arms to resist: for while on the one hand Slesvig would not be united with Holstein, on the other hand it would not be incorporated with Denmark. If such a scheme would be agreed to by the Central Power, it would probably settle for the present the pending dispute." Cowley was ordered to show great caution at his soundings and not to present the scheme as being cherished by Great Britain.

In another, significant dispatch to Cowley, of the 23rd of October, Palmerston abandoned these reservations.¹ There he stated that he had recently had a talk with Reventlow about the problem, and the latter had gone to Copenhagen in order to consult his Government. After careful consideration, wrote Palmerston, it must be recognized "that there are great difficulties in the way of either of the alternatives" proposed by Britain. Then reasons against a division were adduced, and about the other alternative Denmark might say "and with some shew of reason, that to unite Slesvig with Holstein by a common Constitution and legislature, would give German influence so great a preponderance in the United Duchies, that the Danish Element would have no chance of fair representation, and that the End would be the gradual extension of the German Element over the whole, and the progressive extinction of the Danish Element."

Frankfurt might consider, continued the dispatch, whether it would not accept the third plan, "which has been suggested by the Danish Government, and by which all notion of uniting Slesvig with Denmark would be given up, and Slesvig would receive a separate constitution, administration and legislature, but without being united with Holstein." The plan would secure Slesvig against incorporation in Denmark and would "leave the German and the Danish Elements in Slesvig in their natural and existing relations with respect to each other." Presumably Russia and Denmark's other allies would support such a plan, and if Frankfurt accepted it, the affair could no doubt quickly be settled.

Palmerston then expressly ordered Cowley to sound the Central Government as to the third plan. Furthermore, he was to

¹ F.O. 30/108: 23/10, No. 128.

point out that Germany's true interests "would lead her rather to maintain the Integrity of the Danish Monarchy, and to ally herself with it, than to seek to weaken Denmark, and to place Germany and Denmark in hostile relations towards each other." The Central Government ought to keep these considerations in mind "while deliberating upon the arrangements to be made in regard to the Duchy of Slesvig."

A few days before this dispatch was sent, Palmerston in a conference with Bunsen had asked the latter, "ob nicht *eine besondere Verfassung für beide* [Herzogthümer], ohne alle Vereinigung Schlesiens, weder mit Dänemark noch mit Deutschland nicht das billige wäre?"¹ But Bunsen raised strong objections to this. In a later dispatch he characterized the proposal as the very most unfavourable one for Germany. Bunsen turned down Palmerston's emphasizing of the view that Denmark ought not to be weakened, and that amity between Denmark and Germany ought to persist, with the assertion that the blame for the conflict lay with Denmark.

On the 30th of October Cowley stated the result of his soundings.² First of all, he referred to the fact that in a previous dispatch³ he had reported that the Central Government by Banks had been informed of Denmark's unwillingness to accept any of the proposals in the note of the 23rd of June. Cowley therefore had assumed that at the submission of the third plan he "should have found less opposition than is apparently likely to be made." But, he wrote, Schmerling, who besides being Minister of the Interior also was in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, left the foreign affairs to the Under-Secretaries of State Max Gagern and Biegeleben. These did not always agree, not in this question either. So he had had a talk with the President of the National Assembly, H. v. Gagern, but the talk was far from being satisfactory. Gagern maintained that Germany could not content itself with less than division. Cowley called his attention to the injustice of having permitted Deputies from Slesvig to sit in the National Assembly, which actually meant annexion of Slesvig.

¹ Bunsen's dispatch of 21/10, No. 84. - Cf. his dispatch of 22/11, No. 104.

² F.O. 30/112: 30/10, No. 230.

³ *Ibid.*: 23/10, No. 212.

Cowley still thought that the Central Government "will so far give way that it will not refuse to consider any other basis emanating from the *same quarter* [Great Britain], but that it would not agree to admit any other Power into the negotiation." Furthermore, he thought that Frankfurt would demand a simultaneous arrangement of the question of the succession.

About Hodges's above-mentioned dispatch on the atmosphere in the Duchies, of which he had received a copy, Cowley remarked that he had talked about it with people familiar with conditions in Slesvig; on the whole they agreed with Hodges. He had, he wrote, himself been much in favour of a division, but now had begun to see things from a somewhat different point of view. At the end of his dispatch Cowley made various reflections, if anything in favour of the Germans: The Danish King ought to consider the causes of the present conflict. Formerly Denmark was almost considered part of Germany, and the most important offices were held by Germans. "During the last two reigns," he thought, "the contrary principle has been acted upon, and the spirit of German nationality has been aroused."

Cowley's emphasizing in the conversation with Gagern of the injustice of permitting "Deputies" of Slesvig to have a seat in the Diet at Frankfurt, was strongly supported by Palmerston. "You were quite right," he wrote to Cowley,¹ "in contending that the admission of Slesvig Deputies to the Frankfurt Parliament is perfectly unjustifiable and is an act of aggression." The best thing that could be said about this was that it was a complete nullity and without any importance for the political position of Slesvig—just as it would no more be of consequence for the position of Britain, Sweden, and Russia whether Frankfurt admitted Deputies from these countries!

The fact that Palmerston's abandonment of the project of division and his transition to "the third plan" had been communicated to Russia, appears from Nesselrode's dispatch of the 8th of November to Budberg at Frankfurt.² In the dispatch Russia's obligations to Denmark according to the Treaties of 1767 and 1773 and the Emperor's wish that the Central Power "trouve le

¹ F.O. 30/108: 7/11, No. 147.

² F.O. 65/357: copy of the dispatch.

moyen de concilier ses vues concernant les Duchés avec le maintien du Sleswic sous la domination Danoise" were emphasized. Then it was said that Cowley would propose "de dissoudre le lien administratif entre les deux Duchés, – d'ériger le Sleswic en État séparé, – mais de conserver intacte l'union politique qui l'attache à la Couronne de Danemark, semblable à celle qui existe entre la Norvège et la Suède." Frederick VII. would no doubt be glad of such a solution, and Budberg was ordered to support "Cowley's idea."

With some reason Cowley was astonished when Budberg on the 20th of November showed him Nesselrode's dispatch.¹ He explained to Budberg that he had not been instructed to make any formal proposal to the Central Government, but only to sound its opinion, and that he had done so with the result mentioned above.

From St. Petersburg Bloomfield on the 31st of October had reported Nesselrode's satisfaction with Palmerston's approval of the Danish proposal about the "independence" of Slesvig.² It was not strange that Nesselrode felt disappointed when on the 9th of November Bloomfield informed him of Palmerston's previous instructions to Wynn in which nothing was mentioned to that effect.³ Bloomfield therefore told him about Palmerston's order to Cowley. – One gets an impression that both powers wanted to push the other forward as the proposer proper.⁴ – For that matter, it appears from Bloomfield's dispatches that Nesselrode "still clings to the hope of a total failure of the attempt to establish German Unity."⁵

In Palmerston's dispatch to Cowley of the 2nd of October Slesvig's independence was said to be the plan which the Danish Government wanted to propose, "though it has not yet specifically done so." It became the task of the November Government at the peace negotiations to be conducted in London, to specify how far they thought it possible to go towards "independence" for the old Danish Duchy. It was, however, a foregone conclusion that the

¹ F.O. 30/114: 20/11, No. 269.

² F.O. 65/350: 31/10, No. 40.

³ F.O. 65/352: 10/11, No. 55.

⁴ See also Bloomfield's dispatch of 4/12, No. 80. Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.: 10/11, No. 56.

Danish Government would not accept an interpretation like the one given in Nesselrode's dispatch. In his dispatch of the 30th of October Cowley had emphasized the importance of the negotiations being initiated immediately in London. "Once engaged in them both parties would be loath to separate without a settlement," he thought optimistically. However, months were to pass before the negotiations started, and their course was not to correspond to Cowley's optimistic prophecy.

Supplementary Remark.

When Reventlow in the morning of Monday the 26th sent to Brunnow the dispatches Nos. 50–52 (with appendices) with counterpropositions received from Knuth, Brunnow in the same evening returned them to Reventlow.¹ He strongly advised Reventlow not to mix new proposals in the negotiations, but the Danish Government ought to take their time over careful consideration of Palmerston's proposals (of the 23rd); as these seemed to him to be in agreement with the ideas set forth in the memorandum for dispatch No. 50, he had no doubt that they would approve of one or the other of Palmerston's proposals.

¹ Ges. ark., London. Correspondence with the Foreign Office, etc., 1848. – Cf. Reventlow's dispatch of 27/6, No. 52.

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